Seeing red

[The Grand Nudger]

An object is really relative to a subjective agent-- one observes something.  So from my perspective, I am not an object.  My body is.  My ideas are, perhaps.  I'm not.  I'm the "who" who is looking at and experiencing things.  When you say I'm an object, you are conflating the human body with the human experience, and those things are clearly not equal quantities.

Ah, but I can demonstrate the object of you....and I do not know, perhaps could not know, whether or not there even -is- a mind behind it....or so I've been told.

As for idealism: it's not really an explanation for anything.  It's more simply a sensible set arrangement.  A material world view really has no sensible explanation for the mind.  However, an idealistic world view can include and subsume all of the material world view, because the material world view is experienced by us purely as ideas anyway.

It pains me to see you reassert this so often and so erroneously.  You do not think that materialism explains your mind, but this does not mean it cannot or has not offered a sensible explanation of mind.  You may steal the concepts of your opposition at your own peril, as I've often reminded you.  Ultimately, because of this, wherever I am wrong you will be as well.

When you look in that microscope, are you actually experiencing a bacterium?  No, you're experiencing the sensation of light, presumably as processed by the coordinated efforts of several brain structures.  But your experience of the microscope is an idea.  So is the experience of your science professor, of reading a book about science, etc.  It's all, from the perspective of a subjective agent, just ideas anyway.  So idealism requires no extension, but rather the retraction of an unprovable philosophical assumption-- that everything is as it seems to be.  Whether we're in the Matrix, or the Mind of God, or a BIJ, or a real physical universe is irrelevant to us, so long as our experience of sensations and ideas has enough coherence for us to develop a world view and live our lives.

The idea of the thing is not the thing.  Simple logic, not a revelation. OFC things may not be as they seem..but if they are not neither you nor I have any legitimate means of inference. People often set fire to the ground when they realize the fight is unwinnable, but when the ground burns it burns beneath us both. Your call, I guess...you can deny your experience in service of what you say is not an explanation, if you like. I doubt it will lead you to knowledge.

[The Grand Nudger]

Hmn, lost a portion of my response earlier and didn't notice.

I have deeply-entrenched philosophical assumptions, assumptions I've made for as long as I can remember. However, I can see that my assumptions are soon to be challenged. For example, there could be many Cyber-rhythms in the near future who make convincing arguments but aren't people. There could be androids in a couple hundred years which cannot be distinguished from people.

Given that, I must now challenge my own assumptions: that what walks like a human with a mind and talks like a human with a mind is either human or has a mind.

I've never understood why you seem to think those assumptions would only be challenged by an android.   I am -already- the philosophical equivalent of your android, already Cyber Rhythm.  Whats the difference between myself and an android that would make you challenge those assumptions in their case, in some hypothetical future... but not my own, in the actual present?

[bennyboy]

Ah, but I can demonstrate the object of you....and I do not know, perhaps could not know, whether or not there even -is- a mind behind it....or so I've been told.

You can demonstrate the body with my name. But when you look at your hand, do you think "me" or "my hand"? I think of my body as a vehicle for the self, not the self itself.

As for idealism: it's not really an explanation for anything.  It's more simply a sensible set arrangement.  A material world view really has no sensible explanation for the mind.  However, an idealistic world view can include and subsume all of the material world view, because the material world view is experienced by us purely as ideas anyway.

It pains me to see you reassert this so often and so erroneously.  You do not think that materialism explains your mind, but this does not mean it cannot or has not offered a sensible explanation of mind.

I think brain chemistry and structure do a very good job at explaining why we have certain categories of experience. It doesn't do anything to explain why mind exists rather than not existing, nor can it even identify whether a given physical system is conscious. So any thing materialism "explains," it does so with all the assumptions in place which it is meant to be proving.

The idea of the thing is not the thing.  Simple logic, not a revelation.  OFC things may not be as they seem..but if they are not neither you nor I have any legitimate means of inference.  People often set fire to the ground when they realize the fight is unwinnable, but when the ground burns it burns beneath us both.  Your call, I guess...you can deny your experience in service of what you say is not an explanation, if you like.  I doubt it will lead you to knowledge.

Who says ideas of burning feet or exploding brains are not a part of reality? Not I, for sure. However, we never directly burn, directly touch fire, etc. We never touch a chemical reaction, or see it or hear it directly. We perceive represenations of all those events as mental experiences aka qualia. Therefore, whatever happens, it will be the qualia representing it (whatever it really is) which we care about and with which we interact.


This is the thing. It doesn't matter WHAT physical "reality" you point to, I will always be able to say that your knowledge of it is indirect, and that you cannot therefore know its source. I will always be able to say that YOUR reality isn't the universe-- it's a representation of a universe which you experience internally. Whether there's a real universe "out there" or not is unknowable, and probably not even that important, since we are interested in the experience of human agency, which is, of course, exclusively mental in nature.

