RE: From atheism to tentative agnosticism
July 2, 2013 at 4:27 pm
(This post was last modified: July 2, 2013 at 5:08 pm by Inigo.)
'apophenia', you asked
"1. How would one determine that moral reality, separate from moral phenomena (the "appearance" of moral truths), actually exists?"
Let’s assume I’m correct and that morality really does require a god (that morality is composed of the instructions and favourings of a god). This, in itself, would not establish the existence of such a god. For perhaps our moral sensations constitute a hallucination and all our substantial moral beliefs are false. However, it does mean that our moral sensations are now defeasible evidence for the existence of a god. I stress the word ‘defeasible’. They are not proof of the existence of a god. But they are some evidence for the existence of a god.
The reason for this is that we should assume things are as they appear to be unless given reason to think otherwise. So, if you have the visual sensation that there is a chair in front of you, you should assume there is a chair in front of you until you have reason to think otherwise. The brute possibility that you may be mistaken is not yet positive reason to think you are mistaken.
So, I would take the existence of morality to be established if we sense the existence of morality (and we clearly do) and there is no evidence with which this sensation conflicts.
'apophenia' you also ask (something wrong with the quote function it seems, so i'm having to cut and paste):
"4. There appears to be an unspoken but implied argument from consequences here; yes or no? ("If there is no moral reality, that would be bad; therefore there is moral reality, therefore a god must exist.") So what if there is no "moral reality" ?"
No, that is not how I am arguing. There is something incoherent in the thought that it would be morally bad if morality did not exist. Moral badness presupposes morality's existence. My argument is just that morality has certain features and that only the instructions of a certain sort of god would have those features, therefore morality is the instructions of a god of that kind.
'apophenia' you say
"5. You use the term "hallucinatory" as another fallacious implied argument, suggesting that because something only exists in the mind, it is not "real" or genuine or meaningful; memories exist only in the mind, are they then to be considered "hallucinations" in the same sense? (See the argument from consequences.) Calling a mental phenomenon a hallucination carries an implied value judgement, this makes using it this way fallacious."
No, I did not make that argument. Some sensations are not sensations of anything external. For instance pain is like that. If you sense pain, you are in pain. Pain just 'is' a sensation. there is nothing more to it than that. And it is impossible to suffer a hallucination of pain (seems to me). For if you sense pain, you are in pain.
But other senses are 'of' things. So, my visual sensation that there is a chair in front of me is 'of' a chair. A chair is not a sensation (our concept of a chair is of something 'out there' not something mental). And so if there is no chair 'out there' corresponding to my visual sensation then that sensation is a hallucination. Of course, the sensation still exists. You are not hallucinating that you are having a sensation.
the sense that an act is wrong is not analogous to our sense of pain. For instance, there is something obviously incoherent in wondering "well, I feel I am in pain, but I wonder if I actually am". But there is nothing at all incoherent in wondering "well, Xing seems wrong, but I wonder if it actually is".
'apophenia' you ask
"6. What do you consider "real" that you know about by another means than the mind? In other words, is there phenomena and reality, or just phenomena?"
My mind is my means - I cannot use anything else - but that does not mean that all I know is my mind. Or at least, I fail to see why that follows.
Is there just phenomena? Well, no. I know with certainty that my own mind exists, for example. And my mind is not phenomena. My mind is not a sensation, it is the thing that senses.
But anyway, I take these questions to cut across this debate. I assume there is an outside world - I assume solipsism is false. And so, I think, do those who maintain that atheism is true. So this is a shared assumption and not one either side is challenging.
'apophenia' you ask
"2. In what way would a god provide for the existence of, what in common parlance is called objective morality, and you call moral reality? (See various on the Euthyphro dilemma.)"
I take it that what you are asking here is how I would deal with the Euthyphro dilemma. My response to the Euthyphro dilemma is to say what is right is what the relevant god commands.
