If beauty doesn't require God, why should morality? (Bite me Dr. Craig.)

[bennyboy]

Organic chemistry can account for consciousness in the same way that the properties of various metals can account for the strenght of steel. We know that where there's a brain with certain functions, we have a person who seems to be conscious (and accept with a near-total confidence that the person isn't a philosophical zombie or something).

But digestion and cosciousness are different in an important way. There's nothing about digestion (so far as anyone has suggested) that cannot be studied PURELY in terms of the chemistry and mechanics of that system. Consciousness cannot be studied in this way-- you cannot observe a brain and know exactly what it is like for someone to experience their environment or ideas.

Of course studying is an activity which takes place within the domain of consciousness rather than digestion. When we think about what consciousness might be we do so within a function of consciousness itself. When we think about anything else (besides the consciousness of other beings) we are quite content with third person accounts. Empirical evidence is then the gold standard. I would suggest that the something extra you attribute to consciousness has less to do with what it is than it does with the fact that we are that.

I don't attribute anything extra to consciousness. I attribute something extra to the universe which, unless universal laws have changed over time, has always had ingrained in it the capacity for conscious experience. There's also what one might call a "metacapacity" in the Big Bang-- the capacity to create a universe with the capacity to support conscious experience.

Let's get back to the idea of God-- specifically, is there any naturalistic or non-mythological entity or principle which might sensibly be called God. I would argue that the capacity of the universe must be rooted either in itself, if the universe is eternal, and have always been there-- or it must be rooted in some creative seed which caused the universe to unfold in such a way that it had the capacity for experience. If you take the position that consciousness, or its philosophical source, either always existed, or existed at the begining of the universe, you'll find that both these ideas are expressed in various forms in the Christian and many other religions. If you take the entire Bible and other texts as a hodge-podge of allegory, mythology, and metaphor, then you could strip all that cultural excess away and stick to the philosophical point-- that there could not have been a universe that was ever separate from the capacity for experience.

Note that I'm not promoting a conversion to any religion. Instead, I think that most people, scientific or atheist or otherwise, have recognized that there's something uniquely special about a universe which allows beings to exist and experience. And trying to wave this special feature aware by waving vaguely to the physical mechanism involved in processing the environment is like waving in general to a pile of culluloid film and saying, "Casablanca is in there somewhere, you can be sure. Mystery solved!" It's a true enough statement in its own way-- but it's a philosophically unsatisfying one.

[Angrboda]

A more blunt observation could have been made, though-- if you shoot someone through the brain, they will no longer experience qualia.

Except that in this case the painter did continue to experience qualia, just certain components of that qualia were missing. So that wouldn't be a fair observation at all. It's reminiscent of when I challenged ChadWooters argument about veridicality of experience with the example of blindness anosognosia. His response was that you can't tell much from broken brains. This is precisely wrong. You can tell a great deal about ordinary consciousness from broken brains. In this case, part of the brain is missing, and correspondingly, part of the qualia is missing. The brain damage revealed how tightly connected to brain function the experience of qualia is.

That being said, the philosophical question of capacity isn't really about the link between brain and specific qualia. It's why ANY physical structure, under any circumstance, would experience qualia. Why does anything in the universe have this capacity for the existence of subjective experience, rather than just grinding through its mechanical processes sans esprit?

That's not so much a philosophical question as a biological and evolutionary question. Why does the brain produce qualia? Because it evolved that capacity. We can ask similar questions about why we evolved bipedalism, or language, or opposable thumbs. The answers, while interesting in and of themselves, don't reveal a need of an Ur substance for each of these things, language doesn't have to be distributed throughout the universe in order to explain language in the human brain, and there are plenty of animal models to draw upon to suggest that language just evolved. How language or consciousness work is indeed an unsolved question, but we don't need to appeal to explanations that lie outside the brain for the answer. Parts of brains contribute parts of consciousness; the whole of the brain contributes the whole of consciousness. There is no need to appeal anywhere else.

[bennyboy]

A more blunt observation could have been made, though-- if you shoot someone through the brain, they will no longer experience qualia.

