It seems that it's a non sequitur because it's not clear that God's inability to do evil is because he lacks free will. There may be other constraints besides a lack of free will that render him unable to commit evil acts. (It might even be definitional; if good is what God wills, even if he has free will, he cannot will something that is not good.) Just as our inability to fly isn't an impingement on our freedom, God may lack the capacity to choose evil acts, yet still have a range of options to choose from. Perhaps all acts that would be evil are logically impossible to God, and he can't do them because they are impossible rather than because he lacks free will.
I see where you're going with this, but I don't think you're there yet, as there's a disconnect between 1 and 2.
I see where you're going with this, but I don't think you're there yet, as there's a disconnect between 1 and 2.