(September 30, 2013 at 5:13 pm)Rational AKD Wrote:(September 30, 2013 at 2:07 pm)Vincenzo "Vinny" G. Wrote: Are you saying there cannot be any unknown unknowns with your first response?no, i'm saying that it's possible to know what you don't know, that doesn't mean you necessarily know what you don't know.
Quote: Wouldn't "I don't know how an ipod works" be something you didn't even know that you didn't know?yes, but i'm not saying it's necessary to know what you don't know. i'm saying it's possible. that's all I have to argue to refute the argument.
(September 30, 2013 at 2:41 pm)MindForgedManacle Wrote: As noted on an earlier page, Premise 2 in my original post is unclear. I wasn't referring to awareness of ignorance, I was referring to being unaware that you were unaware of something, or not knowing that something was unknown to you.the problem is you are not necessarily unaware that you are unaware. you can consciously be unaware of many things. so when you say "You cannot be aware of that which you are [currently] unaware of" this is false.
Quote: The problem is that we've already gone over this objection in the thread. Even if your definition of omniscience is to 'know everything that can be known' (as ChadWooters earlier tried to run), that still falls short of the argument's intention. Since it's seemingly incoherent to say you know that there is nothing of which you don't know that you don't know (an 'unknown unknown'), you run into an issue. Since unknown unknowns are in potential knowable in some circumstance (this bit is inductive, by the way), the supposedly omniscient being could never rule out whether or not it had attained all possible knowledge. So the point of the argument would, I think, still stand with your definition or not.the problem you don't see is how it's defined. omniscience would include all knowledge possible to know, which in turn would exclude all knowledge logically impossible to know. so if in fact it were impossible to "know that you don't know" it wouldn't matter, because the fact that that knowledge is logically impossible would automatically exclude it from omniscience. it's no more a refutation than saying God's omnipotence is impossible because he can't create a square circle.
I agree with your view that the argument appears to be flawed. I just don't see it as flawed in the area that you do.
I notice you say "It's possible to know what you don't know.", but I don't see this as refuting the argument, because the argument postulates that "It is possible to never know what you don't know." And I imagine that would be true in ordinary circumstances, wouldn't you think so?
