The Hayter-Braeloch Scale

[Caecilian]

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That argument seems silly. A table is brown, therefore it is. To perform an action... a thing must already exist. To be perceived... a thing must already exist. To be defined as a certain thing... a thing must already exist.

"I think therefore I am" has no possible comparison with "a table is brown, therefore it is".

The point of the argument is that beings that are capable of cognitive thought exist by definition (i.e. you can't have a non-existent being capable of thought). So in asking the question "Do I exist?" you are in fact answering it. The mere ability to ask such a question (or think it) confirms the beings existence, by the definition of existence.

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That, at least, is what Descartes thought. IIrc, Kirkegaard argued that the whole exercise presupposed the 'I', thus presupposed that 'I' existed, and was therefore logically trivial. It doesn't confirm anything- it just says that if you exist then you exist.

Anyway, to get back to the original question. It seems to me that you're conflating 2 seperate (but related) issues here. They are:

1. Strength of belief, i.e. certainty.
and
2. Finding one or more theist or atheist arguments convincing.

The 2 don't have to go together. Many theists, maybe most theists, don't know any of the arguments anyway. Their belief is primarily emotional rather than intellectual. If you were to ask one of those believers 'are there conclusive arguments for the existence of god?' they might answer 'I don't know, and I don't even care, I just know that god exists'.

Similarly, a more intellectual theist might accept the ontological argument as 100% intellectually compelling, yet still have deep and distressing doubts about god's existence. Or not find any of the theist arguments compelling at all, and yet still be absolutely certain of the reality of god.

Less likely, but still possible, is someone finding one or more of the theist arguments completely compelling, but still not accepting theism on an intuitive/ emotional level.

In other words: believing that there are conclusive ways of establishing god's existence is not the same as having faith.