I have two points so far. Tell me what you think:
My first point is about the logical compossibility of a GCB and an unknown unknown (UU).
But first some important points:
1) UU don't exist alone, but are predicated on a subject. Ie, something that is unknown is not merely "unknown" but "unknown to some entity", either "unknown to Vinny" or "unknown to MFM" or "unknown to God", eg. There is always a "to + subject(s)". In this case it is "UU to God" we are concerned about.
2) The existence of any "UU to God" relies on the existence of an epistemic threshhold. Ie, there is a limit, before which are all real or hypothetical KKs, KUs. Then beyond the limit is the UUs.
If (1) is true, I think UUs are incoherent. Why?
If God is indeed conceived as a GCB (or MGB depending on your preference) then that by definition rules out unknowns. Postulating UUs thus entail a contradiction.
It's like saying "Imagine a bachelor. Now imagine the bachelor is married. A bachelor cannot be married. Therefore, the concept of a bachelor is incoherent."
You will respond "But, your conception of a marriage bachelor is the problem, not the definition!"
So if there is indeed an MGB/GCB (as the ontological argument, for example goes to show), then it is by definition non-compossible with a set of UUs.
I have a second response based on the status of the confirmed UU claimed by Noel. He postulates three sets of propositions
1) {Known unknowns}. Known question, unknown answer. These are confirmed "to us", presumably not "to God" (notice how the "to + subject" is so important).
2) {Unknown unknowns}. Unknown question, unknown answer. These are confirmed to us, not confirmed to exist to God. If it has to exist to a God, then God does not exist.
3) But we have a special third one: "The status of the set of an unknown unknown". Noel concludes that this is a confirmed existence of unknown unknown to us, but also to God.
And thus, given (3), Noel concludes that God has an unknown unknown, and therefore omnipotence is incoherent.
But I think Noel gets (3) wrong. If you recall, a known unknown is like "How many atoms are in my body?" You know the question but you don't know the answer. An unknown unknown is where you don't know the question or the answer.
But given "What is the status of the set of unknown unknowns?" we know the question, even if we don't know the answer!
So (3) is not UU, but KU.
Now, we have UU beyond the threshold, even for God. But given omniscience, God would know all the answers to KU. So God would know the answer to (3).
So God would have to know the answer to "What is the status of the set of unknown unknowns?"
I have to go to bed, but I love this argument and I'd love to work on it more. Tell me what you think of my responses.
My first point is about the logical compossibility of a GCB and an unknown unknown (UU).
But first some important points:
1) UU don't exist alone, but are predicated on a subject. Ie, something that is unknown is not merely "unknown" but "unknown to some entity", either "unknown to Vinny" or "unknown to MFM" or "unknown to God", eg. There is always a "to + subject(s)". In this case it is "UU to God" we are concerned about.
2) The existence of any "UU to God" relies on the existence of an epistemic threshhold. Ie, there is a limit, before which are all real or hypothetical KKs, KUs. Then beyond the limit is the UUs.
If (1) is true, I think UUs are incoherent. Why?
If God is indeed conceived as a GCB (or MGB depending on your preference) then that by definition rules out unknowns. Postulating UUs thus entail a contradiction.
It's like saying "Imagine a bachelor. Now imagine the bachelor is married. A bachelor cannot be married. Therefore, the concept of a bachelor is incoherent."
You will respond "But, your conception of a marriage bachelor is the problem, not the definition!"
So if there is indeed an MGB/GCB (as the ontological argument, for example goes to show), then it is by definition non-compossible with a set of UUs.
I have a second response based on the status of the confirmed UU claimed by Noel. He postulates three sets of propositions
1) {Known unknowns}. Known question, unknown answer. These are confirmed "to us", presumably not "to God" (notice how the "to + subject" is so important).
2) {Unknown unknowns}. Unknown question, unknown answer. These are confirmed to us, not confirmed to exist to God. If it has to exist to a God, then God does not exist.
3) But we have a special third one: "The status of the set of an unknown unknown". Noel concludes that this is a confirmed existence of unknown unknown to us, but also to God.
And thus, given (3), Noel concludes that God has an unknown unknown, and therefore omnipotence is incoherent.
But I think Noel gets (3) wrong. If you recall, a known unknown is like "How many atoms are in my body?" You know the question but you don't know the answer. An unknown unknown is where you don't know the question or the answer.
But given "What is the status of the set of unknown unknowns?" we know the question, even if we don't know the answer!
So (3) is not UU, but KU.
Now, we have UU beyond the threshold, even for God. But given omniscience, God would know all the answers to KU. So God would know the answer to (3).
So God would have to know the answer to "What is the status of the set of unknown unknowns?"
I have to go to bed, but I love this argument and I'd love to work on it more. Tell me what you think of my responses.
