I agree with the distinction between epistemic/metaphysical possibility.
But is it true that we have no metaphysical possibility to rest on? I think your claim is "For all you know, the notion of a MGB may be incoherent."
But the opposite is also true. We can't give your claim any more weight than it's opposite. Rather I think both must be given equal weight at best, until and unless someone can show there is something incoherent about the concept of God.
What about your MOA for atheism?
I don't think we can go from P2 to C.
The reason for this is that while maximal greatness (or excellence) entails non-contingency, it must be necessary or impossible.
But the same isn't true of metaphysical naturalism. The claim "metaphysical naturalism is true" can be contingent on other truths.
So even if P2 is true, it entails the possibility that metaphysical naturalism is false, because it could be contingent.
Those are my two cents.
PS- I hate how abstract the MOA is.
But is it true that we have no metaphysical possibility to rest on? I think your claim is "For all you know, the notion of a MGB may be incoherent."
But the opposite is also true. We can't give your claim any more weight than it's opposite. Rather I think both must be given equal weight at best, until and unless someone can show there is something incoherent about the concept of God.
What about your MOA for atheism?
I don't think we can go from P2 to C.
The reason for this is that while maximal greatness (or excellence) entails non-contingency, it must be necessary or impossible.
But the same isn't true of metaphysical naturalism. The claim "metaphysical naturalism is true" can be contingent on other truths.
So even if P2 is true, it entails the possibility that metaphysical naturalism is false, because it could be contingent.
Those are my two cents.
PS- I hate how abstract the MOA is.
