It is easy to make the mistake of placing mental properties and physical processes in the same category of being. You will find it extremely difficult, if not impossible, referring to the natural world only quantitatively. When you use qualitative terms to describe physical reality you must do so with a certain understanding: that these terms serve as convenient linguistic conventions.
Most advocates of atheistic approaches to both morality and philosophy of mind make the same category error: they project mental properties onto physical processes or, alternatively, describe physical processes in terms of mental properties. Both ontological and methodological naturalism exclude qualitative assessments of physical reality. These assessments include the mental properties of meaning, qualitative value, and teleology.
Without access to qualitative terms naturalism has nothing to say about morality or mind. Both subjects concern qualitative concepts. Discussing moral questions requires making comparative value judgments. Discussions about mental properties refer to the significance and purpose of things.
You can see the truth of the above by a couple simple examples:
Consider the difference between these two descriptions: 1) “Old growth trees are important to forest eco-systems” vs. 2) “Old growth trees are essential for the survival of forest eco-systems”. Statement 1 makes the category error by attributing a mental property, desire, to forest eco-systems, similar to saying that economic security is important to me.
Now consider the difference between another two statements: 1) “The thermostat wants to reach 72 degrees” vs.2) “The bi-metal strip in a thermostat expands or contracts in response to ambient air-temperature.” Statement 1 attributes intentionality, to the thermostat.
Or yet another: 1) “One function of the liver is to purify the blood” vs. “The liver filters blood.” Physical objects do not have purposes; they just are and do what they do.
And finally: 1) “The smoke indicates a fire” vs. 2) “Smoke rises out of fire.” In statement 1, use of the term ‘indicates’ designates a sign-significance relationship. But in physical terms, one physical thing cannot be ‘about’ another.
So, since the subject of science is limited to the natural world, the scientific method, by virtue of its self-imposed limitation, cannot inquire into the cause or experiential character of mental properties. Nor can scientific findings, like evolutionary processes, be used to support any moral philosophy.
Most advocates of atheistic approaches to both morality and philosophy of mind make the same category error: they project mental properties onto physical processes or, alternatively, describe physical processes in terms of mental properties. Both ontological and methodological naturalism exclude qualitative assessments of physical reality. These assessments include the mental properties of meaning, qualitative value, and teleology.
Without access to qualitative terms naturalism has nothing to say about morality or mind. Both subjects concern qualitative concepts. Discussing moral questions requires making comparative value judgments. Discussions about mental properties refer to the significance and purpose of things.
You can see the truth of the above by a couple simple examples:
Consider the difference between these two descriptions: 1) “Old growth trees are important to forest eco-systems” vs. 2) “Old growth trees are essential for the survival of forest eco-systems”. Statement 1 makes the category error by attributing a mental property, desire, to forest eco-systems, similar to saying that economic security is important to me.
Now consider the difference between another two statements: 1) “The thermostat wants to reach 72 degrees” vs.2) “The bi-metal strip in a thermostat expands or contracts in response to ambient air-temperature.” Statement 1 attributes intentionality, to the thermostat.
Or yet another: 1) “One function of the liver is to purify the blood” vs. “The liver filters blood.” Physical objects do not have purposes; they just are and do what they do.
And finally: 1) “The smoke indicates a fire” vs. 2) “Smoke rises out of fire.” In statement 1, use of the term ‘indicates’ designates a sign-significance relationship. But in physical terms, one physical thing cannot be ‘about’ another.
So, since the subject of science is limited to the natural world, the scientific method, by virtue of its self-imposed limitation, cannot inquire into the cause or experiential character of mental properties. Nor can scientific findings, like evolutionary processes, be used to support any moral philosophy.
