Non-existence

[Edwardo Piet]

I did.. I'll quote my reply

Ok sorry, I didn't see it - and I looked too. My bad.

Philosophical zombies is not a claim which requires evidence on the point of minds, in contradistinction to the claim that we do have minds.

1. If p-zeds are really behaviorally indistingusible then so is their brain activity, they are behaviorally indistinguisble in every way, so they must have consciousness too, so they're not p-zeds, and therefore they can't actually exist.

2. If they are in any way different, if they are more dumbed down and 'zombie like' then they're an exception I would require evidence for of course. But I assume that's not what you're claiming. You claim they are behaviorally identical, therefore they can't actually exist according to '1.'

For everything that philosophical zombies predict of human behaviour is verifiable and holds true.

Including what goes on in the brain. If I had my consciousness stripped off I would not be identical to a p-zed, therefore if they are identical, they must have consciousness and therefore not actually be p-zeds.

Whereas, the idea that others have minds is an unverifiable presupposition based on personal inclination to that generalisation.

They are more or less behaviorally indistinguisble, so this is evidence they have minds. Because brain behavior is still behavior.

Of course it doesn't prove it, because it's not a claim which needs to be proven, as it is readily verifiable that what philosophical zombies does predict does occur. That does not prove the exclusion of mind; but it proves that postulating mind in others is unnecessary, is to claim more than needed to explain the same fact, and the only really important thing - is unverifiable.

Philosophical zombies are behaviorally distingusible from humans, so that includes the brain. So the whole concept of a p-zed is incoherent.

If p-zeds weren't conscious then they wouldn't be indistinguisble. Because I only have evidence of my consciousness, not that it's in anyway a seperate phenonmenon that has no effects on anything else. If I lose my consciousness, I'm unconscious, and if I'm unconscious then I'm not behaviorlly the same. If p-zeds don't have consciousness, then they can't possibily be behaviorally indistingusble, so by their definition they can't exist.

And importantly, it is externally unverifiable, and only an internal surprise.

It's externally unverifiable because it's not there. It's a mere assumption that consciousness is a separate property that you can 'find'. There's no self-evidence for that. I only have self-evidence of consciousness. Not that it's 'my' consciousness, conciousness is the 'me'.

There's nothing to search for. There's no reason to believe consciousness is any more than the workings of the brain or part of it, etc. When I get knocked out cold, my consciousness is effected. There's no reason to believe consciousness is anything more than this physical stuff. It's a mere assumpiton, an illusion - that consciousnes is somehow 'more than that.' There's not only no external evidnece of 'consciousness' being a thing in itself an extra layer...there's not even any self evidence!.

There's self-evidence of consciousness. Not that it's seperate in itself. Not that it can be stripped off from the rest of the brain. So p-zeds are incoherent.

Daniel Dennet doesn't address the points I've raised, and I have already read much of what he has to say about consciousness and qualia, which largely adds absolutely nothing to our understanding of these phenomena[/quote] Because there is no evidence of such phenomena. Not even self-evidence.

There's self-evidence of consciousness, but not as it existing as a seperate phenomena to your brain. When you get knocked unconscious, this shows that consciousness is effected when your brain is. But there is no evidence of the existence of consciousness or qualia as a seperate phenomena. Not even self-evidence. Only the belief in such. There's no evidence - not even self-evidence - of any 'extra thing' 'called consciousness'.

EvF