RE: Objective morality: how would it affect your judgement/actions?
May 3, 2018 at 8:33 am
(This post was last modified: May 3, 2018 at 8:46 am by Edwardo Piet.)
(May 2, 2018 at 2:16 pm)robvalue Wrote: So for example, if we were somehow magically given factual information that "putting someone in solitary confinement is not wrong", then that would mean all the things we thought were harmful about it are somehow not as important as we thought; or else, there are some sort of countering benefits that cancel it out that we're unaware of.
The point is there's an objective fact of the matter whether we can know that fact or not. And knowledge changing (or rather what we think is knowledge: information... changing) is not the same thing as truth changing.
And new information coming to light and making us realize we were wrong no more means that the truth itself changes than it does in science.
Basically: You don't take a Jordan Peterson stance of truth on the matter of scientific truth, philosophical truth, logical truth or mathematical truth... so why take a Jordan Peterson stance of truth on the matter of moral truth?
(May 2, 2018 at 4:02 pm)vulcanlogician Wrote: I think what you are saying here is that moral facts can't be proven. So why call them facts? You can empirically prove that the Earth goes around the sun. You cannot, in the same fashion, prove that torture is wrong.
Unless one is a moral naturalist, a moral fact need not be empirically provable. (Khem has argued in favor of moral naturalism before, but I disagree with the theory, precisely because I see no way that science can determine objective moral values.)
If something is not empirically demonstrable, this does not make it non-factual. It is a fact that the square of a right triangle's hypotenuse is equal to the sum of squares of its other sides, but one can understand it a priori, without empirical proof. I take this sort of axiomatic approach to moral facts.
But before I go into further detail, I'd like to make sure I haven't completely missed the spirit of your question. Have I?
I'm a moral naturalist but I also accept the fact that objective moral knowledge is indeed not necessary for objective moral truth.
(May 3, 2018 at 8:26 am)robvalue Wrote: I notice a kind of tautological use of "morality", as this simulated conversation between a pretend objective morality person is supposed to indicate. I'm not saying this is anyone in particular, it's just a simplified strawman to indicate my thoughts. Feel free to comment on where the conversation could differ.
Action A is objectively immoral.
Why?
It causes a form of unnecessary harm H.
What makes that objectively immoral?
Because causing unnecessary harm is objectively immoral.
So... the usage of the word "immoral" here is entirely redundant. It just means "unnecessary harm".
As I said elsewhere... proving things isn't the point of definitions. Check this article out on that:
https://rationallyspeaking.blogspot.co.u...nt-of.html
Yes, the idea is that causing needless harm and being immoral is one and the same thing. Saying "X action causes needless suffering" is identical in meaning to "X action causes needless suffering which is morally wrong". Saying that allowing or causing needless suffering is "wrong" doesn't add any extra meaning to it. There's no extra step. This is also exactly why the fact/value dichotomy proposed by Hume is a false distinction. It's redundant to say that we should prevent needless suffering whenever possible. The fact that allowing needless suffering to happen is immoral already implies that we should prevent it. It's like asking "Should we be morally good?". It's a nonsensical question because it's like asking "Should we do what we should do?".
