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On Belief in God X
#21
RE: On Belief in God X
(July 9, 2013 at 1:12 am)genkaus Wrote:
(July 9, 2013 at 12:08 am)FallentoReason Wrote: Now you're conflating two different things. I never said God can only be experienced by a select few. I do think that it's right to assume the hand can't be shown though:

Let's call the royal flush my experience of the Lord of the Rings trilogy. I look down at my hand, and what follows is that I think it's extremely boring. That's *my* experience of this hand. How exactly do I *SHOW* you my hand, such that your experience will be *synonymous* with mine? I can't. That's the crux of the OP, that what the theist "holds" is purely *theirs* and a private matter by nature.

Look at it this way. There can be two components of an experience - objective and subjective. The objective one depends upon the nature of object being experienced - its form, physical qualities etc. and the subjective component would be your feelings and emotions related to it. So, when you see a royal flush, the objective part of the experience would be seeing five high cards and the subjective part would be feeling giddy at the expectation of victory. Similarly, while watching LOTR, the objective part would be seeing and listening to everything and the subjective part would be, for you, being extremely bored.

Now, I'm no longer sure what the royal flush represents anymore, so let's do away with the middleman. If you compare your experience of watching LOTR with a theist's experience of god - it would be true that there is a part of your experience that you'd never be able to share. The subjective part of their experience would always be purely theirs - a private matter. But the objective part of the experience can be shared - IF this god is an objective entity.

Compare this to another movie that you saw in a dream last night. Basically, you dreamt that you were in a theatre, watching a movie called "rise of the boobie monster" and you enjoyed it. This experience would be completely a private matter - since I can't share in the objective part (since it was your dream) or the subjective part.

This is the issue with the OP. If this god is an objective entity, then atleast a part of that experience can be shared. The only reason this won't be possible is if this entity is in the theist's head, thus making the experience completely private. Basically, if he actually holds the royal flush, he'd be able to show his hand and the only reason he can't show his hand is because he doesn't have the royal flush.

I think you've made some very important distinctions here and I'm following you all the way on them. I guess the thing I'm left wondering is how one could share their god..? Their subjective experience is in the past and a private matter. The objective entity - god - is most likely a public matter. Does this imply that the theist can control it like a marionette and make it introduce itself to you? I don't think so, or at least it's not directly obvious to me that simply because it's an objective entity, they can manipulate it to satisfy your needs.

Quote:
(July 9, 2013 at 12:08 am)FallentoReason Wrote: And what happens if magically we could transfer his experience on to you and suddenly you confirm the royal flush? That's the other underlying point here - that no matter how crazy something sounds, they *could* have a valid experiential justification for said crazy claim.

That is why we don't consider experiential justification to have any great validity to begin with.

Agreed, but what I also want to get across is that we need to be more understanding of *their* position. Whether true or not, they say they have experiential justification for their beliefs. This means that by *default* there will be some arguments that you can present to them which they will outright deny because of their circumstances.

An example closer to home of this might be that you believe in moral relativism. So a theist could say that action x is morally wrong according to divine command theory. The statement *as is* doesn't affect you in the slightest because whatever *your* justification for moral relativism might be leads you to think that statement is false, according to moral relativism. This means the theist can't simply keep asserting the same thing, because to you it's prima facie false. Therefore they need to find a different strategy to undermine your belief in moral relativity.

Quote:
(July 9, 2013 at 12:08 am)FallentoReason Wrote: Yes! That's the idea. I mean, I don't know what those suggestions would translate to in the real world, but the point is that the atheist should be trying different arguments to settle the fact that they can't possibly be experiencing a royal flush.

But we do try - or haven't you been paying attention? We see that the same experience is replicated in others with completely different gods - thus establishing that a royal flush seems to provide the same experience as a straight flush. We see the necessary implications of having a royal flush - certain cards being missing from the deck (of the necessary implications of the god they experienced - like absence of suffering) and check them out one by one - not true, not true and so on. I'd say that we do a lot to check if they have a royal flush when we had no reason to believe them in the first place.

