Musings about omnipotence and perfection.

[Ryft]

If statement A says something about God and nothing about X, and statement B says something about X and nothing about God, then statement A and B do not say the exact same thing—especially when statement A implicitly denies the fundamental laws of logic and statement B explicitly upholds them.

What exactly are you using as example A and for what reasons does it deny the fundamental laws of logic?

Statement A was, "God is not capable of actualizing self-contradiction X"—in other words, the problem with actualizing X is an extrinsic one (God). It denies the fundamental laws of logic because it implies that actualizing X is possible given the right extrinsic circumstances and that God cannot satisfy those. But its impossibility is not due to some extrinsic feature (that which it has in relation to some thing outside itself); what makes it impossible is not the fact that no agent can produce it. Rather, it is due to an intrinsic feature (that which it has in and of itself); what makes it impossible is the fact that it is incapable of production in and of itself, regardless of any circumstances real or supposed, because a self-contradiction is a logically impossible non-entity.

This is reminiscent of discussion I had early last year, where I had an atheist suggest to me that self-contradictions present a limitation to God's power (because they are something he cannot actualize) so therefore an omnipotent God is impossible. Rather baffled at how he could think that a non-existent nothing can limit anything, I nevertheless tried to answer him carefully with the following.

Let me explain this as carefully as I can. By claiming that actualizing self-contradictions (e.g., making a square circle) is something God cannot do and thus presents a limitation to his power, you are claiming that contradictions are impossible for extrinsic reasons, that they are impossible only because God's power is insufficient for the task. There are two problems with this, which my post earlier addressed.

First, such a claim violates how contradictions are defined; namely, contradictions are logically impossible for intrinsic reasons, not just metaphysically impossible for extrinsic reasons. The logically impossible "carries its impossibility within itself," as Lewis explained. Philosophers articulate the difference between two important categories of truth, necessary and contingent; the former refers to that which is necessarily true and cannot be otherwise (a square has four sides of equal length), while the latter refers to that which happens to be true but could be otherwise (stop signs are red). The fundamental laws of logic are necessary truths, not contingent truths; that is, the law of non-contradiction does not just happen to be true extrinsically (in relation to something else) and could be otherwise, but rather it is necessarily true intrinsically (in and of itself) and cannot be otherwise. So for you to claim that self-contradictions are impossible for extrinsic reasons, a limit of God's power, is to completely redefine the terms and toss logic on its head.

Second, it is true that nearly all the definitions of omnipotence use the word "unlimited" but please give attention to what is unlimited: power. This stems from the Latin potens, from posse (to be able) and therefore refers to the ability to actualize any state of affairs. And Scripture concurs by saying that all things are possible with God. But self-contradictions are neither things nor possible; they are logically impossible non-entities, nothing more than a meaningless combination of words. As non-existent nothings they are not a task to be performed nor an obstacle against the accomplishment of one. As I pointed out earlier, to hold that self-contradictions are only metaphysically impossible for extrinsic reasons is to hold that self-contradictions are possible, albeit extraordinarily difficult; i.e., that the logically impossible is logically possible (itself a meaningless logical contradiction).

I could say, "I cannot produce a square circle," and that doesn't in any way imply that I could create such a thing given different circumstances.

JOHN: Why can't God produce a square circle?

ADAM: Because he does not have sufficient power.

JOHN: An all-powerful being should be able to produce a square circle?

ADAM: Yes, because a being who cannot is thus NOT all-powerful.

JOHN: So the logically impossible is logically possible?

ADAM: [blank expression] Wait, what?

JOHN: You said an all-powerful being should be able to produce a square circle.

ADAM: Right.

JOHN: And a square circle is a logically impossible self-contradiction.

ADAM: Okay.

JOHN: Thus, you think the logically impossible is logically possible, given an all-powerful being.

ADAM: Start over. Ask me the question again.

JOHN: Why can't God produce a square circle?

ADAM: Because it is a logical contradiction.

JOHN: Then why can't God produce a logical contradiction?

ADAM: Because they are incapable of production.

JOHN: And there you have it. That is why the second statement is to be preferred, and the first statement should be rejected. That is, we do not say, "God is incapable of actualizing self-contradiction X," but rather we say, "Self-contradiction X is incapable of actualization."