My case for an Idealistic Monism

[Angrboda]

When I experience a knock on the head, I start inferring ideas about hammers or rocks-- that when a hammer hits my head, it will hurt, or that a rock when held up and let go will always fall to the ground. Whatever the actual reality of hammers and rocks (or of myself) is, I can still make those inferences based on direct experience.

Whenever a brick falls on my foot, I feel the "whatness" of pain, but not the "whatness" of the physical brick. On monistic idealism, this becomes a mystery, that we have to infer the whatness of the brick, and don't experience it directly. On physicalism, it makes sense because the brick isn't an idea, but a cause, affecting nerves that "instruct" the brain / mind to feel pain. On physicalism there is no need to explain away why a brick falling on the foot doesn't impart its whatness to our perception directly.