RE: 70th Anniversary of D-Day
June 7, 2014 at 2:23 am
(This post was last modified: June 7, 2014 at 2:38 am by Anomalocaris.)
If you think superior German skill and quality was overwhelmed by brute Russian numbers encapsulate the whole war in the east, I think you fall for inaccurate stereotyping.
The Germans definitely started the war with a huge lead in skill at all levels. But Germans also had numerical superiority in the total sizes of forces committed to battle all the way through 1941. When Germans won their initial spectacular victories, the Germans usually had numerical superiority over the Russians in actual size of forces that fought. When Germans attacked Moscow, the Germans still had numerical superiority, although they were wore out by then, and their actual combat powers much diminished.
During much of 1942 the Germans also continue to have numerical superiority at the point of battle. It was only when they blundered into Stalingrad that the table turned and Russians enjoyed great superiority in the size if force engaged.
By 1943, Germany no longer had an advantage in skill on strategic level, maneuvering armies groups. They also lost the ability to focus numerically superior forces at the point if battle. By 1944, Russians were also more skillful on the operational level, maneuvering armies and corps. By late 1944 the Russians were clearly better on divisional level as well.
It was only on the company and battalion tactic level the Germans seem to retain an edge almost to the end.
So when the Germans were winning, they were better than the Russians, but they were mostly also in a position of numerical superiority at the point of the battle. When they decidedly lost the ability to achieve numerical superiority at the point of battle, they were also no longer better than the Russians at high level operations and strategy.
The Germans definitely started the war with a huge lead in skill at all levels. But Germans also had numerical superiority in the total sizes of forces committed to battle all the way through 1941. When Germans won their initial spectacular victories, the Germans usually had numerical superiority over the Russians in actual size of forces that fought. When Germans attacked Moscow, the Germans still had numerical superiority, although they were wore out by then, and their actual combat powers much diminished.
During much of 1942 the Germans also continue to have numerical superiority at the point of battle. It was only when they blundered into Stalingrad that the table turned and Russians enjoyed great superiority in the size if force engaged.
By 1943, Germany no longer had an advantage in skill on strategic level, maneuvering armies groups. They also lost the ability to focus numerically superior forces at the point if battle. By 1944, Russians were also more skillful on the operational level, maneuvering armies and corps. By late 1944 the Russians were clearly better on divisional level as well.
It was only on the company and battalion tactic level the Germans seem to retain an edge almost to the end.
So when the Germans were winning, they were better than the Russians, but they were mostly also in a position of numerical superiority at the point of the battle. When they decidedly lost the ability to achieve numerical superiority at the point of battle, they were also no longer better than the Russians at high level operations and strategy.
