Terrible Atheist Argument #1

[MindForgedManacle]

I agree with the distinction between epistemic/metaphysical possibility.

But is it true that we have no metaphysical possibility to rest on? I think your claim is "For all you know, the notion of a MGB may be incoherent."

That wasn't my claim exactly. In a vacuum, both the positive AND the negative assertion alone are only an epistemic possibility. Without a deductive argument or some means to abduce either either way, the initial premise is unacceptable. And this was Alvin Plantinga's expressed reason why the argument "doesn'tt establish it's conclusion". Plantinga thinks it does however make belief in theism rational, since if you accept the first premise, the rest follows.

However, I do have arguments and reasons why I dismiss the first premise (I think there are problems with omnipotence and omniscience), so to me at least it's a done deal.

But the opposite is also true. We can't give your claim any more weight than it's opposite. Rather I think both must be given equal weight at best, until and unless someone can show there is something incoherent about the concept of God.

I agree. I didn't make that as clear earlier as it was in my head. xD

What about your MOA for atheism?

I don't think we can go from P2 to C.

The reason for this is that while maximal greatness (or excellence) entails non-contingency, it must be necessary or impossible.

You're misunderstanding the argument I think. In modal logic, to say something is 'possibly true' means that, provided it isn'nt incoherent, is true in at least one possible world. If metaphysical naturalism is true in any possible world, God cannot exist in that possible world. If cannot cannot exist in any single possible world, then he cannot exist in any of them.

Also, if something is metaphysically true, I think that means it has to be true. For example, it would make no sense to say that mathematical Platonism is true in one possible world, but not in all others.

But the same isn't true of metaphysical naturalism. The claim "metaphysical naturalism is true" can be contingent on other truths.

So even if P2 is true, it entails the possibility that metaphysical naturalism is false, because it could be contingent.

Those are my two cents.

PS- I hate how abstract the MOA is.

"God exists in all possible worlds" rests on other truths the same way naturalism might, namely that God's nature is coherent.

Edit:

Actually, I've rethought that last bit of my post. My modal argument for atheism (that is merely meant to demonstrate why the modal ontological argument for God's existence is useless) can be reformulated as thus:

P1) If metaphysical naturalism is possibly truem then God does not exist.

P2) Metaphysical naturalism is possibly true.

C) Therefore, God does not exist.

I realized that I didn't need for naturalism to be true in the actual world for the conclusion to follow, just that metaphysical naturalism is possible. And if it is possible (i.e true in some possible world), then God - who must exist in all possible worlds if he does exist - cannot exist.

And that's why MOAs are useless.