Elbow Room by Den Dennett
January 26, 2014 at 5:49 pm
(This post was last modified: January 26, 2014 at 7:19 pm by Mudhammam.)
A few moments ago I finished Dan Dennett's Elbow Room. This thread is for those who have read the book, or are familiar with Dennett's compatibalism, who would like to discuss his arguments in the book or in general if you have not read that specific work.
Honestly, I'm slightly underwhelmed, though I regrettably confess that my inexperience in dealing with analytic philosophy probably limited my exposure to the full force of his argument. I love Dan's writing style and the way his brain works but on this particular issue, I yearned for something a bit more clear and straightforward. That's not to say anything in particular tripped me up but his gradual case never really seemed to seal the deal that the "free will problem" is solved, or if merely dissolved, doesn't look more and more like Harris' hard determinism. Admittedly, Dan's only intent may have been to get my intuitions pumping, and on that front he succeeded. Still, I can see why people prefer Harris' hard determinism (to say nothing of it's "implications" for responsibility and morality) based on Harris' clear and precise presentation alone.
So what do you think? Do you remember anything from the book that stood out to you as a particularly strong defense of free will or anything that was just plain weak?
Overall, I gather that Dennett is saying something like, a simple machine with one operating function is an obvious example of determined outcomes. Push the button and the light comes on. Or shove a boulder and it rolls down the hill. Local fatalism, as Dan calls it. But when we add billions of parts and an infinite amount of potential button-pushers or boulder-shovers, *blur-blur-obfuscation-blur-blur-blur* the complex machine with billions of mechanisms and infinite potential pressure selectors now has something like free will and that is something we should want! I just don't see what makes human brains fundamentally different, given their dependence on the fixed laws of nature, that give our off-centered "selves" or sense of self some sort of self-empowerment beyond the illusion of free will Harris claims we can and should practically maintain. Nor do I see how some events in the universe could be free from local fatalism, if determinism is true, at least on the macroscopic level (i.e. classical, Newtonian physics). By the way, I really hope those two debate.
Honestly, I'm slightly underwhelmed, though I regrettably confess that my inexperience in dealing with analytic philosophy probably limited my exposure to the full force of his argument. I love Dan's writing style and the way his brain works but on this particular issue, I yearned for something a bit more clear and straightforward. That's not to say anything in particular tripped me up but his gradual case never really seemed to seal the deal that the "free will problem" is solved, or if merely dissolved, doesn't look more and more like Harris' hard determinism. Admittedly, Dan's only intent may have been to get my intuitions pumping, and on that front he succeeded. Still, I can see why people prefer Harris' hard determinism (to say nothing of it's "implications" for responsibility and morality) based on Harris' clear and precise presentation alone.
So what do you think? Do you remember anything from the book that stood out to you as a particularly strong defense of free will or anything that was just plain weak?
Overall, I gather that Dennett is saying something like, a simple machine with one operating function is an obvious example of determined outcomes. Push the button and the light comes on. Or shove a boulder and it rolls down the hill. Local fatalism, as Dan calls it. But when we add billions of parts and an infinite amount of potential button-pushers or boulder-shovers, *blur-blur-obfuscation-blur-blur-blur* the complex machine with billions of mechanisms and infinite potential pressure selectors now has something like free will and that is something we should want! I just don't see what makes human brains fundamentally different, given their dependence on the fixed laws of nature, that give our off-centered "selves" or sense of self some sort of self-empowerment beyond the illusion of free will Harris claims we can and should practically maintain. Nor do I see how some events in the universe could be free from local fatalism, if determinism is true, at least on the macroscopic level (i.e. classical, Newtonian physics). By the way, I really hope those two debate.