RE: Terrible Atheist Argument #1
November 20, 2013 at 7:44 pm
(This post was last modified: November 20, 2013 at 7:52 pm by MindForgedManacle.)
I'm aware of modal axiom S5, it's the logic of possibility and necessity. Though I'll admit I'm not really familiar with this system and its axioms in regards to usage.
The main problem ontological arguments in this logical system (aside from the one I already mentioned, i.e counter modal arguments) is that they get hopelessly tied into knots by confusing epistemic possibility with metaphysical possibility, and this makes holding to this argument as not being useless indefensible. Basically, "epistemic possibility" can be boiled down to "possible as far as I know", while "metaphysical possibility" is basically "actually possible".
The problem is that Plantinga's modal ontological argument is that all we have to go on is the epistemic possibilty that God could possibly exist. For all we know, God's attributes could be incoherent, either alone or if possessed in tandem, thus voiding the argument. Now, your response might be something like "You can reject anything like that." THAT'S THE POINT. I can run just as strong a modal argument for the truth of atheism:
Have I established the metaphysical truth of metaphysical naturalism? Do you accept it?
The ONLY way to refute this argument is to appeal to an inherent contradiction in the concept of metaphysical naturalism (or deny the first premise, but it seems self-evidently true). And that's exactly what one does with Plantinga's argument. This argument makes a stalemate with Plantinga's, demonstrating that the ontological argument is entirely useless. It makes no sense at all to treat an argument style that can only end in a stalemate with it's opposition as good.
The main problem ontological arguments in this logical system (aside from the one I already mentioned, i.e counter modal arguments) is that they get hopelessly tied into knots by confusing epistemic possibility with metaphysical possibility, and this makes holding to this argument as not being useless indefensible. Basically, "epistemic possibility" can be boiled down to "possible as far as I know", while "metaphysical possibility" is basically "actually possible".
The problem is that Plantinga's modal ontological argument is that all we have to go on is the epistemic possibilty that God could possibly exist. For all we know, God's attributes could be incoherent, either alone or if possessed in tandem, thus voiding the argument. Now, your response might be something like "You can reject anything like that." THAT'S THE POINT. I can run just as strong a modal argument for the truth of atheism:
Modal Ontological Argument for Atheism Wrote:P1) If metaphysical naturalism is possibly true, it is true and God does not exist.
P2) Metaphysical naturalism is possibly true.
C) Therefore, metaphysical naturalism is true and God does not exist.
Have I established the metaphysical truth of metaphysical naturalism? Do you accept it?
The ONLY way to refute this argument is to appeal to an inherent contradiction in the concept of metaphysical naturalism (or deny the first premise, but it seems self-evidently true). And that's exactly what one does with Plantinga's argument. This argument makes a stalemate with Plantinga's, demonstrating that the ontological argument is entirely useless. It makes no sense at all to treat an argument style that can only end in a stalemate with it's opposition as good.
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