Omniscience Argument Against God's Existence

[MindForgedManacle]

To "know everything" is shorthand for "knowing everything that is capable of being known." If something cannot be known for logical reasons then it does not fall within the scope of omniscience. I also point this out to my Calvinist friends who think God knows the future. God cannot know the future because it does not yet exist and you cannot have knowledge of something that does not exist. Likewise you cannot have knowledge of something that logically cannot exist, like a one-sided coin. So your argument is correct, God cannot logically have meta-knowledge. That does not disprove God or His ability to know everything that it is capable of being known.

Your response is actually inapplicable to the argument. I specifically worded the 4th premise to be explicit about what I meant. We can call the set referring to things a being is unaware of Set X. The status of the number of members in that set is always going to be unknowable, by sheer virtue of one not being able to know that they aren't aware of something that can be known about.

The problem is that it is possible to discover things that you were previously unaware of and gain knowledge of them. Hence, God coukd never know whether or not he had exhausted the members of Set X that could be known, but that he simply hasn't yet discovered. That's the argument's real thrust.

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Awareness ~ the act of attaining knowledge where this knowledge was previously unknown to the individual

By this I mean e.g. I could become aware for the first time of some tragedy that happened in a country via the news, and so now I have obtained that knowledge whereas before I was unaware of it. Under this view of "awareness", I would reject (P4) due to the fact that it misunderstands (P1): the first premise states that an hypothetical omniscient mind *already* possesses *all* knowledge.

Actually, P1 is just the definition of omniscience, it does not entail that omniscience is a possible attribute. P4 is just a demonstration that a mind cannot possess all knowledge, because that would be to claim that you can know that there is something you are not aware you can have knowledge of, yet you know of it.

Therefore, it's impossible for such a mind to even become aware of more knowledge, as there is no more knowledge *to be aware of*. Therefore, I reject (P4) simply because an omniscient mind would *know* that there is no more knowledge to become aware of.

Again, that would be to say that it's possible to be aware of the possibility of attaining knowledge of something you aren't even aware you can have knowledge of.

Another way of highlighting the issue is that (P2) & (P3) are describing difficulties associated with a *non-omniscient* mind, which by default won't apply to an omniscient mind, and thus the rest of the argument is a non-sequitur.

The issues in P2 & P3 apply to any mind, because it's an epistemic barrier that is in principle impregnable.

[FallentoReason]

Awareness ~ the act of attaining knowledge where this knowledge was previously unknown to the individual

By this I mean e.g. I could become aware for the first time of some tragedy that happened in a country via the news, and so now I have obtained that knowledge whereas before I was unaware of it. Under this view of "awareness", I would reject (P4) due to the fact that it misunderstands (P1): the first premise states that an hypothetical omniscient mind *already* possesses *all* knowledge.

Actually, P1 is just the definition of omniscience, it does not entail that omniscience is a possible attribute. [1]P4 is just a demonstration that a mind cannot possess all knowledge, [2]because that would be to claim that you can know that there is something you are not aware you can have knowledge of, yet you know of it.

(numbers are mine)

Statement [2] doesn't apply to an omniscient being. To an omniscient being, there is *no* knowledge that it doesn't already possess, hence the being possessing the attribute of omniscience *in the first place*. Therefore [1] is outright false.

Therefore, it's impossible for such a mind to even become aware of more knowledge, as there is no more knowledge *to be aware of*. Therefore, I reject (P4) simply because an omniscient mind would *know* that there is no more knowledge to become aware of.

Again, that would be to say that it's possible to be aware of the possibility of attaining knowledge of something you aren't even aware you can have knowledge of.

And again, this statement is meaningless to an *omniscient* being who possesses *all* possible knowledge. Your statement here implies that the being in question is *not* omniscient by the very fact that you're alluding to this being possibly having the ability of attaining one more bit of knowledge. That is something an omniscient being *isn't* capable of (which, mind you, has interesting implications about omnipotence.. but I digress).

Another way of highlighting the issue is that (P2) & (P3) are describing difficulties associated with a *non-omniscient* mind, which by default won't apply to an omniscient mind, and thus the rest of the argument is a non-sequitur.

The issues in P2 & P3 apply to any mind, because it's an epistemic barrier that is in principle impregnable.

I won't repeat myself here, as you should be able to see what my response would be from the above.

[MindForgedManacle]

Statement [2] doesn't apply to an omniscient being. To an omniscient being, there is *no* knowledge that it doesn't already possess, hence the being possessing the attribute of omniscience *in the first place*. Therefore [1] is outright false.