[The Grand Nudger]

You can demonstrate the body with my name.  But when you look at your hand, do you think "me" or "my hand"?  I think of my body as a vehicle for the self, not the self itself.

I know..you think that there's some other "stuff" in there, a humonculus driving a car.  Even if I accepted this notion I still can't demonstrate that there's even an "in there" to begin with....or so I've been told.

I think brain chemistry and structure do a very good job at explaining why we have certain categories of experience.  It doesn't do anything to explain why mind exists rather than not existing, nor can it even identify whether a given physical system is conscious.  So any thing materialism "explains," it does so with all the assumptions in place which it is meant to be proving.

I'm not sure I understand how an idealist can refer to chemistry or structure as explanation of anything, coherently.  Stolen concepts. Then again, from the above...you don't seem to be an idealist, what with driving your body car around and all.

Who says ideas of burning feet or exploding brains are not a part of reality?  Not I, for sure.  However, we never directly burn, directly touch fire, etc.  We never touch a chemical reaction, or see it or hear it directly.  We perceive represenations of all those events as mental experiences aka qualia.  Therefore, whatever happens, it will be the qualia representing it (whatever it really is) which we care about and with which we interact.

Perhaps you should visit a burn ward sometime, if you doubt the direct and effective nature of fire?  

This is the thing.  It doesn't matter WHAT physical "reality" you point to, I will always be able to say that your knowledge of it is indirect, and that you cannot therefore know its source.  I will always be able to say that YOUR reality isn't the universe-- it's a representation of a universe which you experience internally.  Whether there's a real universe "out there" or not is unknowable, and probably not even that important, since we are interested in the experience of human agency, which is, of course, exclusively mental in nature.

Sure, no matter what I say you can always imply that things may not be as they seem..and you can always state that I do not possess full knowledge.....but that's hardly rational, or a foundation upon which knowledge can be built...nor does it make any positive case for your own explanations as being better or more accurate than mine. In fact, you seem to be quite fond of my explanations, you attempt to co-opt them at every opportunity.

Any idea, yet, on why an android would make you challenge any assumption that I would not? Can't have anything to do with my biology or the androids machinery, that's just a car. I'm just wondering why you allow that I have a soul?
(let's call it what it is Benny, lol)

[bennyboy]

I know..you think that there's some other "stuff" in there

No, exactly the opposite. I think there's a body etc. "out there." I am that which has experiences, not the apparatus for having them or their objects.

I'm not sure I understand how an idealist can refer to chemistry or structure as explanation of anything, coherently.  Stolen concepts. Then again, from the above...you don't seem to be an idealist, what with driving your body car around and all.

Since my position is that idealism subsumes the material world view, your constant claim that I'm stealing concepts is pointless. Chemistry is great-- it presents experiences so consistent that we can expand our ability to manipulate the things around us. However, in my view, both the chemistry, and the rules underlying it, and the entirety of observable existence are more consistently viewed as a collection of ideas, experiences and principles than as things and their properties.

[quote]
Perhaps you should visit a burn ward sometime, if you doubt the direct and effective nature of fire?  

It's like you think I live in the Twilight Zone or something. Fire hurts, I know that and you know that. But the pain is an experience. The awareness that there is fire is an experience-- all our interactions with the "outside" environment are 100% experiential. To live in a reality that is 100% experiential (read: subjective), and then claim that nothing really exists but objects and their properties, is a bizarre disconnect with what we are actually capable of observing.

[quote]
Sure, no matter what I say you can always imply that things may not be as they seem

I won't imply it. I'll state it as a position of absolute certainty.

..and you can always state that I do not possess full knowledge.....but that's hardly rational, or a foundation upon which knowledge can be built...nor does it make any positive case for your own explanations as being better or more accurate than mine.  In fact, you seem to be quite fond of my explanations, you attempt to co-opt them at every opportunity.

Not co-opted. Subsumed.

Any idea, yet, on why an android would make you challenge any assumption that I would not?  Can't have anything to do with my biology or the androids machinery, that's just a car.  I'm just wondering why you allow that I have a soul?
(let's call it what it is Benny, lol)

The reason an android would make me challenge my assumption is that it is not like me. Other people seem to be like me in most regards, so I extend to them the likelihood that they are also sentient. An android is not sufficiently similar to me in makeup or origin for me to make that assumption-- EVEN THOUGH they may act exactly identically, and I may not even be able to tell them apart. Since their mechanism of processing information is different than mine, and since it may be the method of processing which allows for consciousness, then I cannot be satisfied that an android is conscious, even though it very much seems to be.

I don't know what a soul is, but if it is defined as "that which allows matter to be conscious," without any religious connotations, then it necessarily exists. You will not allow this open a definition, however, so you'll have to say what the word means, and why you think I think you have one.

