Of Holes and A-Holes

[genkaus]

Not exactly, for any sensible object you can inquire about it with four basic questions: 1)Of what is it made? 2)How did it come to be? 3)How is it structured? 4)How can it change? Each question has a corresponding cause: material, efficient, form, and final.

Saying, as you do, that everything is material implies that the other three causes are subordinate to material, which is not the case. Someone would be equally justified in saying that material is subordinate to form. In fact one famous physicist whose name escapes me once said, "At the bottom of it all reality seems to be structured nothingness." i.e. all form.

Don't confuse material as an ontological category with material meaning substance. We've been through this before in another discussion.

The question "Of what is it made" pertains specifically to the substance it is made of. But when Aristotle speaks of something being material, as opposed to immaterial, he speaks of what is perceptible. Specifically, the immaterial can have a material cause that is not perceptible by the senses. This confusion is due to the two meaning of the words which are distinct concepts.

As it relates to the OP and holes, I say that holes exist, but only as a formal property with the potential for manifesting in reality as part of a sensible body.

Which makes them sensible and therefore material.