A Conscious Universe

[The Grand Nudger]

-and you're not satisfied with this underlying nature unless it contains some comments about photons -and-....the mind, eh? Baggage.

How about we negotiate, photons, sure, you can have em...mind - not so much, mind isn't a photon...eh? Perhaps photons are spooky, but mind is just something that objects -made out of information- do. Same as a pc in my physical world.

[Pizza]

I'd say that epistemological idealism implies metaphysical idealism as the default position. The question given the philosophical fact (and I think it is a fact) of espistemological idealism, or at least of solipsism as the only truly gnostic position, then it is not knowable whether any limitations intrinsic to the human experience are veiling, or even distorting, our understanding of whatever reality underlies our experiences.

I think epistemological idealism implies epistemological solipsism( "that knowledge of anything outside one's own mind is unsure; the external world and other minds cannot be known and might not exist outside the mind" as wiki puts it), yes but not metaphysical solipsism. But yes you can be both.

As we've discuess, physics as a subject seen in this way is just studying reality, whatever it is, given the caveats that: 1) there's enough consistency to merit study, and 2) the one studying has the power to interact with that reality in order to verify its truth. But that physicalism is, at least to me, different than what most people mean when they view idealism and physicalism as diametrically opposite positions.

Fair enough. I don't think we disagree here. It's good to point this out because many people think incorrectly that idealism is anti-science.

We can renegotiate semantics at any time, and I think we are in fact doing that right now. However, given the OP, this view of physicalism isn't really at odds with the flavor of idealism that I gravitate to, since it can comfortably reduce all of existence down to ideas without invalidating itself. Maybe that's what you're trying to say, after all?

My point in this thread is that I believe important aspects of reality cannot be expressed in terms of the interaction of real objects in a geometric 3D space framework: either because they are things with no volume or no mass, or because they are things which cannot reasonably be inferred from the observation of any physical system without begging the question: specifically, the nature of photons and the nature of mind. Given this, it seems that there are things which are not actually objects, and that these things are coherent ONLY as ideas.

I think about philosophy a lot for some reason and I'm not as scared of solipsism as most people. I also respect George Berkeley's immaterialism more than most; it is so elegance. I lean towards the B-theory of time. I guess we may agree more than not. I just don't agree with metaphysical idealism but that's because I don't care for the mind independent vs dependent dichotomy.

[bennyboy]

-and you're not satisfied with this underlying nature unless it contains some comments about photons -and-....the mind, eh? Baggage.

How about we negotiate, photons, sure, you can have em...mind - not so much, mind isn't a photon...eh? Perhaps photons are spooky, but mind is just something that objects -made out of information- do. Same as a pc in my physical world.

Yay, I got photons! *high fives nobody in particular*

You say this about mind, and there is certainly a strong link between the human brain and the human experience, but there are a couple of problems:

1) You define mind AS brain function-- not a product of it. But you haven't defined exactly what it is about the brain that "IS" mind, except in very vague terms. Is it the information itself? Is it the sensation of a particular brain part firing? Is it a field generated by the electromagnetic fluctuations in neurons as signals travel through them? What is it, other than a general wave toward the brain, and a strong feeling that the mind must be "in there somewhere"?

2) It is impossible to use your definition of the mind outside the context of animal brains. You cannot, for example, look at any other physical system, and know whether it is experiencing qualia or not. In fact, in a philosophical sense, you cannot establish the existence of mind outside your own experience. It seems to me that an objective world view, largely in vogue because of scientific objective observation, is incompatible with a super-important "thing" that you cannot even identify. Is it really correct to say, "I denounce solipsism because it's a pointless position that lends little to an understanding in life," and then follow that arbitrary assumption through a chain of ideas to the brain as creator of mind?

[Mudhammam]

Is it really correct to say, "I denounce solipsism because it's a pointless position that lends little to an understanding in life," and then follow that arbitrary assumption through a chain of ideas to the brain as creator of mind?

How much more is needed besides the obvious evolutionary history of the brain and its effects on everything we can even possibly consider an "experience" or "qualia" or a modus of thought?

[bennyboy]

Is it really correct to say, "I denounce solipsism because it's a pointless position that lends little to an understanding in life," and then follow that arbitrary assumption through a chain of ideas to the brain as creator of mind?

How much more is needed besides the obvious evolutionary history of the brain and its effects on everything we can even possibly consider an "experience" or "qualia" or a modus of thought?

I don't think the evolutionary narrative proves anything. It shows a relationship between brain and behavior, but I don't think it allows us to establish in a philosophically satisfying way whether a given physical system is or isn't experiencing qualia. It doesn't define qualia, give a mechanism for it (other than a vague sense that it's in the brain, somewhere, cuz 'where else?'), or explain why any organism would need to be aware of the processes in the brain in order for it to respond to its environment.

