The Category Error of Scientism

[MindForgedManacle]

It is easy to make the mistake of placing mental properties and physical processes in the same category of being. You will find it extremely difficult, if not impossible, referring to the natural world only quantitatively. When you use qualitative terms to describe physical reality you must do so with a certain understanding: that these terms serve as convenient linguistic conventions.

And you must also realize that convenient linguistic conventions are often misleading and/or error ridden when explored. For example, when I hear presuppositional apologists talk about "absolute truth" or "absolute certainty" I realize that such a qualifier is worthless.

Most advocates of atheistic approaches to both morality and philosophy of mind make the same category error: they project mental properties onto physical processes or, alternatively, describe physical processes in terms of mental properties. Both ontological and methodological naturalism exclude qualitative assessments of physical reality. These assessments include the mental properties of meaning, qualitative value, and teleology.

Very few metaphysical naturalists philosophers I know of would say that their worldview prohibits qualitative assessments. The Alex Rosenburg's of the philosophical world
are rare among naturalists.

And really, very few moral philosophers or philosophers of mind are 1) theists or 2) make use of theism in their philosophical literature on ethics and mind, so you're effectively talking about the entirety of those fields.

Without access to qualitative terms naturalism has nothing to say about morality or mind. Both subjects concern qualitative concepts. Discussing moral questions requires making comparative value judgments. Discussions about mental properties refer to the significance and purpose of things.

Same problems as above.

Consider the difference between these two descriptions: 1) “Old growth trees are important to forest eco-systems” vs. 2) “Old growth trees are essential for the survival of forest eco-systems”. Statement 1 makes the category error by attributing a mental property, desire, to forest eco-systems, similar to saying that economic security is important to me.

And 1) shows you misunderstanding your own example, first off. "Importance" in this context can clearly be seen to mean "in the best interests of enabling, promoting and/or preserving its continued existence". Bam, non-teleological, not ascribing a mental property improperly. In fact, biologists have even tried preventing this in recent decades by more clearly stating such things in ways not amenable to such readings.

Now consider the difference between another two statements: 1) “The thermostat wants to reach 72 degrees” vs.2) “The bi-metal strip in a thermostat expands or contracts in response to ambient air-temperature.” Statement 1 attributes intentionality, to the thermostat.


Or yet another: 1) “One function of the liver is to purify the blood” vs. “The liver filters blood.” Physical objects do not have purposes; they just are and do what they do.

And finally: 1) “The smoke indicates a fire” vs. 2) “Smoke rises out of fire.” In statement 1, use of the term ‘indicates’ designates a sign-significance relationship. But in physical terms, one physical thing cannot be ‘about’ another.

These 3 fail for the exact same reason. And you seem to entirely discount epiphenomenological explanations and descriptions.

So, since the subject of science is limited to the natural world, the scientific method, by virtue of its self-imposed limitation, cannot inquire into the cause or experiential character of mental properties. Nor can scientific findings, like evolutionary processes, be used to support any moral philosophy.

Not particularly interested into getting into this unless you really want to.