Entropy, Kalam, and First Cause

[Anomalocaris]

The same argument applies inside the universe as well. What is to exclude the possibility that entropy does not apply within some parts of the universe where sufficiently large subset of other know physical laws still applies such that we would still call that part a region of our universe?

We can't exclude the possibility that physical laws may be different in a part of the universe we can't observe. At present, we lack a reason to consider that it might be the case, and at least some reason to think the laws of physics are consistent throughout the universe, though I'm not physicist enough to put a number on that. I suspect it's a decimal point followed by a lot of nines.

It's possible that we may be able to exclude that possibility entirely in the future when we understand more about the formation of the universe.

For the same reason there is as yet no reason to hypothesize such a region within our universe, there seem to be as yet no reason to suppose entropy does not apply outside of our universe.

Concentric rings in the WMAP cosmic microwave background survey provide at least some support to the cyclic universe hypothesis, which would violate the Second Law, as commonly understood as an argument against that being possible. The rings were predicted as evidence of black hole collisions in a previous iteration of our universe. That is a reason to hypothesize that something funny may be going on with universe initiation regarding the second law. I don't suppose that entropy does not apply outside the universe, I suppose we don't know whether it applies, applies differently, or doesn't apply to the universe, and that it is premature to make arguments based on it applying to the universe in advance of actual evidence for that being the case.

Also, entropy is not just a arbitrary tunable parameter. It is actually intricately tied to time, what determines order, and statistical probability. So in principle saying entropy doesn't apply says a lot of things about time, statistical probability, and what conditions constitutes order. If other known rules still apply, then saying entropy doesn't apply would seem to set tight boundaries on what base condition outside of the universe is like.

I'm not saying entropy does not apply, I'm saying we don't know how or even if it applies, and that it is improper to use entropy as an argument that the universe can't be cyclically past-infinite before entropy's applicability to that scenario has been supported. The fallacy of composition remains fallacious, and I don't see how you're avoiding making that fallacy, a matter which you haven't addressed.

Not that I particularly favor the cyclic hypothesis, or contend that it is only possible if entropy as commonly understood does not apply. But consider some things: entropy is only meaningful 'in time', which it practically defines. What is 'outside' of our universe? Another space-time continuum within which our universe floats like a bubble, with the arrow of time going the same direction as within our universe (and presumably any other universes). That would be a mega-universe, which begs the question of whether it is a bubble floating in a 'mega-mega-verse', and whether it is 'mega-verses' 'all the way out'. Or does our uninverse exist 'within' 'no-space' and 'no-time' with no 'distance' between ours and any other universes that exist because there is no such thing as distance, and all universes exist simultaneiously because there is no such thing as time? And that's only two possibilities. I admit to being boggled by the unknowns, and if they were known, whatever the actual case is would probably boggle me equally.

We as yet are just not justified in concluding that the rules without our universe must be the same as the rules within it. I concede my position is largely based on the understanding that making that conclusion would commit the fallacy of composition. If you can show why the fallacy is not applicable to this case, I think I would be persuaded to your view.

What I ams saying is it is not a strong position to argue that problems that appear difficult to surmount within known laws of physics can be dismissed by merely claiming laws of physics had been different. It becomes all the more difficult when the hypothesized differences is structured in such a way as to be nearly in principle unverifiable.


Regarding cyclic universe, I see no reason why, even if the universe is cyclic, the cycles themselves must be more or less eternal in the sense that broadly speaking, the cycles in the future are as likely to fit any particular descriptiom as cycles in the past. The cyclic process in itself may well systematically evolve from cycle to cycle. If the cycles were to evolve, then there is no intrinsic problem with every cycle starting at a higher entropy than the last cycle, and there was a definitive beginning with a first cycle that started with minimum antropy, and a last cycle of maximum entropy beyond which any further cycling would produce no more universes in which anything could happen - Ie all further universes would begin already heat dead.

So 2nd law applies to before the beginning and after the end of our universe.