Except that in this case the painter did continue to experience qualia, just certain components of that qualia were missing. So that wouldn't be a fair observation at all. It's reminiscent of when I challenged ChadWooters argument about veridicality of experience with the example of blindness anosognosia. His response was that you can't tell much from broken brains. This is precisely wrong. You can tell a great deal about ordinary consciousness from broken brains. In this case, part of the brain is missing, and correspondingly, part of the qualia is missing. The brain damage revealed how tightly connected to brain function the experience of qualia is.

That's never been debated, at least by me. However, we are doing the maze backwards-- we already know about qualia, and we fit our narrative about why it exists into whatever framework is popular today. God is popular, God made a soul. Physicalism is popular, qualia is supervenient on matter. But if so, the definition of matter is incomplete: "Stuff that can be located in time and space, interacts with matter via the 4 fundamental forces, and can be defined as a form of energy. . . AND CAN SOMETIMES EXPERIENCE ITSELF." Not really a scientific definition, though, since you can never ever see this experience or interact with it directly. It kind of sounds like the X-tians saying "Blah blah blah Jesus blah blah blah salvation. . . What's that, you say? Bunnies and eggs? Let us tell you about Easter!"

That being said, the philosophical question of capacity isn't really about the link between brain and specific qualia. It's why ANY physical structure, under any circumstance, would experience qualia. Why does anything in the universe have this capacity for the existence of subjective experience, rather than just grinding through its mechanical processes sans esprit?

That's not so much a philosophical question as a biological and evolutionary question. Why does the brain produce qualia? Because it evolved that capacity.

That's like saying a car goes because I've developed the ability to manipulate the gas pedal. If the capacity wasn't already intrinsic to the universe, no arrangement or interaction of matter could have achieved qualia, by definition. So the question is-- why is a universe which we conceive to be essentially a mechanical one (with a bit of trickery at the finest resolutions) supportive of processing as experience, when there is supposedly no part of experience which doesn't anyway have an exact biochemical correlate? You already have a complete input-processing-output cycle-- and whether someone is truly sentient or a philosophical zombie is irrelevant to any study we can do scientifically.

[The Grand Nudger]

Are you assuming that there's a factual difference between "truly sentient" and "philosophical zombie"? I think that the position being offered for your consideration, is that experience doesn't "have an exact biochemical correlate"I-mine

- but that it is that biochemical process. That there's no special sauce. Qualia doesn't have a relationship -to- biochemistry, qualia -is- biochemistry. Your question, from my POV, could be rephrased as "why is a universe which we conceive to be essentially a mechanical one (with a bit of trickery at the finest resolutions) supportive of mechanical processes". B-mine.

[bennyboy]

Are you assuming that there's a factual difference between "truly sentient" and "philosophical zombie"?

Of course there is. One has a rich experience of what things are like, and the other does not.

I think that the position being offered for your consideration, is that experience doesn't "have an exact biochemical correlate"I-mine

- but that it is that biochemical process. That there's no special sauce. Qualia doesn't have a relationship -to- biochemistry, qualia -is- biochemistry.

Ahhhh. . . so you know what qualia is, and that it is biochemistry. This is good news-- pray tell, what are the exact physical criteria by which I can establish that a physical system is subjectively experiencing its environment, rather than only seeming to? As for correlates-- of course there's a correlate. My experience is "redness." The biochemical correlate is the release of neurotransmitters in regions of the brain. Saying that "redness" IS a biochemistry is goofy. Redness is that reddish reddy color I see when I look at a red apple. It's an experience, not a brain state.

Your question, from my POV, could be rephrased as "why is a universe which we conceive to be essentially a mechanical one (with a bit of trickery at the finest resolutions) supportive of mechanical processes". B-mine.

You can conflate diametrically opposed ideas if you want to, but it doesn't solve the fundamental problem of qualia: that they are not included in, or explained by, any good mechanical or physical theory of reality. You can guage my response to things, but you can't really know what red looks like when I experience it, or exactly what it's like to be me tasting a pineapple-- EVEN IF you can monitor my brain activitiy.

