What IS good, and how do we determine it?

[Pyrrho]

Well, okay, if you say so........but, whats wrong with any of the numerous reasons given in this thread...or even in the response you just gave me..right up there while claiming you wouldn't know....that you have empathy?  That's a powerful explanation that you, apparently, didn't realize that you just gave.  It's the same explanation given by a great many people.

Like I said, I would still have empathy, but empathy alone cannot explain why a particular action is wrong, since empathy can be so subjective. But then again, you guys believe morality is subjective, so perhaps I shouldn't say what I would think if I did not believe in God.

Except it isn't so very subjective.  This has been discussed before, so I will just quote myself:

I feel like it's completely pointless to even attempt a discussion about morality if we concede that it has no basis in reason. All it will boil down to is "I feel this way," "I dislike that," and nothing could be more unproductive than a back and forth involving nothing but assertions that don't even carry the possibility of being assessed as correct or incorrect.

You are giving a false dilemma.  As has already been stated, morality is not simply a matter of personal preference.  Here is why:

@dahrling

before I can try to give my answer, can you say what you mean when you use the words "Good" and "Evil"? I can't say whether it is universal if I don't know what you mean by it.

That is an excellent question, which most people never really properly address.

I have my answer to that question, already given, which is Hume's answer to the question.  No one else, though, has expressed any interest in that answer in this thread.  Of course, if someone does not agree with Hume, one may come up with one's own answer to the question.  Hopefully, whatever answer one comes up with will somehow be relevant to the way the terms are commonly used, though since different people have different ideas on the subject, no matter what one comes up with, it will not perfectly match all of the ways the terms are used by various people.  But that looseness is explained in Hume's treatment of the subject.  The pure subjectivist approach does not fit as well with common use as Hume's treatment of this, as people do commonly distinguish between personal preferences and what is right and what is wrong.  If ethics were purely a matter of personal preference, then, because I like Mozart, I would be right in saying that people who dislike Mozart are immoral.  That, though, is not how one normally speaks, except as a joke.  And that is why the pure subjectivist approach should be rejected.

To quote Hume on this point:

When a man denominates another his enemy, his rival, his antagonist, his adversary,he is understood to speak the language of self-love, and to express sentiments, peculiar to himself, and arising from his particular circumstances and situation. But when he bestows on any man the epithets of vicious or odious or depraved, he then speaks another language, and expresses sentiments, in which he expects all his audience are to concur with him. He must here, therefore, depart from his private and particular situation, and must choose a point of view, common to him with others; he must move some universal principle of the human frame, and touch a string to which all mankind have an accord and symphony. If he mean, therefore, to express that this man possesses qualities, whose tendency is pernicious to society, he has chosen this common point of view, and has touched the principle of humanity, in which every man, in some degree, concurs. While the human heart is compounded of the same elements as at present, it will never be wholly indifferent to public good, [273]nor entirely unaffected with the tendency of characters and manners. And though this affection of humanity may not generally be esteemed so strong as vanity or ambition, yet, being common to all men, it can alone be the foundation of morals, or of any general system of blame or praise. One man’s ambition is not another’s ambition, nor will the same event or object satisfy both; but the humanity of one man is the humanity of every one, and the same object touches this passion in all human creatures.

http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/341#Hume_0222_563


That was quoted earlier in this thread already, along with some other related ideas, in the post at:

http://atheistforums.org/thread-33164-po...#pid934918



Additionally, you will find that in fact arguments about morality have a troublesome aspect about them, in that people very often do disagree, sometimes without it being possible to come to any agreement.  There are quite a few reasons for this problem, not least of which is the fact that people often disagree about the basis for morality.

If you are trying to persuade someone to a particular course of action, I find that using an Epicurean argument is often the most successful when dealing with people with diverse ideas on morality ("Epicurean" in the sense of following Epicurus, not in the typical sense of the word "epicurean" in English).  The reason being, whatever people claim to care about, and whatever they might actually care about, pretty much everyone cares about their own pleasure and pain, and so appeals to such matters is appealing to something of some importance to one's audience.

We can also see, in the quote above from Hume, why it is that individuals will often be difficult to persuade to be moral, because even though they may feel the relevant feelings, they have other feelings that may be stronger and the stronger feelings may lead to an action contrary to what is suggested by feelings of empathy.


Still, it is worth mentioning that there is more agreement about morality than there is disagreement.  This is somewhat obscured by the fact that one tends to notice the disagreements much more, as conflict naturally gets one's attention.  But just imagine if one disagreed with everyone all the time about morality.  One would pretty much be in constant conflict with everyone about everything.

...

Is there anyway to define good and evil in an universal sense - a definition that everyone, from every culture, can agree on?

...

First of all, that is an impossible standard; there is no way you are going to define those terms such that everyone will agree.  Not everyone even agrees that the earth is not flat (do a search for the "flat earth society").  So universal agreement is out of the question.


There is also a distinction to be made between cultural values and ethics, though not everyone agrees on that idea (as, indeed, not everyone agrees on anything).


