Proving The Resurrection By the Minimal Facts Approach

[Esquilax]

I provided a link to an article in which WLC discusses the role of the Holy Spirit, and this article, while not directly written in response to the charge you are making, may give you some insight into what he is or was thinking.

I think you may be misunderstanding me? I was referring to Craig's use of the Borde-Guth-Vilenkin theorem to confirm Kalam.

With regards to Craig's ideas about the holy spirit, I've actually seen that article before, while researching another debate about Craig I was having; it has problems up the wazoo.

For starters, Craig lists a set of criteria by which the model of christian theism stands, the first being:

(i) it is epistemically possible, that is to say, for all we know, it may be true;

And we have a problem right there, because epistemic possibility needs to be demonstrated, not merely asserted. When it comes to many of the claims of christian theism we have no evidence that they are possible in any way. I don't think I'm saying anything controversial when I point out that only possible things may well be true, so without some verification that the miracle claims central to the religion are possible, we certainly cannot say they could be true. This is a, to use Craig's words, de facto objection to christianity; if the miracle claims are not possible, then they cannot be factually true.

I also have problems with Craig's justification of his belief in christianity: when asked how he knows christianity is true, he says that he knows because he feels the holy spirit. The obvious next question is, how does he know that's what he's feeling?

That's kind of the important part of this, here; Craig asserts subjective feelings that cannot be measured, cannot be shared, and cannot be reliably replicated in others. They don't apply to any external referent or being; it's literally all in his head. So how does he know that he's applying the correct label to that feeling, when he calls it the holy spirit? He doesn't say, and so we're back at the same unspoken premises, that he can't be wrong about his subjective experiences, that he can't be fooled by his brain chemistry, that he can't be given additional information later that will show him something different, and so on.

Craig asserts certainty where none can be found. That's the problem with this argument, not that it's circular. It's not circular, it's just utterly baseless and presuppositional.