[Angrboda]

That's not so much a philosophical question as a biological and evolutionary question. Why does the brain produce qualia? Because it evolved that capacity.

That's like saying a car goes because I've developed the ability to manipulate the gas pedal. If the capacity wasn't already intrinsic to the universe, no arrangement or interaction of matter could have achieved qualia, by definition. So the question is-- why is a universe which we conceive to be essentially a mechanical one (with a bit of trickery at the finest resolutions) supportive of processing as experience, when there is supposedly no part of experience which doesn't anyway have an exact biochemical correlate?

There were two parts to that answer, evolution and biology. Regardless, it's not clear how matter gives rise to experience. It's not clear how matter gives rise to the ability to count from one to ten in the way the brain does it. It's not clear how matter can read squiggles on a page. It's not clear how matter can recognize objects. If you were being consistent, every function of the mind is mysterious in this same way, so every part of the mind would have to be supported by unexplained properties of matter. Being consistent, you would have to assign all the processing that the mind does to some "special properties." You might suggest that because computers can do some of these things that you don't need a special explanation for them, but the fact is that the brain does all these things in a way which is totally unlike how a computer does them. So these other processes are no less mysterious than qualia and consciousness. Carried out consistently, you've implied that all the functions of mind cannot be explained by matter, because they're all mysterious, and must be explained some way else. Carried through, that's nothing more nor less than the positing of a soul. If you're going to posit a special explanation to account for awareness, you also have to posit a special explanation for counting, for spoken language, for written language, for facial recognition, for every thing that the brain does that we haven't mechanically explained yet — and that's basically everything. We know what parts of the brain correlate to these processes, but we don't have a mechanical explanation for how it accomplishes these things, and where doesn't explain how. You may not think of it as such, but if you require a special explanation for consciousness, you're advocating nothing less than dualism. You want to put awareness in a special box that these other features of mind don't fit into, but they all belong in the same box. There is no categorical difference between the mystery of language and the mystery of qualia. You cannot construct a category which fits the former things but which does not also fit qualia. I dare you to. But to you, qualia is somehow special. You're enamored with it in a way that you're not enamored with these other qualities of mind. It's as if you're led to say, "I can't imagine how matter can explain X, therefore X requires a special explanation," except that the only thing you're willing to put in X is consciousness. But that doesn't follow. The conclusion that a special explanation is required does not follow logically from the premise that you can't imagine how matter explains X. That's fallacious reasoning. A mere argument from incredulity. And it's an argument which, realistically, you would have to apply to all these other capacities of mind. You might delude yourself that you could "imagine" how matter can figure out where a sentence begins and ends, or what a colored blob in our visual field actually is, but you can't. We don't understand these other processes any better than consciousness. You give consciousness a special place because it's special to you. If you applied your criteria consistently, you end up with complete dualism, and that's absurd.

[The Grand Nudger]

Of course there is. One has a rich experience of what things are like, and the other does not.

So, some examples of things that belong in either group?

Ahhhh. . . so you know what qualia is, and that it is biochemistry. This is good news-- pray tell, what are the exact physical criteria by which I can establish that a physical system is subjectively experiencing its environment, rather than only seeming to?

LOL, if you had absorbed a single letter of anything I've posted to you in this thread you'd realize how ridiculous a question that is to ask of me. The "seeming" is the "experiencing". It doesn't, to my mind, matter a lick - between an observer - or the one who is either experiencing or "seeming" to experience. It is the same phenomena. Now look up at the first part of your post again.

You can conflate diametrically opposed ideas if you want to, but it doesn't solve the fundamental problem of qualia: that they are not included in, or explained by, any good mechanical or physical theory of reality.

I'm just not sure what I'm being asked to explain here. There's no good mechanical or physical theory of reality that accounts for what, exactly?

The only thing you seem to be willing to offer up on the subject of qualia is that it is mysterious and different and inexplicable. Well, that sounds like a summary of your conclusion - not any chain of reasoning that led up to it.

I can only work with what I have. We attempt to explain the unknown by reference to the known. I mean, obviously, I'm not going to be solving any of the deepest mysteries of the cosmos here, but neither are you - and maybe..just maybe...you aren't actually catching a whiff of one here.