This is what I'm talking about! Now you're not resorting to the near impossible task of getting them to show their cards. There's other ways which indirectly tell you something about the cards they hold, and if they're honest enough/your argument is sound, then it will undermine their experiential justification from their *own* p.o.v.

Quote:
(July 9, 2013 at 12:08 am)FallentoReason Wrote: No, what I think is that the atheist needs to be a little more pro active and realise that the experience can be undermined in a different way. They would have to try a line of argumentation that would lead to the conclusion "...and that's why you couldn't possibly have experienced God" because if the experience is undermined such that "God" wasn't responsible for it, then the floodgates open for the theist to fill in the blank with anything *but* God.

You are crediting the theist with too much rationality. The only way you'll convince them they couldn't possibly have experienced god would be by first proving that there is no god. Try giving any explanation - that the experience was caused by hormones - god stimulated the glands. It was caused by force particles - god is a jedi. And you won't convince them that there is no god because they'll keep saying "but I experienced him".

I don't think we can generalise too much. After all, reasons along those lines worked on me Smile

(July 9, 2013 at 1:21 am)MindForgedManacle Wrote: You're sort of missing the pount. As already pointed out, the actual purpose isn't to claim improbability of their religious views being correct, but to demonstrate that they're being inconsistent - and arriving no where - by claiming that their theological and soteriological views are thereby correct because of some particular experience, when it can be - and has been - claimed by believers of EVERY religion, and EVERY denomination of every religion.

In other words, if you accept the basicality of religious experience as a confirmation of said beliefs, you arrive at a contradiction and inconsistency, since said experience can be claimed by anyone just a validly and lead to mutually exclusive beliefs being true, such as there both being only one God and there being multiple gods being simultaneously true.

If you get dealt a royal flush, what do you do? It's right there in front of your eyes. Doesn't that give you justification for believing you have a royal flush?

(July 9, 2013 at 3:15 am)Ryantology Wrote:
(July 9, 2013 at 12:08 am)FallentoReason Wrote: Because in the real world, they simply *can't* show their "hand".

Oh, they absolutely could. They won't. And there is a perfectly rational explanation as to why: their 'royal flush' is virtually certain to be nothing any other player would recognize as such. They have only two options.

1: Lay down a hand more suited to the strength of any theist claim, such as K♥ J♥ 8♣ 7♦ 4♠, and insist that it doesn't appear to be a royal flush to the other players because they aren't interpreting poker hands according to what they believe is correct (i.e., you aren't interpreting it so that they win every hand), or
2: Never show their hand because, as long as they don't show, the game cannot continue and nobody can prove they don't have a royal flush.

It is giving theists far too much credit to suggest that they are incapable of showing their hands. If that's the case, they aren't actually holding any cards and should not be treated as though they are legitimate participants in the game.

If you do not have evidence which exists outside of your head, you can only lose or draw.

If you've read genkaus' last post, then let me ask you this: how do you literally show god?
"It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain a thought without accepting it" ~ Aristotle
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#22
RE: On Belief in God X
(July 10, 2013 at 11:52 pm)FallentoReason Wrote: If you've read genkaus' last post, then let me ask you this: how do you literally show god?

I have no idea, but that's their problem, really. If they can't show their god, there's no logical reason to accept their claim that they have one... even if they do.

If they actually have cards, they can show those cards. Whether or not they have a royal flush will be revealed.
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#23
RE: On Belief in God X
(July 10, 2013 at 11:52 pm)FallentoReason Wrote: I think you've made some very important distinctions here and I'm following you all the way on them. I guess the thing I'm left wondering is how one could share their god..? Their subjective experience is in the past and a private matter. The objective entity - god - is most likely a public matter. Does this imply that the theist can control it like a marionette and make it introduce itself to you? I don't think so, or at least it's not directly obvious to me that simply because it's an objective entity, they can manipulate it to satisfy your needs.

That's a valid point - and one that applies beyond the question of god. For example, if I had been lost at sea for days and upon being rescued, tell the wondrous tale of a fish as big as any ship in the world - one that has a fountain on top of its head.