Again, this is a misunderstanding. The argument is that omniscience (meaning possessing all knowledge) is impossible. The maximum possible knowledge a mind could have is that there is nothing it is aware of that it doesn't fully understand. But a being could never know that there is something it doesn't know of (nor how much it doesn't know), because by definition it wouldn't know about it. The being in question could only believe that it's omniscient, but it couldn't know it.

And again, this statement is meaningless to an *omniscient* being who possesses *all* possible knowledge. Your statement here implies that the being in question is *not* omniscient by the very fact that you're alluding to this being possibly having the ability of attaining one more bit of knowledge. That is something an omniscient being *isn't* capable of (which, mind you, has interesting implications about omnipotence.. but I digress).

The argument is that omniscience isn't possible, not that there is a being who possesses omniscience and thus knows my argument to be faulty. There is always at least one thing that a mind could never know, and that is whether or not there is something it doesn't know of. And since that is always unknown, the being also can never know whether or not there is something that it doesn't know of, but could potentially know of.

I won't repeat myself here, as you should be able to see what my response would be from the above.

I don't get your response, honestly. It boils down to that omniscience is impossible because of an inherently unknownable answer to the question "Is there anything of which I don't know that I'm unaware of?", which further means the being doesn't know that it's acquired all possible knowledge.

[MindForgedManacle]

Although I thank you for your critique.

[FallentoReason]

Again, this is a misunderstanding. The argument is that omniscience (meaning possessing all knowledge) is impossible. The maximum possible knowledge a mind could have is that there is nothing it is aware of that it doesn't fully understand. But a being could never know that there is something it doesn't know of (nor how much it doesn't know), because by definition it wouldn't know about it. The being in question could only believe that it's omniscient, but it couldn't know it.

I'd have to disagree with your definition of omniscience: "The maximum possible knowledge a mind could have is that there is nothing it is aware of that it doesn't fully understand." I'd say omniscience is simply when the set of all possible knowledge also happens to be the set of what an entity/mind knows. Under this definition, the statement "what this mind doesn't know is ____" never applies to a mind which is omniscient. This leads me to your statement: "But a being could never know that there is something it doesn't know of (nor how much it doesn't know), because by definition it wouldn't know about it." So if "by definition" it "doesn't know about [something]", then it was never omniscient to begin with i.e. your argument concerns a non-omniscient mind, which of course isn't your desired end game.

I think it's simply not possible to take omniscience alone and show that there's a logical contradiction. Or if it's possible, you'd have to use a different route other than purely knowledge, as knowing everything by definition doesn't seem to cause any problems.

The argument is that omniscience isn't possible, not that there is a being who possesses omniscience and thus knows my argument to be faulty. There is always at least one thing that a mind could never know, and that is whether or not there is something it doesn't know of. And since that is always unknown, the being also can never know whether or not there is something that it doesn't know of, but could potentially know of.

An omniscient mind would know that it knows everything. A simple proof of this is that knowing that you know everything is itself a piece of knowledge, and the attribute of omniscience would entail that this mind knows that already, thus the set of potential knowledge that it could acquire about absolutely *anything* is the empty set.

I don't get your response, honestly. It boils down to that omniscience is impossible because of an inherently unknownable answer to the question "Is there anything of which I don't know that I'm unaware of?", which further means the being doesn't know that it's acquired all possible knowledge.

To me it sounds like your hypothetical being is one which *worked* its way up to an alleged state of omniscience. This is the only way I can make sense of certain statements you make about this being. But when it comes to the *definition* of omniscience, I just don't see how your argument applies to it. *By definition*, this hypothetical mind knows all that there is to know, and thus implying that it can't know ______ is either a false statement OR you're referring to a different being altogether - one that is non-omniscient.

[bennyboy]

I think Omni arguments are bullshit, because they are addressing obviously bullshit definitions of God. If there IS something mystical pervading the universe, or responsible for its existence, it's not going to be comprehensible to Gomer the fuckwit or Mehmed the goatherd.

I'm not sure who's dumber, the ones who make these silly arguments, or the ones who keep bothering to explain why they fail, when it's so obvious.

[Fidel_Castronaut]

I think Omni arguments are bullshit, because they are addressing obviously bullshit definitions of God. If there IS something mystical pervading the universe, or responsible for its existence, it's not going to be comprehensible to Gomer the fuckwit or Mehmed the goatherd.

I'm not sure who's dumber, the ones who make these silly arguments, or the ones who keep bothering to explain why they fail, when it's so obvious.

Because some people don't understand why they fail.

Obvious to you, perhaps.

Also, discussion on omni-facets almost always become a definitional debate about what omni-facets mean (already evident on this thread within two pages).

