(September 13, 2010 at 5:18 pm)Tiberius Wrote: Actually theVOID, it is you who is confusing things here. Plato said knowledge was "true justified belief", however there is debate over whether this is enough of a description. Indeed, there are examples where Plato's knowledge is called into question. See Gettier problem.
The Gettier problem is circumstantial and only find flaws in certain types of Justification, Reliablism and Mentalism are two proposed solutions to this problem - their definitions of justification solve the Gettier problem.
In fact there are several solutions to the Gettier Problem, which is not a be-all-and-end-all, but merely an obstacle for some epistemic justifications.
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/The+Soluti...1074000876
Quote:theVOID Wrote:In philosophy knowledge is a true justified belief - That being, I can be said to "know" P if P and I am justified in believing that P.Actually, no. You have the belief, you have the justification, but you miss out "true" for some reason. You can only be said to "know" P if you are justified in believing in P, and P is true. I have no quarrels with the justification of some beliefs; I do have problems with whether we can "know" these things as true.
Refer to the underline/bold/italic - That is your "If P is true"
I have already states my case for the relative insignificance of the Gettier problem, if you want to continue this debate then i'm keen,

Quote:Quote:To a degree of absolute certainty that is true, however having a TJB requires no such certainty.No, but it does require "truth". You seem to be making the very common mistake of missing that part out. Having the justified belief be "true" is very important, as without it, you could make claims of knowledge that are simply not true, even if they are perfectly justified.
I did not miss it out at all, you simply didn't read or didn't understand correctly. See above.
Quote:Perhaps you thought that the "true" in TJB meant "honest"? If so, look over it again. Wikipedia has some helpful pages on it.
No, and for the same reasons as above. P being true is of the utmost importance and i did not once neglect that - This is your error, not mine.
Quote:The justified true belief theory of knowledge suffered a significant setback with the discovery of Gettier problems, situations in which the above conditions were met but that many philosophers disagree that anything is known. Robert Nozick suggested a clarification of "justification" which he believed eliminates the problem: the justification has to be such that were the justification false, the knowledge would be false.
Yeah, that is all true, i have no objections to it, nor does it impede reliablism or mentalism.
Quote:It may seem ridiculous to you, but as far as I am concerned, in an absolute sense, we cannot know that "gravity" exists.
Now you're just being a solopsist. You think we could be brains in a Vat too? What about a computer sim?
Your insistence in equating absolute certainty with knowledge leads you to such stupid and wildly impractical conclusions.
Quote: It doesn't matter how likely something is of being true; if there is an alternative explanation, however bizarre or unsettling that might be, we cannot say that "gravity is known truth".
I was speaking of the effects of gravity, they could be angels pulling shit down, but given the description of the circumstance it would still be true. The justification would not be true however, where as the explanation offered by general relativity would be justified in many senses, especially when reliabilism is used as epistemic justification.
Quote: Whether through the Last Thursday example, or through delusions of our own minds, I believe it is impossible to "know" these things in any absolute way. As such, they remain very justified beliefs, but beliefs nonetheless.
In that sense it would be impossible to know any past events to be known to be true regardless of whether or not they were in fact true, you can take this position all you like but this makes it impossible for you to be consistent on any matters of historical fact.
Again the problem is how you are using "knowledge" It does not follow that because of the Gettier problem you are incapable of knowing anything other than what is logically necessary, especially considering Gettier himself only thought it valid in certain thought experiments given certain epistemic justifications and not as an overarching problem, as you are (ab)using it.
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