@ Rae,
I use the term ‘know’ as a synonym for “awareness of” which is a commonly accepted usage. I use the term “idea” as a synonym for “the meaning or significance of a thing”.
The Hume quote you posted in fact discusses two distinct kinds of knowledge: sensations and conceptions. I think you would agree that Hume considers the difference between the sight of a green apple and the memory of it a difference of degree, not of kind. Both are ideas. He claims that the second idea is more vague and less rich of an experience than that of the first idea. This is true, but has no relevance to this discussion. In that quote, Hume did not address the distinction between the being aware of a thing and the content of that awareness.
My guess as to why you would post this particular quote is that you object to my acceptance to the Thomist proposition, “ ideas are the means by which we know.” In doing do, you missed the mark. I use the term ‘know’ as a synonym for ‘awareness of’ which is a commonly accepted usage. I use the term ‘idea’ as a synonym for “the meaning or significance of a thing”. The following statement serves as an example of how these terms work in everyday language: Smith knows that a gnomon is a sundial’s shadow-casting part.
In my example, Smith is the knowing subject. Knowing is what Smith does. ‘Meaning’ is that which Smith knows. ‘Gnomon’ is sign which the knowing subject understands. So in the example you can see three distinct concepts: an interpreter, a sign, and the sign’s significance. You must preserve these distinctions in order to develop a valid philosophy of mind.
@Reality Salesman,
Writing about values, concepts, and identity you stated, “These are all subjective things…” And you are correct. The question raised by the OP is the relationship between subjective qualitative experiences and objectively quantifiable observations. The position of the OP which I defend is this: scientism fails to maintain the distinction between the qualitative and the quantifiable.
I use the term ‘know’ as a synonym for “awareness of” which is a commonly accepted usage. I use the term “idea” as a synonym for “the meaning or significance of a thing”.
The Hume quote you posted in fact discusses two distinct kinds of knowledge: sensations and conceptions. I think you would agree that Hume considers the difference between the sight of a green apple and the memory of it a difference of degree, not of kind. Both are ideas. He claims that the second idea is more vague and less rich of an experience than that of the first idea. This is true, but has no relevance to this discussion. In that quote, Hume did not address the distinction between the being aware of a thing and the content of that awareness.
My guess as to why you would post this particular quote is that you object to my acceptance to the Thomist proposition, “ ideas are the means by which we know.” In doing do, you missed the mark. I use the term ‘know’ as a synonym for ‘awareness of’ which is a commonly accepted usage. I use the term ‘idea’ as a synonym for “the meaning or significance of a thing”. The following statement serves as an example of how these terms work in everyday language: Smith knows that a gnomon is a sundial’s shadow-casting part.
In my example, Smith is the knowing subject. Knowing is what Smith does. ‘Meaning’ is that which Smith knows. ‘Gnomon’ is sign which the knowing subject understands. So in the example you can see three distinct concepts: an interpreter, a sign, and the sign’s significance. You must preserve these distinctions in order to develop a valid philosophy of mind.
@Reality Salesman,
Writing about values, concepts, and identity you stated, “These are all subjective things…” And you are correct. The question raised by the OP is the relationship between subjective qualitative experiences and objectively quantifiable observations. The position of the OP which I defend is this: scientism fails to maintain the distinction between the qualitative and the quantifiable.