You can guage my response to things, but you can't really know what red looks like when I experience it, or exactly what it's like to be me tasting a pineapple-- EVEN IF you can monitor my brain activitiy.

That's true, I can't. But that doesn't establish that it couldn't be done. Given that we're pretty good at manipulating qualia, I'd say that this would suggest that there is a framework, a language, if you will (that your "color" is analgous to a computers "1011010111010101110101- and so on"). Otherwise, how would we accomplish that? Given the above, and that we at least know where to look, I'd say we're a little closer than your summary would seem to suggest. I don;t know what "it" -is- any more than you do - but that won;t stop me from checking off a list of things that it is -not-. Qualia does not appear to be, by any observation that we have ever made of it - as indirectly as you choose to conceive of those observations; wholly mysterious, inexplicable, or extraneous.

When I get drunk, I understand that my subsequent subjective experience is an issue of chemistry. How do you understand yours?

[bennyboy]

Of course there is. One has a rich experience of what things are like, and the other does not.

So, some examples of things that belong in either group?

Sure. The reddishness of red as I experience it belongs only to one with real qualia, and not to a philosophical zombie.

Ahhhh. . . so you know what qualia is, and that it is biochemistry. This is good news-- pray tell, what are the exact physical criteria by which I can establish that a physical system is subjectively experiencing its environment, rather than only seeming to?

LOL, if you had absorbed a single letter of anything I've posted to you in this thread you'd realize how ridiculous a question that is to ask of me. The "seeming" is the "experiencing". It doesn't, to my mind, matter a lick - between an observer - or the one who is either experiencing or "seeming" to experience. It is the same phenomena. Now look up at the first part of your post again.

Well, I'm talking about qualia-- the experience of what things are like, which a philosophical zombie by definition cannot have. If you think there's no such thing as qualia, then I have only to put my mouth in my pillow and scream to prove to my satisfaction that you are wrong. I'm happy to leave it at that.

You can conflate diametrically opposed ideas if you want to, but it doesn't solve the fundamental problem of qualia: that they are not included in, or explained by, any good mechanical or physical theory of reality.

I'm just not sure what I'm being asked to explain here. There's no good mechanical or physical theory of reality that accounts for what, exactly?

You have to explain why red looks so reddy-reddish to me.

The only thing you seem to be willing to offer up on the subject of qualia is that it is mysterious and different and inexplicable. Well, that sounds like a summary of your conclusion - not any chain of reasoning that led up to it.

I didn't say it's inexplicable. I said that there's no workable mechanical model of qualia, and no non-arbitrary criteria for determining where it even exists.

Qualia does not appear to be, by any observation that we have ever made of it - as indirectly as you choose to conceive of those observations; wholly mysterious, inexplicable, or extraneous.

I don't think I've said said those things. I've said that qualia are part of the natural universe, and that the capacity for qualia must necessarily be intrinsic TO the universe.

When I get drunk, I understand that my subsequent subjective experience is an issue of chemistry. How do you understand yours?

Since I've responded favorably to several posts now in which the nature of qualia was directly linked to brain parts, brain chemistry and brain function, I don't see the point of this question. My understanding is the same as yours-- changes to brain chemistry affect the way my brain processes incoming information, resulting in a distorted or altered experience. This has no bearing on the capacity for qualia to exist rather than not, and the philosophical arguments for a kind of God defgined in terms of that that capacity being intrinsic and possibly eternal.

[Whateverist]

Is belonging to a philosophical zombie a real alternative?

[bennyboy]

Is belonging to a philosophical zombie a real alternative?

That's the thing. Nobody's sure. When the Cyberbenny 3000 comes out, with all the mannerisms and behaviors of the real thing, which seems to really experience and interact sensibly to the universe-- what's to be said? Does the Cyberbenny get legal privileges? Does it have duties? Does it get to demand that the government make clones for it to love and train? Can it be arbitrarily turned off or modified?

Will it be capable of truly moral behavior if it doesn't have the same brain / hormonal mechanisms that people do?