[Mudhammam]

I don't think the evolutionary narrative proves anything. It shows a relationship between brain and behavior, but I don't think it allows us to establish in a philosophically satisfying way whether a given physical system is or isn't experiencing qualia. It doesn't define qualia, give a mechanism for it (other than a vague sense that it's in the brain, somewhere, cuz 'where else?'), or explain why any organism would need to be aware of the processes in the brain in order for it to respond to its environment.

Sure, it's not a silver bullet for everything we would like to understand regarding the neurophysiology of mental experiences but that mind has a physical basis --- a perspective that analogously coincides with individual growth and development of brain, and simultaneously qualia --- I think it's more than adequate evidence.

[bennyboy]

I don't think the evolutionary narrative proves anything. It shows a relationship between brain and behavior, but I don't think it allows us to establish in a philosophically satisfying way whether a given physical system is or isn't experiencing qualia. It doesn't define qualia, give a mechanism for it (other than a vague sense that it's in the brain, somewhere, cuz 'where else?'), or explain why any organism would need to be aware of the processes in the brain in order for it to respond to its environment.

Sure, it's not a silver bullet for everything we would like to understand regarding the neurophysiology of mental experiences but that mind has a physical basis --- a perspective that analogously coincides with individual growth and development of brain, and simultaneously qualia --- I think it's more than adequate evidence.

It's also a straw man. I've explicitly talked about the relationship between brain and mind. Since I see all of reality as the complex expression of ideas and the interaction among ideas, I have no problem with the brain-- as the expression of underlying ideas.

What you do not have is a reason why the mind exists at all, and what properties a brain has that a rock doesn't have, that allows/causes/necessitates this existence. And this is the sum total of the physicalist view on mind: it can't really define mind, can't establish whether a system experiences qualia, cannot explain the mechanism of the creation of mind, and cannot even prove that mind exists.

And yet, after all this, "It's in the brain. . . obviously." I want to know how you go from direct experience to this level of confidence in this view. What non-arbitrary steps did you take from solipsism, to objectivism, to confident statements about the nature of mind? If you claim your view on mind is obvious, then please, tell me how to see it for the obvious truth that it is, WITHOUT making the choice to accept it to be so merely because this choice feels pragmatic.

[The Grand Nudger]

1) You define mind AS brain function-- not a product of it. But you haven't defined exactly what it is about the brain that "IS" mind, except in very vague terms. Is it the information itself? Is it the sensation of a particular brain part firing? Is it a field generated by the electromagnetic fluctuations in neurons as signals travel through them? What is it, other than a general wave toward the brain, and a strong feeling that the mind must be "in there somewhere"?

You're waiting for definitions and explanations that are truncated by considering mind -as- brain. I have defined exactly what about brain -is- mind, physical structures capable of and engaged in computation. In my explanation, information is a description of the state of a physical structure, this is all that the term information refers to, architecturally. I'd wager that any particular sensation is many "parts firing" - not necessarily by description of function, but by my experienced depth and breadth of function (and how others report the experience). It is the -state- of a nueron, any-field- is a carrier for a signal (again, same way it works in any pc, in principle). It is what I have continually described it as, that you ask makes me doubt that any part of my explanations have sunk it -at all-. Thats my explanation, anyway...I don't know that it's done that way, I can only see how it could be done by reference to objects we see doing this sort of work to a similar or identical effect as described. I don;t really need to wonder about anything more fundamental, lurking around under the surface, if this work can be accomplished here, at our level of observation and interaction.

2) It is impossible to use your definition of the mind outside the context of animal brains. You cannot, for example, look at any other physical system, and know whether it is experiencing qualia or not.

-and we can't know from animal brains either...unless we reference observed effect. There's very little we can say about -our own- with any credibility once we remove the metrics by which we judge these relationships in any other context...which seem, in this particular context, to be unsuitable to you here regardless of how suitable you find them elsewhere.

In fact, in a philosophical sense, you cannot establish the existence of mind outside your own experience.

If you'd like to go that route, sure....but I'd caution against proposing knowledge and then defending that knowledge against criticism by invoking the solipsism defense. If I can't know such and such, neither can you.

It seems to me that an objective world view, largely in vogue because of scientific objective observation, is incompatible with a super-important "thing" that you cannot even identify.

What thing, and is there a requirement for anyone to be able to identify any conceptual thing? A requirement of complete knowledge?

