Well, I guess we can work on this in more detail.
The following is from http://aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/primac...sness.html
So, piece by piece:
I suspect that all the atheists posting here are comfortable with this, more or less. We are pretty sure that if all the people and dolphins and other perceiving subjects dropped dead, then the universe would still exist.
This doesn't address what Popper called "World Three" objects, like numbers. Some people (e.g. Roger Penrose) think that numbers exist independently of our thoughts about them. So I'm not sure whether Rand considered such intangible objects to be part of "the universe." That's an issue that a Randian would want to address, I think, since for Platonists and other idealists, God, numbers, and other ideal objects can not be known through the senses, but exist independently of perception anyway.
Maybe Rand explains all this in her books. The summary I've quoted sort of skips over that.
This, too, would need explication before we'd want to accept it. In what way does a thing have an identity or nature, as itself and not another thing, that exists when unperceived? Do all unperceived trees have the same nature and identity, or does each individual tree have its own? Does the nature or identity require physical embodiment, or do such natures exist as ideas?
I can see that we have consciousness by perceiving that things not-us also exist. Husserl, for example, has laid out the stages which a newborn baby goes through, as it goes from being a sort of undifferentiated "I" to perceiving that it is separate from the mother, etc. This is big for Freud, too.
What the brief description quoted above glosses over is the whole Kantian "copernican revolution." This is the problem that our perceptions (mental phenomena) have a relationship to the things-in-themselves that are not simple or direct. In other words, what we know through perception is a mental image or interpretation, filtered through sense experience and mental categories. Anything that appears to our consciousness has always already been interpreted. And the degree to which these interpretations are consistent across all animals of the same species, or vary depending on culture, is an open question.
Then to get from mental phenomena to something that deserves to be called "knowledge" I think requires more steps. Most atheists these days probably want something like the scientific method -- fitting accumulated sense data into an interpretive framework or theory that can be tested against other observations. So, OK, "looking outward" is required, but I don't think it's sufficient.
Then there is the larger question of where "outward" is. Like it or not, I am a part of nature. If I believe in the primacy of matter, then I have to believe that my physical brain is necessary for my mental activity to happen. And my physical brain is a physical object among all the other physical objects -- my mind is not some kind of pure spark that is independent of the "outward" world.
Also I think it is possible to have something deserving of the name "knowledge" about matters that are not received through the senses. Math, for example.
So that all gets a bit tricky. And that complicates the following:
So where is "inward," exactly? Is it not also a set of mental phenomena which are created by the physical brain? I'm guessing my "inward" self would consist of memories, interpretations I've formed about the world, my likes and dislikes, that kind of thing.
I do believe that I can gain a certain kind of knowledge by reflecting on these things. Is there a hard and fast boundary between this set of mental phenomena and the ones that come to me from "outward"? I think the line is kind of fuzzy. I don't only get knowledge from things that are CURRENTLY in my line of sight -- I abstract knowledge from things I have sensed by remembering, interpreting, and analyzing them.
I'm not clear yet on what this absolute difference is between inner and outer. Is my consciousness of my left foot inner or outer? Is proprioception inner or outer?
Again, the "outer" gets into the "inner" by a path that isn't completely direct or simple. Are the nerve impulses in my optic nerve outer until they form a mental image, at which time they become inner?
The web site quoted above continues:
I suspect that a lot of atheists who accept the primacy of existence won't be comfortable saying that this automatically leads to the recognition of rights. No doubt Rand explicates this in detail elsewhere.
Nor do I see that Idealism, with or without a Supreme Being, necessarily leads to the view that I have no identity, that nature is whatever I want it to be, and that I am infinitely flexible, malleable, usable and disposable. Neither Plato nor Aristotle (who wouldn't agree with the primacy of existence, as Rand states it) would say that people are without a nature or that we are infinitely changeable.
So I grant that it's not fair for me to take such a brief summary and pass judgement on it. I would need a lot more explication as to why these assertions are true. But I think that gives an idea of why we aren't ready to accept Rand's ideas when they're simply asserted as fact. As thinking people we deserve to have the dots connected so that we can see WHY we are supposed to accept these things.
The following is from http://aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/primac...sness.html
Quote:The basic metaphysical issue that lies at the root of any system of philosophy [is] the primacy of existence or the primacy of consciousness.
The primacy of existence (of reality) is the axiom that existence exists, i.e., that the universe exists independent of consciousness (of any consciousness), that things are what they are, that they possess a specific nature, an identity. The epistemological corollary is the axiom that consciousness is the faculty of perceiving that which exists—and that man gains knowledge of reality by looking outward. The rejection of these axioms represents a reversal: the primacy of consciousness—the notion that the universe has no independent existence, that it is the product of a consciousness (either human or divine or both). The epistemological corollary is the notion that man gains knowledge of reality by looking inward (either at his own consciousness or at the revelations it receives from another, superior consciousness).
The source of this reversal is the inability or unwillingness fully to grasp the difference between one’s inner state and the outer world, i.e., between the perceiver and the perceived (thus blending consciousness and existence into one indeterminate package-deal). This crucial distinction is not given to man automatically; it has to be learned. It is implicit in any awareness, but it has to be grasped conceptually and held as an absolute.