I think Hume got it right:



The end of all moral speculations is to teach us our duty; and, by proper representations of the deformity of vice and beauty of virtue, beget correspondent habits, and engage us to avoid the one, and embrace the other. But is this ever to be expected from inferences and conclusions of the understanding, which of themselves have no hold of the affections or set in motion the active powers of men? They discover truths: but where the truths which they discover are indifferent, and beget no desire or aversion, they can have no influence on conduct and behaviour. What is honourable, what is fair, what is becoming, what is noble, what is generous, takes possession of the heart, and animates us to embrace and maintain it. What is intelligible, what is evident, what is probable, what is true, procures only the cool assent of the understanding; and gratifying a speculative curiosity, puts an end to our researches.

http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/341#Hume_0222_335


Extinguish all the warm feelings and prepossessions in favour of virtue, and all disgust or aversion to vice: render men totally indifferent towards these distinctions; and morality is no longer a practical study, nor has any tendency to regulate our lives and actions.


http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/341#Hume_0222_336


... Personal Merit consists altogether in the possession of mental qualities, useful or agreeable to the person himself or to others. 

http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/341#Hume_0222_558


And as every quality which is useful or agreeable to ourselves or others is, in common life, allowed to be a part of personal merit; so no other will ever be received, where men judge of things by their natural, unprejudiced reason, without the delusive glosses of superstition and false religion. Celibacy, fasting, penance, mortification, self-denial, humility, silence, solitude, and the whole train of monkish virtues; for what reason are they everywhere rejected by men of sense, but because they serve to no manner of purpose; neither advance a man’s fortune in the world, nor render him a more valuable member of society; neither qualify him for the entertainment of company, nor increase his power of self-enjoyment? We observe, on the contrary, that they cross all these desirable ends; stupify the understanding and harden the heart, obscure the fancy and sour the temper. We justly, therefore, transfer them to the opposite column, and place them in the catalogue of vices; nor has any superstition force sufficient among men of the world, to pervert entirely these natural sentiments. A gloomy, hair-brained enthusiast, after his death, may have a place in the calendar; but will scarcely ever be admitted, when alive, into intimacy and society, except by those who are as delirious and dismal as himself.


http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/341#Hume_0222_560



When a man denominates another his enemy, his rival, his antagonist, his adversary,he is understood to speak the language of self-love, and to express sentiments, peculiar to himself, and arising from his particular circumstances and situation. But when he bestows on any man the epithets of vicious or odious or depraved, he then speaks another language, and expresses sentiments, in which he expects all his audience are to concur with him. He must here, therefore, depart from his private and particular situation, and must choose a point of view, common to him with others; he must move some universal principle of the human frame, and touch a string to which all mankind have an accord and symphony. If he mean, therefore, to express that this man possesses qualities, whose tendency is pernicious to society, he has chosen this common point of view, and has touched the principle of humanity, in which every man, in some degree, concurs. While the human heart is compounded of the same elements as at present, it will never be wholly indifferent to public good, [273]nor entirely unaffected with the tendency of characters and manners. And though this affection of humanity may not generally be esteemed so strong as vanity or ambition, yet, being common to all men, it can alone be the foundation of morals, or of any general system of blame or praise. One man’s ambition is not another’s ambition, nor will the same event or object satisfy both; but the humanity of one man is the humanity of every one, and the same object touches this passion in all human creatures.


http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/341#Hume_0222_563


But though reason, when fully assisted and improved, be sufficient to instruct us in the pernicious or useful tendency of qualities and actions; it is not alone sufficient to produce any moral blame or approbation. Utility is only a tendency to a certain end; and were the end totally indifferent to us, we should feel the same indifference towards the means. It is requisite a sentiment should here display itself, in order to give a preference to the useful above the pernicious tendencies. This sentiment can be no other than a feeling for the happiness of mankind, and a resentment of their misery; since these are the different ends which virtue and vice have a tendency to promote. Here therefore reason instructs us in the several tendencies of actions, and humanity makes a distinction in favour of those which are useful and beneficial.

http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/341#Hume_0222_585


The hypothesis which we embrace is plain. It maintains that morality is determined by sentiment. It defines virtue to be whatever mental action or quality gives to a spectator the pleasing sentiment of approbation; and vice the contrary. We then proceed to examine a plain matter of fact, to wit, what actions have this influence. We consider all the circumstances in which these actions agree, and thence endeavour to extract some general observations with regard to these sentiments.


http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/341#Hume_0222_592



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So, morality is based on sentiment (feeling).  But it is not every sentiment; it is taking a broad view, without reference to one's personal situation.  Hence the difference between describing something as a personal preference, and something that is good.  The second can be distinguished by thinking about things without reference to oneself.  Whether a man is cheated by a merchant in China, is likely to have little reference to or little affect on me personally.  Yet I still have feelings about this, just as most people do.  It is those kinds of sentiments that are moral sentiments, and the source of morality.