Is it really correct to say, "I denounce solipsism because it's a pointless position that lends little to an understanding in life,"

For me, yes - you'll have to decide your own answer for yourself. What do you think, throwing your chips in with the solipsists on me Benny? I don;t want to hear anything else about the fundamental units of the universe if you are - you're done, fin, you have nothing to communicate to anyone, if there is indeed anyone to communicate it to, or a universe exterior, for that matter.

and then follow that arbitrary assumption through a chain of ideas to the brain as creator of mind?

I don't think that brain creates mind...so I guess you'll have to ask someone else? Like I said, nothing sunk in. Maybe that's why we're having inexplicable disagreements?

Can't the brain/mind be an expression of the underlying mechanic of objects...which are themselves an expression of the underlying mechanics of ideas? Why this need to cut out the middle man for mind? Not satisfied with the photons?
-of course not.........

(also...you ask alot of questions that you don't seem to be prepared to answer for your own framework - got an ETA on that "how do ideas do ideas to ideas" question I asked? No amount of me being wrong would make your position more credible, no shortage of explanation from me would excuse such a shortage from yourself. Bonus points if you can explain computation without reference the the behavior and characteristics of physical objects - also.....you'll be very, very famous. To my knowledge, no one has ever built an idea machine....(though we have managed to build seemingly physical quantum computers) imagine the applications of a sizeless computer! - hell, we could do away with our meatsuits and let our consciousness float as point particles (ala photons)...yes?)

-if it isn't clear, I think I can give you your underlying idea world and it won't remove the brain as mind comment in the least......I actually feel that your framework would support a physical comp mind (provided that I say "and physical stuff is just a particular interaction of ideas/information" - and especially since it does not look to redefine computation in the least, any existing example of comp holds for this framework of yours). Gratz, you're still a biological automaton..and mind isn't all that important to the issue. That's if I just conceded for sake of argument, mind you...I still don't think you've constructed a very solid framework-

Let me ask a very simple and general question. In your framework...why do you and I need computers and an internet connection to have this conversation, fundamentally? What is it about our "idea stuff" that requires this other "idea stuff" in order to interact and form a third set of "idea stuff"? What necessity is there, for starters, for this middle step?
(you already know my answer, the human voice only travels so far - described by resistance in air, etc...we possess no ESP organ (if such transmission is possible), the comps and internet act as physical states and carriers...on and on)

[bennyboy]

1) You define mind AS brain function-- not a product of it. But you haven't defined exactly what it is about the brain that "IS" mind, except in very vague terms. Is it the information itself? Is it the sensation of a particular brain part firing? Is it a field generated by the electromagnetic fluctuations in neurons as signals travel through them? What is it, other than a general wave toward the brain, and a strong feeling that the mind must be "in there somewhere"?

You're waiting for definitions and explanations that are truncated by considering mind -as- brain. I have defined exactly what about brain -is- mind, physical structures capable of and engaged in computation.

If you take any arbitrary collection of physical systems, then they will all meet your definition of mind, since all matter is computing information about spin, mass, etc. Congratulations, you've proven that the universe is conscious!

-if it isn't clear, I think I can give you your underlying idea world and it won't remove the brain as mind comment in the least......I actually feel that your framework would support a physical comp mind (provided that I say "and physical stuff is just a particular interaction of ideas/information" - and especially since it does not look to redefine computation in the least, any existing example of comp holds for this framework of yours).

Great. So we agree.

[The Grand Nudger]

If you take any arbitrary collection of physical systems, then they will all meet your definition of mind,

-actually...they wont - no more so than they do (some things...sure, I'm always saying that plants and pcs have "mind" if we have "mind"...aren't I?) - but what may have to be reclassified will comprise such a miniscule portion of all the stuff in the universe...it hardly bears mention in such a manner..since neither of us have taken it upon ourselves to redefine computation.

since all matter is computing information about spin, mass, etc.

-um..no, computation is a bit more strict than stuff interacting - thats why we can;t build a computer out of anything...any old way we like.

-Computation requires a range of very specific interactions -regardless of the means by which these interactions are achieved-. Things we don't describe as conscious now are unlikely to find themselves in the position of being conscious just because we alter our idea of how those interactions are achieved, how those requirements are met. The universe will remain a "dumb" place where lot of things(ideas) happen...that has computational/conscious systems -within it-, as it is now. Besides...you don't think computers are conscious anyway, now do you? If you are conscious, then a rock is not, even if you're both comp systems (there are further undeclared requirements). Why not apply the same blade to the relationship between yourself and the universe? Yourself and a photon?

Congratulations, you've proven that the universe is conscious!

Unless you're being snarky.....I think I see what our problem might be - you have a strange idea of what computation is and entails
(combined with your strange ideas about QM.....a picture emerges)

Great. So we agree.

You keep telling me that we don't..so........lol.