So, piece by piece:
Quote:The primacy of existence (of reality) is the axiom that existence exists, i.e., that the universe exists independent of consciousness (of any consciousness)
I suspect that all the atheists posting here are comfortable with this, more or less. We are pretty sure that if all the people and dolphins and other perceiving subjects dropped dead, then the universe would still exist.
This doesn't address what Popper called "World Three" objects, like numbers. Some people (e.g. Roger Penrose) think that numbers exist independently of our thoughts about them. So I'm not sure whether Rand considered such intangible objects to be part of "the universe." That's an issue that a Randian would want to address, I think, since for Platonists and other idealists, God, numbers, and other ideal objects can not be known through the senses, but exist independently of perception anyway.
Maybe Rand explains all this in her books. The summary I've quoted sort of skips over that.
Quote:that things are what they are, that they possess a specific nature, an identity.
This, too, would need explication before we'd want to accept it. In what way does a thing have an identity or nature, as itself and not another thing, that exists when unperceived? Do all unperceived trees have the same nature and identity, or does each individual tree have its own? Does the nature or identity require physical embodiment, or do such natures exist as ideas?
Quote:The epistemological corollary is the axiom that consciousness is the faculty of perceiving that which exists—and that man gains knowledge of reality by looking outward.
I can see that we have consciousness by perceiving that things not-us also exist. Husserl, for example, has laid out the stages which a newborn baby goes through, as it goes from being a sort of undifferentiated "I" to perceiving that it is separate from the mother, etc. This is big for Freud, too.
What the brief description quoted above glosses over is the whole Kantian "copernican revolution." This is the problem that our perceptions (mental phenomena) have a relationship to the things-in-themselves that are not simple or direct. In other words, what we know through perception is a mental image or interpretation, filtered through sense experience and mental categories. Anything that appears to our consciousness has always already been interpreted. And the degree to which these interpretations are consistent across all animals of the same species, or vary depending on culture, is an open question.
Then to get from mental phenomena to something that deserves to be called "knowledge" I think requires more steps. Most atheists these days probably want something like the scientific method -- fitting accumulated sense data into an interpretive framework or theory that can be tested against other observations. So, OK, "looking outward" is required, but I don't think it's sufficient.
Then there is the larger question of where "outward" is. Like it or not, I am a part of nature. If I believe in the primacy of matter, then I have to believe that my physical brain is necessary for my mental activity to happen. And my physical brain is a physical object among all the other physical objects -- my mind is not some kind of pure spark that is independent of the "outward" world.
Also I think it is possible to have something deserving of the name "knowledge" about matters that are not received through the senses. Math, for example.
So that all gets a bit tricky. And that complicates the following:
Quote:The epistemological corollary is the notion that man gains knowledge of reality by looking inward (either at his own consciousness or at the revelations it receives from another, superior consciousness). [Rand rejects this possibility.]
So where is "inward," exactly? Is it not also a set of mental phenomena which are created by the physical brain? I'm guessing my "inward" self would consist of memories, interpretations I've formed about the world, my likes and dislikes, that kind of thing.
I do believe that I can gain a certain kind of knowledge by reflecting on these things. Is there a hard and fast boundary between this set of mental phenomena and the ones that come to me from "outward"? I think the line is kind of fuzzy. I don't only get knowledge from things that are CURRENTLY in my line of sight -- I abstract knowledge from things I have sensed by remembering, interpreting, and analyzing them.
Quote:The source of this reversal is the inability or unwillingness fully to grasp the difference between one’s inner state and the outer world, i.e., between the perceiver and the perceived (thus blending consciousness and existence into one indeterminate package-deal). This crucial distinction is not given to man automatically; it has to be learned. It is implicit in any awareness, but it has to be grasped conceptually and held as an absolute.
I'm not clear yet on what this absolute difference is between inner and outer. Is my consciousness of my left foot inner or outer? Is proprioception inner or outer?
Again, the "outer" gets into the "inner" by a path that isn't completely direct or simple. Are the nerve impulses in my optic nerve outer until they form a mental image, at which time they become inner?
The web site quoted above continues:
Quote:Observe that the philosophical system based on the axiom of the primacy of existence (i.e., on recognizing the absolutism of reality) led to the recognition of man’s identity and rights. But the philosophical systems based on the primacy of consciousness (i.e., on the seemingly megalomaniacal notion that nature is whatever man wants it to be) lead to the view that man possesses no identity, that he is infinitely flexible, malleable, usable and disposable. Ask yourself why.
I suspect that a lot of atheists who accept the primacy of existence won't be comfortable saying that this automatically leads to the recognition of rights. No doubt Rand explicates this in detail elsewhere.
Nor do I see that Idealism, with or without a Supreme Being, necessarily leads to the view that I have no identity, that nature is whatever I want it to be, and that I am infinitely flexible, malleable, usable and disposable. Neither Plato nor Aristotle (who wouldn't agree with the primacy of existence, as Rand states it) would say that people are without a nature or that we are infinitely changeable.
So I grant that it's not fair for me to take such a brief summary and pass judgement on it. I would need a lot more explication as to why these assertions are true. But I think that gives an idea of why we aren't ready to accept Rand's ideas when they're simply asserted as fact. As thinking people we deserve to have the dots connected so that we can see WHY we are supposed to accept these things.