[Edwardo Piet]

Should introduce talk of phenomenology yet?

[The Grand Nudger]

No, exactly the opposite.  I think there's a body etc. "out there."  I am that which has experiences, not the apparatus for having them or their objects.

A semantic difference that makes no difference.  You are in your vehicle, your vehicle is out there.  You know that's not going to go far with me.

Since my position is that idealism subsumes the material world view, your constant claim that I'm stealing concepts is pointless.  Chemistry is great-- it presents experiences so consistent that we can expand our ability to manipulate the things around us.  However, in my view, both the chemistry, and the rules underlying it, and the entirety of observable existence are more consistently viewed as a collection of ideas, experiences and principles than as things and their properties.

Your claim is irrational, so I disregard it. That you have stolen concepts is -why- it's irrational (in part)..and I'd hardly consider that pointless.  

It's like you think I live in the Twilight Zone or something.  Fire hurts, I know that and you know that.  But the pain is an experience.  The awareness that there is fire is an experience-- all our interactions with the "outside" environment are 100% experiential.  To live in a reality that is 100% experiential (read: subjective), and then claim that nothing really exists but objects and their properties, is a bizarre disconnect with what we are actually capable of observing.

Sure, I may be a brain in a vat.  As I've already said..while this may be true it's not a very good foundation for knowledge or truth claims.  

I won't imply it.  I'll state it as a position of absolute certainty.

-and that's fine...but it's an irrational criticism.  There is no requirement that either of us possess full knowledge.  

Not co-opted.  Subsumed.

-yet another flourish of semantics that makes no difference.  

The reason an android would make me challenge my assumption is that it is not like me.  Other people seem to be like me in most regards, so I extend to them the likelihood that they are also sentient.

Hold the phone...that's just  a vehicle, remember?  

.An android is not sufficiently similar to me in makeup or origin for me to make that assumption-- EVEN THOUGH they may act exactly identically, and I may not even be able to tell them apart.  Since their mechanism of processing information is different than mine, and since it may be the method of processing which allows for consciousness, then I cannot be satisfied that an android is conscious, even though it very much seems to be.

A more thorough endorsement of my position on the matter could hardly be imagined.  A more explicit example of your special pleading could not be asked for. Just one breath ago, you were telling me about other people seeming to be like you. Well, an android that seems to be conscious, like you...satisfies -that- criteria...and there's no sense in pointing at the differences in the vehicle given your previous comments.

I don't know what a soul is, but if it is defined as "that which allows matter to be conscious," without any religious connotations, then it necessarily exists.  You will not allow this open a definition, however, so you'll have to say what the word means, and why you think I think you have one.

It's just a name I've given the humonculus you feel confident that I possess, and that an android does not. The immaterial "me" inside the vehicle of my body.  Soul seems to fit, don't you think? I don't know why the religious connotations would bother you, you decided to describe your "mind" in a manner indistinguishable from their "souls".

[Edwardo Piet]

Daniel Dennett on "real consciousness":

[...]This is a lovely book by a friend of mine named Lee Siegel, who's a professor of religion, actually, at the University of Hawaii, and he's an expert magician, and an expert on the street magic of India, which is what this book is about, "Net of Magic." And there's a passage in it which I would love to share with you. It speaks so eloquently to the problem. "'I'm writing a book on magic,' I explain, and I'm asked, 'Real magic?' By 'real magic,' people mean miracles, thaumaturgical acts, and supernatural powers. 'No,' I answer. 'Conjuring tricks, not real magic.' 'Real magic,' in other words, refers to the magic that is not real; while the magic that is real, that can actually be done, is not real magic."

Now, that's the way a lot of people feel about consciousness.

Real consciousness is not a bag of tricks. If you're going to explain this as a bag of tricks, then it's not real consciousness, whatever it is. And, as Marvin said, and as other people have said, "Consciousness is a bag of tricks." This means that a lot of people are just left completely dissatisfied and incredulous when I attempt to explain consciousness. So this is the problem. [...]

Source, transcript from: https://www.ted.com/talks/dan_dennett_on...anguage=en

[emjay]

@Benny

To be clear, I first learned of the term 'Idealism' (in the sense of consciousness) in that Rational AKD thread, where he was talking about Monistic Idealism. I got the idea from there that you were an Idealist but not a Monistic Idealist, from how you argued in that thread. But you've said that you're not one (or sort of not one), so since it was me that referred to you as one in this thread, I apologise for that mistake.

