(September 9, 2021 at 5:07 pm)vulcanlogician Wrote:Quote:Nagel famously asserts that "an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism—something it is like for the organism."[2] This assertion has achieved special status in consciousness studies as "the standard 'what it's like' locution."[3] Daniel Dennett, while sharply disagreeing on some points, acknowledged Nagel's paper as "the most widely cited and influential thought experiment about consciousness."[4]:441https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/What_Is_...e_a_Bat%3F
So, to Nagel, if it is :like something" to be a p-zombie, then a p-zombie is conscious (and therefore no p-zombie at all). Dennett, a functionalist, disagrees with this thesis. Like Dennett, I'm a little leary of Nagel's theory... it is a rejection of physicalism after all. But his thought experiments are interesting.
I really like Dennett. He doesn't like the standard categories like functionalism and physicalism, and neither do I.
Nagel's idea is not profound. To say that being conscious means "there is something that it is like to be that organism" is pretty much just a description of consciousness. It provides no extra insights to me, though I agree with it.
The only way to understand consciousness is to look at its functionality. It is a process that produces a filtered narration and a sense of self. How does it do that? Looking at the physical nature of the brain, as well as the informational functionalism will get us closer to understanding that.