(January 18, 2016 at 8:57 am)bennyboy Wrote: First of all, don't be offended. Subsuuuuuumes is just me playing around with emphasis, because it's central to my view, not just a semantic argument.
Idealism subsumes the mechanical and scientific understanding-- those are all ideas, after all. There's no problem with having many ideas being about things or properties, and in fact those kinds of ideas are very useful.
What is your notion of what an idea is? In the physicalist paradigm, ideas are things just as much as a desk or a glass is a physical thing. If you're saying something different, you need to provide some defense of that instead of just handwaving it aside with the non-informative label 'idea'. What is an idea in your framework? You have a referent that doesn't seem to refer to anything. A signifier without a significand.
Materialism is a reduction of all phenomenon to a small set of mathematical principles, with some metaphysics thrown in for good measure. It explains by breaking apart composite phenomena into parts that explain the composite. Your breaking everything down into 'ideas' doesn't explain. It merely leaves the nature of things undefined. It subsumes, but doesn't reduce. Is there anything that an idea cannot be? Is there anything an idea must be? It seems that under your view, an idea can be anything, so you haven't identified any parts which explain the composite. That's a weakness, not a strength. What are the practical limits on ideas in your Idealism?