The difference between ethical atheism and nihlism is that ethical atheists have more faith

[genkaus]

There is your approach to teleology, you just make it up. You have a debate, people debate about what the ends of different parts of life are, but there is actually no way to resolve the debate or say what the final end of anything is or where it stops, there are a million different ways that are judged by "explanatory power", as defined by whoever defines whatever they want in whatever way they want.

Don't make me repeat my arguments. That any so called purposes or ends are made up by humans does not mean we make it up. I've already told you that the way to resolve the debate is by justifying your proposition. There may be a million different ways - but none of them should be considered valid unless a rationale is provided for them. So no, whoever cannot define whatever they in whatever way they want.

Hey genkaus, have you seen the thread on ecstasy?

I haven't even seen a thread high. Where did it score ecstasy?

[jstrodel]

Don't make me repeat my arguments. That any so called purposes or ends are made up by humans does not mean we make it up. I've already told you that the way to resolve the debate is by justifying your proposition. There may be a million different ways - but none of them should be considered valid unless a rationale is provided for them. So no, whoever cannot define whatever they in whatever way they want.

I understand that perfectly well, but how does that transcend phenomenological understanding and appreciate teleology? Do you understand phenomenological methods of belief formation to yield authoritative answers to teleology?

Why should any person feel like they need to accept your approach to defining teleology or your sense of explanatory power or something like that? How does your approach to teleology become more than an opinion? How can it capture the nature of something and be shown to more than some other way? How can someone feel bound to accept your methods and values in assessing teleology, and ultimately, if something is more your perception of teleology, how can it be said that thing actually has that end?

[Neo-Scholastic]

I understand that perfectly well, but how does that transcend phenomenological understanding and appreciate teleology? Do you understand phenomenological methods of belief formation to yield authoritative answers to teleology?

Wow! That's a lot of $5 words in a short amount of space.

Genkaus, I know we have fundamentally different opinions about what 'concepts' really are. Don't you suppose that some things are discovered rather than fabricated. It seems to me that mathematical truths do not vary, though we may not fully understand them. Why must we exclude final ends from the discovery process? Why assume that final ends are abstract fantasies?

[genkaus]

I understand that perfectly well, but how does that transcend phenomenological understanding and appreciate teleology?

How many times do I have to repeat myself? By use of reason and evidence.

Do you understand phenomenological methods of belief formation to yield authoritative answers to teleology?

That would be an apt description of religion. Thankfully, use of reason and logic requires you to depend on more than phenomenology.

Why should any person feel like they need to accept your approach to defining teleology or your sense of explanatory power or something like that?

Because its rational and justified.

How does your approach to teleology become more than an opinion?

By being logical.

How can it capture the nature of something and be shown to more than some other way?

Same answer.

How can someone feel bound to accept your methods and values in assessing teleology, and ultimately, if something is more your perception of teleology, how can it be said that thing actually has that end?

Again, if I can provide a valid argument for my case....

---

Genkaus, I know we have fundamentally different opinions about what 'concepts' really are. Don't you suppose that some things are discovered rather than fabricated. It seems to me that mathematical truths do not vary, though we may not fully understand them. Why must we exclude final ends from the discovery process? Why assume that final ends are abstract fantasies?

I never excluded discovery from being an important part of the process of having concepts. Understand that I do not consider final ends to be abstract fantasies nor do I consider them to be fabricated. As a matter of fact, if someone was to justify a "final end" of an object to me, then I certainly would not consider something that was fabricated but something that was "discovered" through an examination of what that object is.

The discoveries you make depend upon the premises you start with. To take an example of one of the mathematical truths - the value of pi is discovered as the ratio of a circle's circumference to its diameter. But perfect circles do not exist in the natural world. They are an idealized form of shapes found in the natural world, all of which can at best be an approximation to the perfect circle. This does not mean that the concept of the circle has been fabricated or is simply an abstract fantasy - it is formulated from reality, from things that exist. The closer your axiomatic concepts are to the natural world and the closer your methodology is to how nature works - the more aptly your discoveries would describe it.

Ultimately all concepts and ideas are made-up - that is, formulated, not fabricated - by humans and therefore ultimately all 'final ends' are made-up as well. The validity of those 'final ends' is then compared based on whether they were fabricated on the fly or if they were logically derived from other concepts that were formed on the basis of real world.

