RE: God, the author of the biggest holocaust
June 15, 2015 at 9:45 pm
(This post was last modified: June 15, 2015 at 9:51 pm by Randy Carson.)
(June 3, 2015 at 11:04 pm)Simon Moon Wrote: The 'holocaust of the children', as Greg Paul puts it, dwarfs any human caused holocaust by a wide margin. All of the mass slaughters of the 20th century combined pale by comparison.
So, this god created a universe with at least 100 billion galaxies, each with at least 100 billion stars, with an untold number of planets orbiting these stars (2000 extrasolar planets found thus far in our galactic neighborhood alone) only to pick one that is a literally a child killer.
"But, but... The Fall of man!" i hear you exclaim. Sorry, but that does not let god off the hook. Being omniscient, he would have known the Earth was going to be a child killer, yet he let it happen anyway,
"But, but... free will!" I hear you exclaim. Really?
I have more thoughts on your post which accuses God of creating a "holocaust of the children". I'm going to begin by discussion the logical problem of evil as a backdrop to a more direct response to your post which has to do with the evidential problem of evil (which I have highlighted in blue below).
And yes, this is one of those cases when a short question requires a long answer. Sorry.
The Intellectual or Logical Problem of Evil
Those who argue the logical problem of evil are attempting to show that God is a contradiction. Typically, the argument follows a form such as:
P1. God must be all-powerful, all-knowing and all-good.
P2. An all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-good being could eliminate evil.
P3. Evil exists.
C. Therefore, God does not exist.
However, for this argument to work, it must also prove an implicit fourth premise:
P4. God can have no good reason to allow evil to exist
Theist Response:
If God has morally sufficient reasons to allow even one act of evil, then the argument falls apart, because this would show that God and the existence of evil are not logically contradictory. God might allow evil in view of His overriding goals for mankind, such as the goal of giving human beings free will.
If God had made us like robots which did evil things, then God would be responsible for those evils since as robots, we would simply do as we were designed. However, we are not robots; we have free will, and we can choose to do good or evil. Consequently, God is not responsible for our choices.
Agnostic scholar Paul Draper acknowledges that “theists face no serious logical problem of evil” while J.L. Mackie, a staunch defender of the problem of evil argument reluctantly admits “We can concede that the problem of evil does not, after all, show that the central doctrines of theism are logically inconsistent with one another.”
The Evidential Problem of Evil
While the existence of evil may not be logically incompatible with God, the huge amount of suffering in the world seems more compatible with an absent God rather than a purposefully inactive one. This is known as the "evidential problem of evil", and the argument follows like this:
P1. If pointless evils exist, then God does not exist.
P2. Pointless evils exist.
C. Therefore, God does not exist.
Theist Response:
There are at least two possible responses to the evidential problem of evil argument: the "good reasons" approach and the "no-see-ums" approach.
A. The “good reasons” approach
The “good reasons” approach simply claims that God has good reasons for allowing both more and natural evils to exist—reasons that may be completely unknown to us. For example, courage and compassion are good things, and natural disasters provide opportunities for us to exhibit courage ourselves and to offer compassion to others.
At first glance, this may give the impression that God is just as malicious to the people He created as an abusive husband is to his battered wife. However, this fails because while no one would deny that the husband hurts his wife solely for the purpose of inflicting pain, God can use the suffering in our lives–no matter how profound–to strengthen us.
Another variation of this argument is:
P1. If someone could stop an evil X from happening but didn’t, that person would be immoral.
P2. God could have stopped evil X but didn’t.
B. Therefore, God is immoral. (And thus contradictory and therefore non-existent.)
The problem with this argument is that if God is obligated to stop a single act of rape, wouldn't He be obligated to stop all acts of rape? And murder? And burglary? At some point, God would have prevented every evil and severely limited man’s free will. Our remaining choices would be trivial as we lived out our lives in a programmed state of being.
The bottom line is that God may have good reasons to allow evil in the world, and the burden of proof is on the atheist to show that He doesn’t have any good reason to allow such evil.
B. The “no-see-um” approach
If a man looks out into his backyard and sees no elephants, he might exclaim, “I don’t see any elephants in my backyard.” But if he says, “I don’t see any fleas in my backyard”, would that justify him in also saying, “There are no fleas in my backyard?” The fact that he can’t see any fleas—because they are so small—does not mean that there are no fleas present. Similarly, when an atheist says, “I cannot see any good reason why God allows evil events to occur”, it does not follow that there are no good reasons.