Now it's clear that you're arguing for a soul, or a homunculous, I have to say that that's not my position at all (as it stands)... so my position is much much more in line with Rhythm's, and thinking in terms neural networks, systems, and computation. I believe that every aspect of personality... every trait and idiosyncrasy... can be accounted for in the neural networks of the brain. Everything that makes one person different from another, makes one person an introvert and another an extrovert, one person afraid and one person courageous etc can be accounted for by learning and habits of thinking... that without memory it would be impossible to have a personality. So in my view if there was a soul that made all experience possible it would have to be a tiny speck and exactly the same in everyone, and with all decision-making and personality taking place in the brain, in the neural networks, it could at most be an observer and nothing more, and thus could not be held accountable in any religious sense. In other words I'm a hard determinist, hence my avatar.

I'm not a neuroscientist but nonetheless I have spent years thinking and theorising about psychology in terms of neural networks. I pay no attention to any psychological theory that I can't relate into neural network terms, so you could say I'm a self-made 'neuropsychologist', using and developing neuropsychological theories to understand myself and the mind, basically because I have a reductionistic/mechanistic need to understand everything. So for instance, the human tendencies of bias and stereotyping can be completely understood in neural network terms... indeed that almost sums up the essence of how a neural network functions. So I did a lot of writing and theorising about that, and addressed many other aspects of personality in the same way. So from my perspective it's not just wishful thinking that leads me to believe that if there were a soul it wouldn't have much to do, but rather that I actually have solid (to me at least) theoretical models of how the brain the could achieve certain aspects of personality. So that's why it makes it all-but-impossible for me to envision a soul with any more responsibility than a simple observer, and why the soul question is essentially closed for me, from a religious standpoint at least of a soul that is held accountable for choices.

I know you're not arguing for a soul in a religious sense, but the same sorts of questions apply as I would ask of any theist (or myself). First of all, do you disagree with my allocation of responsibility for the soul/homunculous that you envision? I.e. do you believe it is more than an observer? And second of all, why have a brain in the first place, that clearly handles at least some (and in my view, all) processing in the mind? If the 'soul' can handle some of it, why not all (this one is more aimed at theists)? In other words, what is your role for the brain, which you say is co-opted or subsumed in your view of reality?

[bennyboy]

A semantic difference that makes no difference.  You are in your vehicle, your vehicle is out there.  You know that's not going to go far with me.

What can I say? That is, in fact, how people perceive things.

[quote]
Your claim is irrational, so I disregard it.  That you have stolen concepts is -why- it's irrational (in part)..and I'd hardly consider that pointless.  

You keep parrotting about stolen claims, and haven't addressed the fact that all the observations upon which your world view, from which you claim I'm stealing concepts, are purely experiential. You've placed an IDEA at the top of the food chain as much as I have.

Sure, I may be a brain in a vat.  As I've already said..while this may be true it's not a very good foundation for knowledge or truth claims.

False gnosticism is just religion by another name. I'm not trying to make truth claims where none can be reasonably established. I'm making claims of agnosticism, where the only reasonable position is agnosticism. I'm arguing for Idealism, because it's the only monist position based on experience rather than ideas inferred from experience.

-and that's fine...but it's an irrational criticism.  There is no requirement that either of us possess full knowledge.

Weren't you about 3 lines ago talking about knowledge or truth claims? You are taking a position which claims knowledge, then qualifying that position by saying you don't really need knowledge.

-yet another flourish of semantics that makes no difference.  

It's a non-trivial position, in fact, and not merely a semantic one. The material world view is NOT at odds with idealism, except where you unnecessarily assert that the objective interpretations of shared experiences (i.e. of objects and their properties) consist ALL reality. Mind, on the other hand, is so completely foreign to the material world view that all you can do is wave toward the brain and say "See? There it is. That's the explanation," when it is nothing of the sort.

Hold the phone...that's just  a vehicle, remember?

I'm talking about the experience of subjective agency, not about a dualism. You should be able to infer that without me explicitly stating it.

A more thorough endorsement of my position on the matter could hardly be imagined.  A more explicit example of your special pleading could not be asked for.  Just one breath ago, you were telling me about other people seeming to be like you.  Well, an android that seems to be conscious, like you...satisfies -that- criteria...and there's no sense in pointing at the differences in the vehicle given your previous comments.

Other people seem to have brains of a particular structure and chemistry, and to have their origins in the mating of two already-conscious human beings.

It's just a name I've given the humonculus you feel confident that I possess, and that an android does not. The immaterial "me" inside the vehicle of my body.  Soul seems to fit, don't you think?  I don't know why the religious connotations would bother you, you decided to describe your "mind" in a manner indistinguishable from their "souls".

You're really running with this "vehicle" idea, but falsely. I'm saying that the subjective agent does not equate itself with the body, and it is only to this degree that I use the term vehicle. To talk about a homunculus is to speak dualistically: that there is a physical (as in, material) body, occupied by a magical fairy. That's never been my position, though you will continue persistently with your ventriloquy, I'm sure.