[jstrodel]

genkaus, prove to me using your methods that there is some absolute way in which a tree can be differentiated from the air that it lives in, and that people should accept that concept of a tree as opposed to seeing a tree as being some common unity of things understood through physical and chemical relations and biological order, that a tree based on the way that the unity of biological, and chemical elements has a kind of unity to it that can be described such that a tree has an end that is different from the physical, chemical and biological relations between air and a dead patch of dirt.

I think what you will prove is that I am an idiot because I can't see that your opinion of a tree is different from appreciating what a tree is. In religious circles, that is considered pride, but if you accept the epistemology and ethics of someone like Nietzsche I suppose you could redefine pride to be a virtue that allows you to have absolute knowledge of a subjective world.

I would still call it pride though.


Religious belief is not phenomenological, although experience plays a role in grounding religious belief. It is certainly not limited to that pathetically insufficient method.

You are stuck in a skeptical worldview, and the only way to elevate yourself above it is to artificially elevate your opinions. That is what you call "reason" and "evidence".

[genkaus]

You are getting annoying. If you lack the capacity to understand my arguments, then atleast don't make it so transparent.

genkaus, prove to me using your methods that there is some absolute way in which a tree can be differentiated from the air that it lives in,

There is not absolute way - when did I ever argue for anything absolute? And what we identify as a tree is contained within the space beyond which its constituent cells are not found.

and that people should accept that concept of a tree as opposed to seeing a tree as being some common unity of things understood through physical and chemical relations and biological order, that a tree based on the way that the unity of biological, and chemical elements has a kind of unity to it that can be described such that a tree has an end that is different from the physical, chemical and biological relations between air and a dead patch of dirt.

And what is all this blather supposed to signify? Are you high again?

I think what you will prove is that I am an idiot

I don't have to prove it - its pretty obvious.

because I can't see that your opinion of a tree is different from appreciating what a tree is. In religious circles, that is considered pride,

You mean, using your brain?

but if you accept the epistemology and ethics of someone like Nietzsche

I don't even know what his epistemology is.

I suppose you could redefine pride to be a virtue that allows you to have absolute knowledge of a subjective world.

I do consider pride to be a virtue - but I don't consider it to have anything to do with gaining knowledge.

I would still call it pride though.

Call what pride?

Religious belief is not phenomenological, although experience plays a role in grounding religious belief. It is certainly not limited to that pathetically insufficient method.

Ofcourse it isn't. Sorry for even suggesting that. Phenomenology is a complex and detailed field of study - religious belief is not. You can believe whatever you want to, perceive causes where none exist and consider things that go against everything we know to be true - and you do all that on the basis of 'faith'. The only time where phenomenology enters is when you are high and call it a religious experience.

You are stuck in a skeptical worldview, and the only way to elevate yourself above it is to artificially elevate your opinions. That is what you call "reason" and "evidence".

Except, mine is not a skeptical worldview - ask any skeptic around here.

[jstrodel]

There is not absolute way - when did I ever argue for anything absolute? And what we identify as a tree is contained within the space beyond which its constituent cells are not found.

You used the word teleological, as if your view of teleology was more than an opinion. To ascribe some goal to something does not justify that goal.

Why can't you just argue your points instead of ridiculing me?

[genkaus]

You used the word teleological, as if your view of teleology was more than an opinion. To ascribe some goal to something does not justify that goal.

Firstly, I did not ascribe teleology to everything it existence.

Secondly, it being more than my opinion does not make it absolute.

Thirdly, justifying the ascription of goal is what justifies it.

Fourthly, if your justification is based on the object itself rather than your wants and needs, then the ascribed teleology is objective - not subjective or absolute.

Why can't you just argue your points instead of ridiculing me?

Why can't I do both?

[jstrodel]

You have an interesting sense of the word objective. You seem to think that phenomenological perceptions (if they are separated from carnal bias through having no wants and needs associated with them) can yield "objective" knowledge.

