Metaphysical free will makes no sense anyway really.
I guess an omniscient God can only be truly omniscient if the universe is assumed to be deterministic.
So if we do that, he knows the future exactly and what he will do and so he can't do anything else. So this makes metaphysical free will impossible for him (and I believe it's impossible in a deterministic universe anyway... and in an indeterministic one it may not be impossible but it completely lacks evidence.... undetermined does not equate to 'free will').
Compatabilist free will is still possible for him however. Since, because he's also (presumably) omnipotent as well as omniscient... he can't be put under duress or legitimately threatened or otherwise coerced into making decisions. So presumably he would have a definition of free will compatible with determinism (a definition that the comptatabilist's espouse) that would apply to him.
I guess an omniscient God can only be truly omniscient if the universe is assumed to be deterministic.
So if we do that, he knows the future exactly and what he will do and so he can't do anything else. So this makes metaphysical free will impossible for him (and I believe it's impossible in a deterministic universe anyway... and in an indeterministic one it may not be impossible but it completely lacks evidence.... undetermined does not equate to 'free will').
Compatabilist free will is still possible for him however. Since, because he's also (presumably) omnipotent as well as omniscient... he can't be put under duress or legitimately threatened or otherwise coerced into making decisions. So presumably he would have a definition of free will compatible with determinism (a definition that the comptatabilist's espouse) that would apply to him.