[FallentoReason]

I think Omni arguments are bullshit, because they are addressing obviously bullshit definitions of God. If there IS something mystical pervading the universe, or responsible for its existence, it's not going to be comprehensible to Gomer the fuckwit or Mehmed the goatherd.

I'm not sure who's dumber, the ones who make these silly arguments, or the ones who keep bothering to explain why they fail, when it's so obvious.

Maybe you should teach philosophy at a university, eh!

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Also, discussion on omni-facets almost always become a definitional debate about what omni-facets mean (already evident on this thread within two pages).

It's a good thing. Otherwise the last two pages would be of two people speaking ambiguously without ever having the hopes of seeing eye to eye eventually.

[MindForgedManacle]

I'd have to disagree with your definition of omniscience: "The maximum possible knowledge a mind could have is that there is nothing it is aware of that it doesn't fully understand." I'd say omniscience is simply when the set of all possible knowledge also happens to be the set of what an entity/mind knows.

I don't see the problem with my definition, which by the way isn't as you quoted. What you quoted was my statement of what the maximum possible knowledge was, not my working definition of omniscience, which was "possessing all knowledge".

Under this definition, the statement "what this mind doesn't know is ____" never applies to a mind which is omniscient. This leads me to your statement: "But a being could never know that there is something it doesn't know of (nor how much it doesn't know), because by definition it wouldn't know about it." So if "by definition" it "doesn't know about [something]", then it was never omniscient to begin with i.e. your argument concerns a non-omniscient mind, which of course isn't your desired end game.

Actually, that is my end game, that any claim to there being a... being who possesses all knowledge is in fact impossible because it leads to an impossible knowledge claim.

I think it's simply not possible to take omniscience alone and show that there's a logical contradiction. Or if it's possible, you'd have to use a different route other than purely knowledge, as knowing everything by definition doesn't seem to cause any problems.

That's what the argument does (I think). Even under the sort of stop-gap definition of knowledge (a justified, true belief) omniscience becomes incoherent, because the being claimed to have omniscience can never justify the belief that there is nothing it doesn't know of, even if the belief were true, hence it couldn't have knowledge of it.

A true belief held without justification isn't knowledge.

An omniscient mind would know that it knows everything. A simple proof of this is that knowing that you know everything is itself a piece of knowledge, and the attribute of omniscience would entail that this mind knows that already, thus the set of potential knowledge that it could acquire about absolutely *anything* is the empty set.

Except the being couldn't know that by virtue of it being an incoherent claim. That is literally saying: "I know that there is nothing of which I do not know that I'm unaware of". That's epistemically impossible.

To me it sounds like your hypothetical being is one which *worked* its way up to an alleged state of omniscience. This is the only way I can make sense of certain statements you make about this being.

No, it would be about a being who believes it knows it's omniscience, but it is a belief that can never be justified even if it's true, because knowledge of that which you don't know that you're unaware of is a contradiction in terms. Regardless of whether or not there are any members of this set, that is true. In other words, the being could never know this set was empty.

But when it comes to the *definition* of omniscience, I just don't see how your argument applies to it. *By definition*, this hypothetical mind knows all that there is to know, and thus implying that it can't know ______ is either a false statement OR you're referring to a different being altogether - one that is non-omniscient.

Or it shows that the definition of omniscience is incoherent if it is "possessing all knowledge". It shows that such isn't a possible attribute to begin with.

The real way to beat the argument is to show that you can know there is nothing you don't know, that you don't know (that there are no 'unknown unknowns').

[Vincenzo Vinny G.]

P1) Omniscience is the ability for a mind to possess all knowledge.

P2) You cannot be aware of that which you are [currently] unaware of, even if in principle you could one day become aware of it.

P3) If you are unaware of something, you cannot have knowledge of it so long as you remain unaware of it.

P4) Because P1-3 are true, knowledge of the status of the set referring to "everything one's mind is unaware of" is unknowable, even if the set itself has no members.

C1) Therefore omniscience is an impossible attribute to possess.

P5) God is defined as a being whom possesses the attribute of omniscience.

C2) Therefore God does not exist.

Is there anything wrong here?

It's good that there are atheists who are looking to work on arguments.

But your argument commits a modal error in P2. To see this, we can make a distinction between two sorts of metacognitive states:
a) Cognizant unawareness: I KNOW that I am unaware of how many atoms are in my body.
b) Non-cognizant unawareness: I DON'T KNOW that I am unaware of how many atoms are in my body.

P2 denies the possibility of (a). Although, (a) is obviously a possible stance to hold.