I would argue this:
1. Sense perception is ALWAYS tied to wants and needs. The quantity of ones wisdom which informs ones presuppositions is always tied to economics, of the individual and the culture. The quantity and quality of sense perceptions are always related to time and skill, which is always related to economics, funding for specific programs, cultural values, the spirit of the society which takes it as their duty to appreciate the nature of things. It is incredibly naive to suppose that sense perception can be disconnected from wants and needs.
2. Even if every single person in the world, through a rigorous process of science, set out to study the nature of something, and they expended thousands of dollars (perhaps financed through political pro-science campaigns), their sense perceptions would never describe things in themselves (the ding an sich), they would only describe the collective experience. People really have no sense what the intrinsic nature of things are or what their goals are, apart from science.
3. The compatibility between metaphysics and naturalism is debatable. Many philosophers have expressed misgivings about metaphysics, I think they are wrong, but I do not know if you can actually accept naturalism and be consistent with scientism and accept metaphysics or teleology.
4. Hume taught that you could not derive an "ought" from an "is". I think this applies to empirical statements but not teleological statements. People can have knowledge of what the ends of things are, but it is not through science. I think actually it is through appreciating their wants and needs. The material universe has, in part, its essence or its goal in human wants and needs, because the material world is created by God. So people can know what they should do by observing their wants and needs, which relate to their inner sense of human nature and their biological requirements for survival. People are wise to take heed to this. At the same time, science cannot demonstrate that this survival instinct is a goal of human life. If you take the words "human life" and say, by definition, people must life, but there is no reason to think if naturalism is true a human exists as having a greater teleological, goal driven processes to it than a severed human limb. They are just different chemical, material organisms.

Where, in the language of chemistry, biology or physics can you say that a human life has a goal behind it that is different from a severed limb? You could observe some similarities between the two of them. Of course, this becomes very significant when you get into issues like abortion.

If you want to get into teleology, you have to use the language of faith, you have to rely on intuitive perceptions of human nature. It is like when you start talking about other minds, you cannot really prove that they exist using the language of science, but you leave the scientific method when it conflicts with your values. Some Christians are foolish enough to leave the scientific method even when it fails to give them answers about the nature of right and wrong and what the goal of human life is.

[genkaus]

You have an interesting sense of the word objective. You seem to think that phenomenological perceptions (if they are separated from carnal bias through having no wants and needs associated with them) can yield "objective" knowledge.

That seems pretty self-evident.

1. Sense perception is ALWAYS tied to wants and needs. The quantity of ones wisdom which informs ones presuppositions is always tied to economics, of the individual and the culture. The quantity and quality of sense perceptions are always related to time and skill, which is always related to economics, funding for specific programs, cultural values, the spirit of the society which takes it as their duty to appreciate the nature of things. It is incredibly naive to suppose that sense perception can be disconnected from wants and needs.

Prove it. Prove that sense perception is ALWAYS tied to wants and needs - not just usually tied to it - and cannot be separated from it.

2. Even if every single person in the world, through a rigorous process of science, set out to study the nature of something, and they expended thousands of dollars (perhaps financed through political pro-science campaigns), their sense perceptions would never describe things in themselves (the ding an sich), they would only describe the collective experience. People really have no sense what the intrinsic nature of things are or what their goals are, apart from science.

Given that I don't buy Kant's premise of a noumenal world - this argument is meaningless to me. I'd say that our collective experience- no, even an individual experience - separated from subjective bias can and does give us knowledge of the intrinsic nature of things. Their goals, however, are a different matter, since I also reject the idea of intrinsic goals.

3. The compatibility between metaphysics and naturalism is debatable. Many philosophers have expressed misgivings about metaphysics, I think they are wrong, but I do not know if you can actually accept naturalism and be consistent with scientism and accept metaphysics or teleology.

Now that's just silly. Naturalism is a metaphysical position Its contradictory to say that something that belongs to a category is not compatible with it.

4. Hume taught that you could not derive an "ought" from an "is". I think this applies to empirical statements but not teleological statements. People can have knowledge of what the ends of things are, but it is not through science. I think actually it is through appreciating their wants and needs. The material universe has, in part, its essence or its goal in human wants and needs, because the material world is created by God. So people can know what they should do by observing their wants and needs, which relate to their inner sense of human nature and their biological requirements for survival. People are wise to take heed to this. At the same time, science cannot demonstrate that this survival instinct is a goal of human life. If you take the words "human life" and say, by definition, people must life, but there is no reason to think if naturalism is true a human exists as having a greater teleological, goal driven processes to it than a severed human limb. They are just different chemical, material organisms.

A lot of unjustified assumptions in this load of crap. Hume himself postulated that ought can be derived from is on the basis of subjective needs and wants. As for the rest of it - there is no justification for assuming that there is a god or that he created the material world or that he created it with a purpose in mind or those purposes are somehow reflected in human wants and needs or that humans themselves would have certain teleological ends. So, really, there is no reason for me to even refute these unfounded assumptions.

Where, in the language of chemistry, biology or physics can you say that a human life has a goal behind it that is different from a severed limb? You could observe some similarities between the two of them. Of course, this becomes very significant when you get into issues like abortion.

Like I said before, since I don't buy the idea of inherent or intrinsic teleology, this is not a problem for me.