Now, assuming that none of them has seen this thing in the past, there would be many reactions to the story. Some will say "show us picture or a dead body or take us where you saw it - otherwise you must be lying". Others will say, "you had a sunstroke which made you see things". Some may take me at my word. Some may say "there may be such a fish or there may not be, we don't care". Others, may say "Let's go look for this thing." Others may say that they have studied marine biology for years and there is no way such a thing could exist without wrecking the ecosystem.

Now, if you are a reasonable man, you should realize that your claim does sound outlandish. So, while this thing may actually exist, you shouldn't expect anyone else to believe you without solid evidence. As a matter of fact, given the validity of sunstroke explanation, you have a good reason to doubt what you think you saw. So, while we just happen to know that a whale does exist, for this man and his community, there is ample reason not to believe it does.

Let's take this analogy further. Looking for supporters of your claim, you ask around and find another mariner who says he saw a kraken. Since that is not the shared experience, you doubt him and he doubts you. Then, he brings out ten other guys who, when he told them of his experience, also went out to the sea, got sunstroked and now claim that they saw the kraken. Knowing how the power of suggestion works on the mind, you reasonably ask if it is not possible that the first guy hallucinated and the others saw what they expected to see due to the sunstroke. Some of them may even be lying so as not to appear as having taken up a fool's errand. At this point, the guys who went out upon your suggestion return, all of them sunstroked and all of them saying that they saw the whale but none of them with so much as a picture of it. Now, if you are a reasonable man, you'd realize that all the objections you apply to the krakeners apply to you and your whalers as well. You should question what you saw even though you were certain some time ago that you saw it. If you are reasonable, you realize that while this whale might actually be out there, the sunstroke explanation is just as valid and explains the kraken as well. So rather than trying to convince anyone else, you should question your own experience and look for some objective evidence.

The fun begins when the parties involved are unreasonable. The whalers and krakeners both continue insisting that what they saw was real while the others were just sunstroked. Being angered by the others' suggestions, each group builds its entity to more and more until a fight breaks out about who saw what. Meanwhile, all those who didn't take them seriously are standing around, equally horrified and laughing their asses off about these crazy people fighting over imaginary creatures. Seeing this, the whalers and krakeners put aside their differences and decide to attack the bystanders first and figure out which of them is right later.

(July 10, 2013 at 11:52 pm)FallentoReason Wrote: Agreed, but what I also want to get across is that we need to be more understanding of *their* position. Whether true or not, they say they have experiential justification for their beliefs. This means that by *default* there will be some arguments that you can present to them which they will outright deny because of their circumstances.

Which is why we also present alternate explanations for their experience. Not only do we argue why the entity they claim is illogical - or atleast unlikely - we also give them alternate reasons for their experience. If they are reasonable, they should realize on the strength of these two points how their experiential justification is invalid.


(July 10, 2013 at 11:52 pm)FallentoReason Wrote: An example closer to home of this might be that you believe in moral relativism. So a theist could say that action x is morally wrong according to divine command theory. The statement *as is* doesn't affect you in the slightest because whatever *your* justification for moral relativism might be leads you to think that statement is false, according to moral relativism. This means the theist can't simply keep asserting the same thing, because to you it's prima facie false. Therefore they need to find a different strategy to undermine your belief in moral relativity.

The theist here would have other strategies. He can try to show that facts contradict moral relativism - by showing there are universal and absolute morals. He can address my basis for moral relativism. He can give alternate explanations as to why I might feel as if morals are relative without them necessarily being so.

And all the same tools are available to me as well. Ultimately, facts will vindicate the one who is right.

(July 10, 2013 at 11:52 pm)FallentoReason Wrote: This is what I'm talking about! Now you're not resorting to the near impossible task of getting them to show their cards. There's other ways which indirectly tell you something about the cards they hold, and if they're honest enough/your argument is sound, then it will undermine their experiential justification from their *own* p.o.v.

The key requirement you are forgetting is if they are being rational.
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#24
RE: On Belief in God X
(July 11, 2013 at 10:15 am)genkaus Wrote:


Yep, so that's a pretty spot on analogy for what's happening today. But I still don't see how the krakeners would show the kraken to a skeptic. *whistle* "KRAAAKEN, c'mere boy!"