The supposed problem with this answer is that it makes morality arbitrary. I think there is certainly a sense in which it does, but it is a rather innocuous sense of 'arbitrary' and not one that indicates a flaw in the theory.
"1. How would one determine that moral reality, separate from moral phenomena (the "appearance" of moral truths), actually exists?"
Let’s assume I’m correct and that morality really does require a god (that morality is composed of the instructions and favourings of a god). This, in itself, would not establish the existence of such a god. For perhaps our moral sensations constitute a hallucination and all our substantial moral beliefs are false. However, it does mean that our moral sensations are now defeasible evidence for the existence of a god. I stress the word ‘defeasible’. They are not proof of the existence of a god. But they are some evidence for the existence of a god.
The reason for this is that we should assume things are as they appear to be unless given reason to think otherwise. So, if you have the visual sensation that there is a chair in front of you, you should assume there is a chair in front of you until you have reason to think otherwise. The brute possibility that you may be mistaken is not yet positive reason to think you are mistaken.
So, I would take the existence of morality to be established if we sense the existence of morality (and we clearly do) and there is no evidence with which this sensation conflicts.
'apophenia' you also ask (something wrong with the quote function it seems, so i'm having to cut and paste):
"4. There appears to be an unspoken but implied argument from consequences here; yes or no? ("If there is no moral reality, that would be bad; therefore there is moral reality, therefore a god must exist.") So what if there is no "moral reality" ?"
No, that is not how I am arguing. There is something incoherent in the thought that it would be morally bad if morality did not exist. Moral badness presupposes morality's existence. My argument is just that morality has certain features and that only the instructions of a certain sort of god would have those features, therefore morality is the instructions of a god of that kind.
'apophenia' you say
"5. You use the term "hallucinatory" as another fallacious implied argument, suggesting that because something only exists in the mind, it is not "real" or genuine or meaningful; memories exist only in the mind, are they then to be considered "hallucinations" in the same sense? (See the argument from consequences.) Calling a mental phenomenon a hallucination carries an implied value judgement, this makes using it this way fallacious."
No, I did not make that argument. Some sensations are not sensations of anything external. For instance pain is like that. If you sense pain, you are in pain. Pain just 'is' a sensation. there is nothing more to it than that. And it is impossible to suffer a hallucination of pain (seems to me). For if you sense pain, you are in pain.
But other senses are 'of' things. So, my visual sensation that there is a chair in front of me is 'of' a chair. A chair is not a sensation (our concept of a chair is of something 'out there' not something mental). And so if there is no chair 'out there' corresponding to my visual sensation then that sensation is a hallucination. Of course, the sensation still exists. You are not hallucinating that you are having a sensation.
the sense that an act is wrong is not analogous to our sense of pain. For instance, there is something obviously incoherent in wondering "well, I feel I am in pain, but I wonder if I actually am". But there is nothing at all incoherent in wondering "well, Xing seems wrong, but I wonder if it actually is".
'apophenia' you ask
"6. What do you consider "real" that you know about by another means than the mind? In other words, is there phenomena and reality, or just phenomena?"
My mind is my means - I cannot use anything else - but that does not mean that all I know is my mind. Or at least, I fail to see why that follows.
Is there just phenomena? Well, no. I know with certainty that my own mind exists, for example. And my mind is not phenomena. My mind is not a sensation, it is the thing that senses.
But anyway, I take these questions to cut across this debate. I assume there is an outside world - I assume solipsism is false. And so, I think, do those who maintain that atheism is true. So this is a shared assumption and not one either side is challenging.
'apophenia' you ask
"2. In what way would a god provide for the existence of, what in common parlance is called objective morality, and you call moral reality? (See various on the Euthyphro dilemma.)"
I take it that what you are asking here is how I would deal with the Euthyphro dilemma. My response to the Euthyphro dilemma is to say what is right is what the relevant god commands.
The supposed problem with this answer is that it makes morality arbitrary. I think there is certainly a sense in which it does, but it is a rather innocuous sense of 'arbitrary' and not one that indicates a flaw in the theory.
