Mind is the brain?

[The Grand Nudger]

We're trying to summit Mt. Impossible so that we can have a discussion about a current working hypothesis of mind.

[little_monkey]

True, but computers don't compare to a human mind as the latter took 5 billion years to evolve to what it is today. Evolution doesn't have intentionality. It produces organism that struggles to survive. In that struggle, species improve in mobility, in responding to different stimuli, in adapting to a multitude of environments, and so on. Memory, self-awareness, intelligence increased as species became more complex. There's no reason to believe that evolution has any intentionality whatsoever. Randomness, natural selection, flow of the gene pool, etc. can account for the development of the different species. And we see in the development of the brain throughout this evolution. Why you need to believe in some intentionality is a question you need to ask yourself. I see no problem in not believe in any intentionality in the evolution of life on this planet. It makes life more wonderful, more precious, more exciting than to believe that some deity has a plan. Why would I want to be at the mercy of such a plan?!? 

Oops, careful there.  When I talk about external intention, I'm talking about human intention: we see as coherent processes those things we've controlled, and as "just stuff" those which we haven't.  But actually, this division is arbitrary.

Indeed, the division is always arbitrary as we have a mind that is fundamentally creative. And as such, we can always redefine our definitions. 

When people disagree - often over definitions - this creative process of redefining terms is often referred as "moving the goal posts". 

[bennyboy]

Is this how you handle every competing proposition to your own notion of matter-mind?  I'm starting to see how you managed to come to that flight of fancy now.  You can;t tell the difference between a cantelope, a ferrarri, a pc, or a golf club.  Things must all be the same stuff.  Matter-mind.  Matter-melon.  Matter-9 iron, and ofc none of these are dinstinct from each other, none are specific.  So, its Matter-mind/melon/9 iron/computer/ -all of the stuff happening-.  All properties of matter, nothing specific, nothing discrete.

Look, either a whole system is mind, or a part of it is. If you cannot demonstrate that the whole system is, then it must be assumed that part of it is. If we want to understand the essence of mind, we'll have to establish what about a particular physical system allows for mind. Waving at the brain doesn't work, because not all brain systems are connected to the subjective experience of ideas. You might as well wave at your bedroom and say, "Yep. . . evidence is it's in there somewhere, for sure."

WE actually don't see things that way, but you should already know that.  There appear to be a great many comp systems on earth that we neither designed nor manufactured.  OFC, the contention of CTM is that we and other sentient life are among the most robust examples.  The division line is specific, refer to the definition, when you finally allow for identity in the world.

And this says exactly what about why material systems allow for subjective experience?

[The Grand Nudger]

Look, either a whole system is mind, or a part of it is.

CTM would tell you that the human brain is the object of interest in the human system. It's stuck with the evidence available, rather than your daydreams about matter-mind. It's not the comp theory of fingers and toes. Or the theory of nose mind. Another "no shit" statement, regardless.

If you cannot demonstrate that the whole system is, then it must be assumed that part of it is.  If we want to understand the essence of mind, we'll have to establish what about a particular physical system allows for mind.  Waving at the brain doesn't work, because not all brain systems are connected to the subjective experience of ideas.  You might as well wave at your bedroom and say, "Yep. . . evidence is it's in there somewhere, for sure."

CTM doesn't "wave at the brain", it attempts to explain how the brain works in the first place.  But who cares, because here you are now making tiny slices and divisions for subjective experience of ideas that you will not allow for any other proposition.  Whatever happened to "it's all just stuff and arbitrary lines"....?

And this says exactly what about why material systems allow for subjective experience?

Nothing, it only shows that your previous claim was woefully incorrect, why? However, as to the question -I'd explain it to you, again, but since you won't allow that comp systems exist to begin the discussion in the first place...I'm afraid it's pointless, and more than a little bit absurd. Not that you can elaborate, ofc, until things can be themselves rather than "just stuff/all the stuff/the same stuff". Until such a time as you can consistently and -specifically- describe what you are referring to by subjective experience, no rational or informative discussion can be had regarding your question. When you do decide that things can be assigned identity again, as you did above, you can no longer object in the manner that you have. So I guess you have a decision to make.

Force your own statements into irrationality, or we can just move forward safe in the knowledge that a computer is a thing, that comp systems exist, and that there are at least -some- things that do not fit the definitions of either.......and try to answer that question of yours.

[little_monkey]

Is this how you handle every competing proposition to your own notion of matter-mind?  I'm starting to see how you managed to come to that flight of fancy now.  You can;t tell the difference between a cantelope, a ferrarri, a pc, or a golf club.  Things must all be the same stuff.  Matter-mind.  Matter-melon.  Matter-9 iron, and ofc none of these are dinstinct from each other, none are specific.  So, its Matter-mind/melon/9 iron/computer/ -all of the stuff happening-.  All properties of matter, nothing specific, nothing discrete.

Look, either a whole system is mind, or a part of it is.  If you cannot demonstrate that the whole system is, then it must be assumed that part of it is.

