Arcanus recently wrote on his blog about metaphysical naturalism being "defeated".
http://aristophrenium.com/ryft/naturalis...s-the-dust
Far from being a supporter of metaphysical naturalism in that I do not subscribe to the belief that *everything* in existence if material and described by natural causes. I hold that the state of existence is currently unknown, and that the only evidence we have for things existing comes from a naturalistic model.
Arcanus made some rather dubious statements though, and I thought I'd offer my rebuttal.
Unless I've misunderstood his point, this is one big non-sequitur. It simply does not follow that from "the whole of reality is constituted by only natural things" you can get that there is no such thing as truth, reason, knowledge. These things exist as manifestations in the mind; as concepts, neuron firings that are common to our entire species. The same can be held for other concepts, such as mathematics. There isn't anything in the natural world that constitutes a "1", but the concept of "1" is held within our minds, and is therefore natural given our minds are natural products.
Secondly, just because taking one position means that thinking itself is the product of neurons firing does not negate metaphysical naturalism. Things like truth, knowledge are not rendered meaningless, just put in a subjective context. Truth is our interpretation of the happenings of the natural world; knowledge is our collection of truths. It does not matter that these things only exist in our brains; nor does it negate metaphysical naturalism that they are so. Only for people who think that logic somehow transcends us would this seem like a good argument at all, and from that perspective I can understand why Arcanus thinks it is. However, I would argue that logic does not transcend us; logic is the method by which our mind work, and is entirely natural in substance.
Finally, on the point that we cannot say anything is true or better or incorrect, just different; I agree. This doesn't do anything to affect metaphysical naturalism, nor logic, for logic can be seen as a subjective method for evaluating arguments (and indeed, many people can think that an argument is valid, which others think it is not). My position is one of agnosticism; that knowledge is subjective, logic a mental construct by which we understand our world and reason, and what we perceive as "truth" ultimately unknowable.
I'm not a metaphysical naturalist; I don't take up a position that only matter exists, only that the position of metaphysical naturalism is supported by the current evidence we have.
To create a counter-point, I could argue that your same argument against metaphysical naturalism applies to supernaturalism as well. Truth, knowledge, etc are meaningless if transcendant beings in some non-natural realm could influence our thoughts, or change things in the natural universe. To use a Catholic concept of transubstantiation as an example: if a communion wafer can be a wafer whilst also literally being the body of Jesus Christ, yet appears in all natural aspects to be a wafer, how can we know it is the body of Jesus Christ? How can we say this is truth, or better, or incorrect, just different?
http://aristophrenium.com/ryft/naturalis...s-the-dust
Far from being a supporter of metaphysical naturalism in that I do not subscribe to the belief that *everything* in existence if material and described by natural causes. I hold that the state of existence is currently unknown, and that the only evidence we have for things existing comes from a naturalistic model.
Arcanus made some rather dubious statements though, and I thought I'd offer my rebuttal.
Quote:On the definitional point, I replied, it’s because everything needed to defeat the view is built into the view itself. A world view is essentially meaningless if we have no reason to think it’s true, and especially if we are incapable of determining its truth. So if we assume metaphysical naturalism—and we must if we’re to evaluate whether or not it self-destructs—do we find this to be the case under that world view?
Yes. According to that world view, the whole of reality is constituted by only natural things, causes, and forces; i.e., nothing exists but that which either can be described in purely natural terms or is reducible to such terms. But if we assume this view, then we suddenly find ourselves with no reason to think it’s true, because all of our thinking is nothing more than cells and atoms in various patterns of activity. Ergo, such things as truth, reason, knowledge, morality, etc., are suddenly rendered meaningless; since there is no frame of reference transcending the brain’s activity, we’re rendered unable to state that X is true or that Y is false—including reasoning between them—because it turns out that such categories and processes are all just various patterns of synaptic activity in the brain. When that view is held consistently under its own terms, we are denied any basis for evaluating one synaptic pattern of activity against another. We cannot say anything is true or better or incorrect. Just different.
Unless I've misunderstood his point, this is one big non-sequitur. It simply does not follow that from "the whole of reality is constituted by only natural things" you can get that there is no such thing as truth, reason, knowledge. These things exist as manifestations in the mind; as concepts, neuron firings that are common to our entire species. The same can be held for other concepts, such as mathematics. There isn't anything in the natural world that constitutes a "1", but the concept of "1" is held within our minds, and is therefore natural given our minds are natural products.
Secondly, just because taking one position means that thinking itself is the product of neurons firing does not negate metaphysical naturalism. Things like truth, knowledge are not rendered meaningless, just put in a subjective context. Truth is our interpretation of the happenings of the natural world; knowledge is our collection of truths. It does not matter that these things only exist in our brains; nor does it negate metaphysical naturalism that they are so. Only for people who think that logic somehow transcends us would this seem like a good argument at all, and from that perspective I can understand why Arcanus thinks it is. However, I would argue that logic does not transcend us; logic is the method by which our mind work, and is entirely natural in substance.
Finally, on the point that we cannot say anything is true or better or incorrect, just different; I agree. This doesn't do anything to affect metaphysical naturalism, nor logic, for logic can be seen as a subjective method for evaluating arguments (and indeed, many people can think that an argument is valid, which others think it is not). My position is one of agnosticism; that knowledge is subjective, logic a mental construct by which we understand our world and reason, and what we perceive as "truth" ultimately unknowable.
I'm not a metaphysical naturalist; I don't take up a position that only matter exists, only that the position of metaphysical naturalism is supported by the current evidence we have.
To create a counter-point, I could argue that your same argument against metaphysical naturalism applies to supernaturalism as well. Truth, knowledge, etc are meaningless if transcendant beings in some non-natural realm could influence our thoughts, or change things in the natural universe. To use a Catholic concept of transubstantiation as an example: if a communion wafer can be a wafer whilst also literally being the body of Jesus Christ, yet appears in all natural aspects to be a wafer, how can we know it is the body of Jesus Christ? How can we say this is truth, or better, or incorrect, just different?