I don't think you've dodged the issue I raised.

Quote:
(July 10, 2013 at 11:52 pm)FallentoReason Wrote: Agreed, but what I also want to get across is that we need to be more understanding of *their* position. Whether true or not, they say they have experiential justification for their beliefs. This means that by *default* there will be some arguments that you can present to them which they will outright deny because of their circumstances.

Which is why we also present alternate explanations for their experience. Not only do we argue why the entity they claim is illogical - or atleast unlikely - we also give them alternate reasons for their experience. If they are reasonable, they should realize on the strength of these two points how their experiential justification is invalid.

Agreed, and this is the correct thing to be doing. Sitting back and saying "show me the money" in a literal sense is not.

Quote:
(July 10, 2013 at 11:52 pm)FallentoReason Wrote: An example closer to home of this might be that you believe in moral relativism. So a theist could say that action x is morally wrong according to divine command theory. The statement *as is* doesn't affect you in the slightest because whatever *your* justification for moral relativism might be leads you to think that statement is false, according to moral relativism. This means the theist can't simply keep asserting the same thing, because to you it's prima facie false. Therefore they need to find a different strategy to undermine your belief in moral relativity.

The theist here would have other strategies. He can try to show that facts contradict moral relativism - by showing there are universal and absolute morals. He can address my basis for moral relativism. He can give alternate explanations as to why I might feel as if morals are relative without them necessarily being so.

And all the same tools are available to me as well. Ultimately, facts will vindicate the one who is right.

Agreed.

Quote:
(July 10, 2013 at 11:52 pm)FallentoReason Wrote: This is what I'm talking about! Now you're not resorting to the near impossible task of getting them to show their cards. There's other ways which indirectly tell you something about the cards they hold, and if they're honest enough/your argument is sound, then it will undermine their experiential justification from their *own* p.o.v.

The key requirement you are forgetting is if they are being rational.
[/quote]

Leave that with them. As long as you've adequately shown your points to be valid, then that's all you *can* do.
"It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain a thought without accepting it" ~ Aristotle
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#25
RE: On Belief in God X
Quote:On Belief in God X

The better response might be:

On Belief in God - Y?
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#26
RE: On Belief in God X
(July 13, 2013 at 12:26 am)FallentoReason Wrote: Yep, so that's a pretty spot on analogy for what's happening today. But I still don't see how the krakeners would show the kraken to a skeptic. *whistle* "KRAAAKEN, c'mere boy!"

He may not be able to - I understand and accept that. What the krakener must now understand and accept is that given the improbability of such a being, validity of sunstroke explanation, existence of many other alternate explanations and the claims of the whalers, his continued inability to do so is not only sufficient reason for me to disbelieve his claim but also sufficient reason for him to doubt his experience.

So, in conclusion to the OP, the improbability of the royal flush is given as a starting point for better evaluation, not a clinching argument for settling the discussion. It is the justification for healthy skepticism - not evidence for disbelief. On its own, it wouldn't qualify as sufficient reason for the one holding the flush to question his experience - but it is reason enough for him to take another look - to look for evidence both for and against it. And if he happens to find that the bulk of evidence and other logical arguments indicate that he is not holding the royal flush, then that - along with the initial improbability - form reason sufficient for him to doubt the experience of royal flush.
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#27
RE: On Belief in God X
(July 13, 2013 at 12:41 am)genkaus Wrote:
(July 13, 2013 at 12:26 am)FallentoReason Wrote: Yep, so that's a pretty spot on analogy for what's happening today. But I still don't see how the krakeners would show the kraken to a skeptic. *whistle* "KRAAAKEN, c'mere boy!"

He may not be able to - I understand and accept that. What the krakener must now understand and accept is that given the improbability of such a being, validity of sunstroke explanation, existence of many other alternate explanations and the claims of the whalers, his continued inability to do so is not only sufficient reason for me to disbelieve his claim but also sufficient reason for him to doubt his experience.

