Seeing red

[Angrboda]

Intention is what a system has when it represents an isomorphism of the environment and acts on that isomorphism to further its interests in its environment.  A galaxy doesn't form an isomorphic representation nor act on that representation.

What interests?  Why does a given physical system have interests, and what about having them magically makes it experience qualia?

This was never about 'qualia'.  It was about the intentionality in a physical system.  Qualia implies consciousness.  I could explain how similar such systems account for qualia and consciousness, but that is beyond the scope of the original discussion which you seem to have hijacked with questions about consciousness.

Or perhaps we're talking about how dog-like human structures are.  Or how robotic-like certain dog structures are.  What makes you think this is a response to your post about supervenience?  It's not.  But if you ask me I will answer.  Mind doesn't 'supervene' on mere matter of any configuration.  Mind is a representational system like that of the robots.  The human representational system is capable of greater flexibility and complexity, but this is a difference in degree, not kind.

Okay, what is it about the universe that, if certain kinds of information or processing is there, causes qualia to exist-- when there is nothing like this in "matter of any configuration"?

This is an argument from ignorance and also begs the question by implying that human mind is not a specific configuration of matter.

I'm really trying to see a purely physical perspective here, but I keep hearing about things which are immaterial, or at least non-concrete, and which are ambiguous or not clearly defined except in terms of arbitrary assessments.
. . . . . .

 I pointed to representational systems as indicator of mind.  And by representational system, I don't mean just the robot itself or its computer.  By representational system I mean the entire set of the feedback loop which includes the sensors, which feed the computer, which feeds the actuators on the wheels which then feeds back upon the environment, which then feeds back into the sensors.  It is an entire economy in which "information processing" is only a component.

Oh, I get it.  However, I don't see a non-arbitrary division between what a robot does and what, say, a galaxy does.  Does a galaxy not intake light and materials, manipulate them, and output other light and materials?  Does it not send practically infinite photons to neighboring galaxies in a cluster?

I still think we're just saying, "Mind is whatever seems human to us."

And I think you're skewing things to make a point.  I have in detail described the necessary components and constraints required for intentionality.  You've introduced vague parallels that don't fit the description of a representational system given.  And you ask why the two aren't the same thing?  Because they're not.  A galaxy doesn't fit the description already laid out.  Your constructing vague parallels while ignoring the specifics given is dishonest on your part.  Again you've hijacked questions about intentionality to make this about consciousness; it never was about mind per se, but I've been generous enough to indulge your questions.  If you're just going to drive like a lemming towards cookie cutter arguments like this, you will find your questions being ignored.  

I have defined in non-arbitrary terms how the representational systems in question function; the role of different aspects of the system, and the constraints upon them.  You have taken a system which only partially fulfills those roles and constraints and ask why it isn't the same.  A galaxy doesn't form a representational system.   Period.  Repeatedly asking why not is either a sign you've been dropped on your head or the expression of a rhetorical agenda.  I see it as the latter.  Unless you can make something of your question other than blase misunderstanding of descriptions given, I don't see the point of your current line of questioning.

I still think we're just saying, "Mind is whatever seems human to us."

And I tire of such facile arguments.   Of course a description of mind in terms of components is going to parallel a description of the human mind.  The human mind is the prototype for which we are seeking similarities of in other systems.  I haven't given a description of mind yet, so the only place you're pulling this from is a pre-rehearsed playbook.  If you keep trammeling the argument with dull stereotypical reactions like this, I'm going to start ignoring you.  I gave a description of a representational system that instances intentionality, not mind.  You are taking my descriptions of a non-mind system, and launching a rhetorical point upon it by blurring that distinction with unasked questions about 'mind'. I foresaw this days ago, but chose to indulge you. Whether you do this by design or simply because that's who you are, I don't care; I'm tiring of your stereotyped rhetorical maneuvers.