Free Will

[Pyrrho]

Bold emphasis is added:

"My criteria for free will, if it is to mean anything, is that a person has the genuine ability to choose alternative possibilities."

I don't know what you mean.  Clearly, a person cannot simultaneously do two mutually exclusive actions (e.g., go to the store while at the same time staying away from the store).  What the person will do is either go to the store at a given time or not.  How will you test your idea that one "has the genuine ability to choose alternative possibilities"?  What would be different in the world that we can observe if that claim is true, versus an otherwise identical world in which that claim is false?

It seems to me that there is no test, no way of distinguishing between having that "genuine ability" and not having it.  Not only not an actual test, but no theoretical test either.  So it seems to me to be mere empty words, devoid of any real meaning.

The distinction lies in the cause which is ultimately responsible for a given act: we are lead either through a chain of events that in principle can be traversed to the starting conditions of the universe, or to an individual will that renders judgment (in its decision to act) by means of pure intellection, perhaps not independent, but supervenient upon the sum of physical events that are present as a result of predetermined circumstances. To me, it seems like the difference between treating a murderer or a rapist as a moral agent wholly culpable for their crimes rather than merely the victims of bad luck. The idea that one genuinely possesses the ability to choose between alternative possibilities is simply that one can always do otherwise, in principle, than whatever it is they ultimately decide, in contradistinction to the reality where actions are shackled to the antecedent determinants that no one can truly be held accountable for. As these contraries are metaphysical, I'm inclined to think that the suggestion of a possible test is a category mistake; what changes rather is our perspective of the human condition; for example, our approach to moral questions and what a rational response to bad actors should be.

So are you saying that it is merely a difference in attitude?



For the rest, you use words like "cause" that are normally associated with ordinary events, that can be examined scientifically.  Like whether or not smoking causes cancer.

Additionally, this claim;

"As these contraries are metaphysical, I'm inclined to think that the suggestion of a possible test is a category mistake..."

seems to suggest that metaphysics isn't really about anything.  It seems to me that a "difference" that makes no difference is no difference at all.

Separating some subject off from scrutiny seems very much like what many religionists try to do with their religion.  And saying that there is a magic kind of cause of things seems suspiciously similar to claiming "god did it."


I am also not convinced that a metaphysical position has the practical importance that you claim.  No matter what the ultimate cause, it is still a good idea to lock up serial killers.  And, as a practical matter, insofar as rehabilitation is practically possible, that, too, seems like a good idea.  And for that, one would want to use science to see what works and what does not.  And it likewise seems to be a good idea to prevent people from becoming serial killers, insofar as that is practically possible.  And, again, one would want to use science for that to see what works and what does not.  Metaphysics seems entirely irrelevant to all of this.