So, in conclusion to the OP, the improbability of the royal flush is given as a starting point for better evaluation, not a clinching argument for settling the discussion. It is the justification for healthy skepticism - not evidence for disbelief. On its own, it wouldn't qualify as sufficient reason for the one holding the flush to question his experience - but it is reason enough for him to take another look - to look for evidence both for and against it. And if he happens to find that the bulk of evidence and other logical arguments indicate that he is not holding the royal flush, then that - along with the initial improbability - form reason sufficient for him to doubt the experience of royal flush.

If we're strictly linking it back to the OP now, then the above fails to establish anything against the OP. The circumstance I set up in the OP was that, whether true or false, the believer claims they have experiential justification for their belief, just like someone who got dealt a royal flush has the ongoing experiential justification before their eyes, just like the original krakener who, according to your story, has experiential justification for the claim that they have seen such a beast. So to say"the improbability of the royal flush[/god/the kraken] is given as a starting point for better evaluation" is *exactly* what I'm suggesting shouldn't be done. Alternate routes need to be found which undermine the very concept of a royal flush/god/the kraken, which then undeniably leads to the conclusion that experiential instances are impossible.
"It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain a thought without accepting it" ~ Aristotle
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#28
RE: On Belief in God X
(July 14, 2013 at 8:45 am)FallentoReason Wrote: If we're strictly linking it back to the OP now, then the above fails to establish anything against the OP. The circumstance I set up in the OP was that, whether true or false, the believer claims they have experiential justification for their belief, just like someone who got dealt a royal flush has the ongoing experiential justification before their eyes, just like the original krakener who, according to your story, has experiential justification for the claim that they have seen such a beast. So to say"the improbability of the royal flush[/god/the kraken] is given as a starting point for better evaluation" is *exactly* what I'm suggesting shouldn't be done. Alternate routes need to be found which undermine the very concept of a royal flush/god/the kraken, which then undeniably leads to the conclusion that experiential instances are impossible.

And here I thought we were finally coming to an agreement. Well, if you don't think "improbability" is a good enough argument to start a discussion with, then you don't. Arguably, there could be both better and worse arguments to be made. Still, here's how I think the conversation would go.

Royal Flush Holder: Woohoo, I got a royal flush. I'm gonna win this pot, bitches.

Me: Really? You have a royal flush? You know that the chances of that are like a billion to one.

RFH: Yeah, so? Doesn't change the fact that I have a royal flush.

Me: So, you say. In fact, that's what the other five guys are saying too. That's not just improbable, that's just impossible.

RFH: Maybe they're lying. Or just drunk and wrong about the cards they actually have.

Me: Aren't you drunk too?

RFH: Yeah, so?

Me: So, maybe you are seeing things too.

RFH: No, I have the real royal flush.

(I put five cards on the table)

Me: Say, do you think I put a royal flush on the table just now?

RFH: Yes, that's right. That's a royal flush too.

Me: Wrong. That's not a royal flush, its a straight flush.

RFH: That little trick doesn't prove that I don't have the royal flush.

(I look through the deck)

Me: Well, would you look at that? Wouldn't you say that if you have the royal flush then atleast one Queen would be missing from the deck.

RFH: I do have the Royal Flush and a Queen is missing.

Me: Nope. See? All 4 queens - present and correct.

RFH: Well, I still have the royal flush.

Me: So, let me get this straight. You keep saying that you have the royal flush - something highly improbable to begin with - while others claim the same thing, while we know that you are drunk and therefore possibly seeing hings, while we also know that you can't tell the difference between a royal flush and a non-royal flush and while we also know that the cards necessarily missing from the deck for you to have one are not missing at all - and you expect us to believe you? How can even you believe yourself?

RFH: Well, when you put it like that.....
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#29
RE: On Belief in God X
(July 14, 2013 at 9:17 am)genkaus Wrote:
(July 14, 2013 at 8:45 am)FallentoReason Wrote: If we're strictly linking it back to the OP now, then the above fails to establish anything against the OP. The circumstance I set up in the OP was that, whether true or false, the believer claims they have experiential justification for their belief, just like someone who got dealt a royal flush has the ongoing experiential justification before their eyes, just like the original krakener who, according to your story, has experiential justification for the claim that they have seen such a beast. So to say"the improbability of the royal flush[/god/the kraken] is given as a starting point for better evaluation" is *exactly* what I'm suggesting shouldn't be done. Alternate routes need to be found which undermine the very concept of a royal flush/god/the kraken, which then undeniably leads to the conclusion that experiential instances are impossible.

