RE: Free Will, Free Won't?
September 3, 2013 at 6:33 pm
(This post was last modified: September 3, 2013 at 6:34 pm by Whateverist.)
I've never been sure what to make of the Libet results. If neuroscience measures activity which precedes our conscious realization of our choice, is it measuring a process on its way to becoming our choice or is it measuring a process which leaves us out? How do we decide which it is? Surely no one is so naive as to think discursive thoughts unattached to any desires, habits or drives are the source of volition. Must actions which the will undertakes freely have to be ones in which we are able to choose consciously between alternatives as if on a whim? If so, then free will is an odd idea. But if free will means we are unrestrained in acting to attain that which in fact we want, then we sure seem to have that. In fact we may even at times be capable of acting unconsciously to attain what we want, as when our hand flies off the hot stove to attain our desire not to burn.
Of course we are not free to choose what we want because what we want is one of the ways to characterize who we are. So we can no more choose what we want than we can choose to be a different person or species. Furthermore, why would we want to do that? If free will requires the capacity to be who we want to be or feel we should be, then I don't think we have that kind of freedom.
Of course we are not free to choose what we want because what we want is one of the ways to characterize who we are. So we can no more choose what we want than we can choose to be a different person or species. Furthermore, why would we want to do that? If free will requires the capacity to be who we want to be or feel we should be, then I don't think we have that kind of freedom.