And here I thought we were finally coming to an agreement. Well, if you don't think "improbability" is a good enough argument to start a discussion with, then you don't. Arguably, there could be both better and worse arguments to be made. Still, here's how I think the conversation would go.

I don't know if you're picking up on the subtleties here, or if you outright disagree with these subtleties, but the royal flush scenario highlights the irrelevance of probabilities. Think of this alternate scenario: I deal 5 cards to you. You turn them over and see cards p, q, r, s and t. The chances of that ever happening were going to be some ridiculously small number, yet you sit there with the experiential justification that rightly allows you to claim you indeed have been dealt cards p, q, r, s and t, regardless of the maths.

When it comes to the reality of religious claims, we can't make the assumptions that you've ran with here:

Quote:


because (and this is up for debate) I think the royal flush scenario *by nature* puts the royal flush holder in a position where they have a "one up". Why? Well, because properly basic beliefs are a damn strong reason to hold on to said beliefs. Would you ever accept that you need to question I dealt you cards p, q, r, s and t when they're sitting right in front of you? Do we need to acknowledge Descartes' demon has been sitting at the table this whole time? No, I think we can assume that what you see is what you see, regardless of improbability or deep skepticism of the senses. As the nature of the scenario implies, no one actually has impaired senses.

In light of this, that's why it's actually irrational to ask the royal flush holder to check again, to see if they really have a royal flush. I could ask you the same thing with cards p, q, r, s and t, and it would go something like this:

Me: so you really have those cards, despite the odds?

You: yes.

Me: are you sure? The odds suggest you should check again. Do you really have those cards?

You: yes.

Me: ok, but just to make sure, could you check one final time?

You: ok... *looks down, and back up again* *sigh* yeees!


Let's bring this back to the real world:


Atheist: you are deluded. You didn't experience God.

Theist: I am sure of it. It was *undeniable* (appeal to their properly basic belief).

Atheist: you need to be rational. It's highly unlikely that it was a genuine experience.

Theist: I know what I felt/heard/saw (appeal to their experiential justification of said belief).

Atheist: there are a myriad of other explanations.

Theist: ...I know what I felt/heard/saw!!!!


Basically, I think properly basic beliefs are something we can't deny to ourselves. I dealt you cards p, q, r, s and t, and as a result, you have an inescapable belief that that is in fact so - that I dealt you cards p...t. Therefore, to allow such beliefs to be "sound" in everyday living, such as giving testimony about something relatively trivial you saw to a friend, and not have to ask to "check your hand again", surely means that the same should go for a theist who felt/heard/saw something x years ago which made them think differently about the world. Unless of course one has a strong bias against that particular brand of properly basic belief for some unknown reason. Then maybe you should stay consistent and question the entirety of what you experience and ask if there really is an external world beyond the Self. If you don't have reason to do that, then neither does the theist for their subset of alleged experiences. If so, then your only logical alternative is to grant them that experiential justification, but find *different* means to show them that justification actually needs to be discarded.
"It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain a thought without accepting it" ~ Aristotle
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#30
RE: On Belief in God X
(July 14, 2013 at 9:55 am)FallentoReason Wrote: I don't know if you're picking up on the subtleties here, or if you outright disagree with these subtleties, but the royal flush scenario highlights the irrelevance of probabilities. Think of this alternate scenario: I deal 5 cards to you. You turn them over and see cards p, q, r, s and t. The chances of that ever happening were going to be some ridiculously small number, yet you sit there with the experiential justification that rightly allows you to claim you indeed have been dealt cards p, q, r, s and t, regardless of the maths.

I disagree. While the experiential justification is sufficient for me to believe that I hold those cards, to rightly claim it, i.e. claim with the expectation of others believing me, I would require more than that. While experiential justification trumps improbability, they don't have that justification for believing me and therefore, for them, the improbability still is a valid reason for skepticism. And while, as a matter of convenience, they may accept my claim due to the lower significance of cards I hold, I cannot expect the same acceptance if I claim to hold a royal flush.

(July 14, 2013 at 9:55 am)FallentoReason Wrote: because (and this is up for debate) I think the royal flush scenario *by nature* puts the royal flush holder in a position where they have a "one up". Why? Well, because properly basic beliefs are a damn strong reason to hold on to said beliefs. Would you ever accept that you need to question I dealt you cards p, q, r, s and t when they're sitting right in front of you? Do we need to acknowledge Descartes' demon has been sitting at the table this whole time? No, I think we can assume that what you see is what you see, regardless of improbability or deep skepticism of the senses. As the nature of the scenario implies, no one actually has impaired senses.

As I have said before, given sufficient reason to do so, I would accept that I need to question that I have been dealt the cards p...t. And as I have also said before, I do not consider improbability to be sufficient reason, but improbability combined with a myriad of other reasons would be.


(July 14, 2013 at 9:55 am)FallentoReason Wrote: In light of this, that's why it's actually irrational to ask the royal flush holder to check again, to see if they really have a royal flush. I could ask you the same thing with cards p, q, r, s and t, and it would go something like this:

Me: so you really have those cards, despite the odds?

You: yes.

Me: are you sure? The odds suggest you should check again. Do you really have those cards?

You: yes.

Me: ok, but just to make sure, could you check one final time?

You: ok... *looks down, and back up again* *sigh* yeees!


Let's bring this back to the real world:


Atheist: you are deluded. You didn't experience God.

Theist: I am sure of it. It was *undeniable* (appeal to their properly basic belief).

Atheist: you need to be rational. It's highly unlikely that it was a genuine experience.

Theist: I know what I felt/heard/saw (appeal to their experiential justification of said belief).

Atheist: there are a myriad of other explanations.

Theist: ...I know what I felt/heard/saw!!!!

That is both an inaccurate representation and analogy. The "myriad of other explanations" argument isn't reflected in the cards analogy. And more significantly, appeal to improbability is not the only argument we use in a theist atheist debate. If that were the only counter in our arsenal, then we wouldn't expect theists to question their experience even if we still would've sufficient reason to remain skeptical.


(July 14, 2013 at 9:55 am)FallentoReason Wrote: Basically, I think properly basic beliefs are something we can't deny to ourselves. I dealt you cards p, q, r, s and t, and as a result, you have an inescapable belief that that is in fact so - that I dealt you cards p...t. Therefore, to allow such beliefs to be "sound" in everyday living, such as giving testimony about something relatively trivial you saw to a friend, and not have to ask to "check your hand again", surely means that the same should go for a theist who felt/heard/saw something x years ago which made them think differently about the world. Unless of course one has a strong bias against that particular brand of properly basic belief for some unknown reason. Then maybe you should stay consistent and question the entirety of what you experience and ask if there really is an external world beyond the Self. If you don't have reason to do that, then neither does the theist for their subset of alleged experiences. If so, then your only logical alternative is to grant them that experiential justification, but find *different* means to show them that justification actually needs to be discarded.

I think you are trivializing the significance of triviality here. We grant validity to experiential justifications in trivial matters, even though it is not logical to do so, because it is much more convenient. It is not a question of bias but of relevance to oneself. I may accept someone's claim that they experienced Angelina Jolie (that came out dirtier than intended) because such a claim is relatively insignificant. The claim of experiencing god is much more significant. Especially when it entails directives regarding my behavior. The consistency here would be regarding the thumb rule for experiences of greater significance to require greater evidence.

Because my last post seems a bit meandering and confusing, I will state my position as briefly as possible.

A person may hold experience as sufficient justification for a belief - IF there aren't any valid objections to that belief or any valid alternate explanations for the experience. He also cannot expect others who do not share the same experience to accept his belief on his say so. The probability of his belief would play a role in others' acceptance of it.

A person who does not have the experience and has no valid reasons for or against the said belief, may condition his acceptance (but not his denial) upon the probability and significance of it being true. For example, if the probability of it being true is high or the significance low, one may accept such a belief. It may not be logical, but its more convenient.
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