Bad assumption. Mind = configuration of stuff. If the configuration is not there, you still have stuff with no mind. But mind doesn't exist apart from stuff.

[bennyboy]

Look, either a whole system is mind, or a part of it is.  If you cannot demonstrate that the whole system is, then it must be assumed that part of it is.

Bad assumption. Mind = configuration of stuff. If the configuration is not there, you still have stuff with no mind. But mind doesn't exist apart from stuff.

Nobody is saying that it does.

[bennyboy]

CTM would tell you that the human brain is the object of interest in the human system.  It's stuck with the evidence available, rather than your daydreams about matter-mind.  It's not the comp theory of fingers and toes.  Or the theory of nose mind.  Another "no shit" statement, regardless.  

That's a strange strawman. You keep pretending I'm saying stuff has mind that I haven't said has it. I'm saying the exact opposite: that much of the systems you are pointing to does NOT allow for mind, and that you aren't doing a sufficient job of establishing mindful systems. Waving at the brain will never be sufficient, until you can show exactly what about the brain allows for mind.

CTM doesn't "wave at the brain", it attempts to explain how the brain works in the first place.  But who cares, because here you are now making tiny slices and divisions for subjective experience of ideas that you will not allow for any other proposition.  Whatever happened to "it's all just stuff and arbitrary lines"....?

That's still what I'm saying. Parts of the brain do not allow for mind, but since they are in the same approximate location, you wave toward the entire brain. You might as well wave toward my entire bedroom.

Nothing, it only shows that your previous claim was woefully incorrect, why?  However, as to the question -I'd explain it to you, again, but since you won't allow that comp systems exist to begin the discussion in the first place...I'm afraid it's pointless, and more than a little bit absurd.  Not that you can elaborate, ofc, until things can be themselves rather than "just stuff/all the stuff/the same stuff".   Until such a time as you can consistently and -specifically-  describe what you are referring to by subjective experience, no rational or informative discussion can be had regarding your question.  When you do decide that things can be assigned identity again, as you did above, you can no longer object in the manner that you have.  So I guess you have a decision to make.

If you wanted to know where graphics came from, you wouldn't just wave your hand at a computer. You'd have to identify the graphics card, and explain what about it allowed for light patterns to be presented on your screen. Unless you want to define "graphics" as "everything computers do," then you have to provide actual details. Of course, you are pretty much doing that: defining "mind" as "everything brains do." Either that, or you're aware your theory says very little about what neural systems allow for mind, and are just dodging the issue.

[Foxaèr]

This idiot is basically just stating the mind as the consciousness versus the brain as the source.

We know the heart is not the source of love.

I think that is the same comparison that is trying to be made between the mind and the brain.

That is what I have deduced, anyway, not that I believe the garbage being spouted hither to and yonder.

[The Grand Nudger]

CTM would tell you that the human brain is the object of interest in the human system.  It's stuck with the evidence available, rather than your daydreams about matter-mind.  It's not the comp theory of fingers and toes.  Or the theory of nose mind.  Another "no shit" statement, regardless.  

That's a strange strawman.  You keep pretending I'm saying stuff has mind that I haven't said has it.  I'm saying the exact opposite: that much of the systems you are pointing to does NOT allow for mind, and that you aren't doing a sufficient job of establishing mindful systems.  Waving at the brain will never be sufficient, until you can show exactly what about the brain allows for mind.

I would gladly provide you with such an explanation as soon as you decide that comp systems exist.  What, btw, is supposed to be a strawman about the above?  

That's still what I'm saying.  Parts of the brain do not allow for mind, but since they are in the same approximate location, you wave toward the entire brain.  You might as well wave toward my entire bedroom.

How would you know?  In your estimation it's all matter-mind...and you won't even -allow- my definition of terms to begin explaining it from CTM.  So you tell me what parts you're referring to, because I fail to see how your statement could -possibly- be true in the case of matter-mind, and it certainly isn't true in CTM.

If you wanted to know where graphics came from, you wouldn't just wave your hand at a computer. You'd have to identify the graphics card, and explain what about it allowed for light patterns to be presented on your screen.  

Which would be trivially easy once we've established that comp systems do, in fact, exist. You don't get to talk about identification until you allow for identity. Until then, I'm gonna go with matter-graphics as an explanation. / shrugs

Unless you want to define "graphics" as "everything computers do," then you have to provide actual details.  Of course, you are pretty much doing that: defining "mind" as "everything brains do."  Either that, or you're aware your theory says very little about what neural systems allow for mind, and are just dodging the issue.

I'm not doing anything. I can't, until you decide that it's not all just stuff happening/physics after all. Until you can finally accept that your objections are insufficient, there can be no discussion of -any- comp system. How am I supposed to answer your questions if you will not allow me to identify, specify, or describe? Ask yourself that question.

[bennyboy]

The strawman is that you keep talking about physical objects and sayng they don't have mind. I've never said they do.

As for the rest: look, if I ask how an engine converts chemical energy to motion, you won't just wave at the engine, and say "There it is." You'll explain about the burning process, show how fuel is regulated, show how the pistons work. You'll show how the sparkplugs ignite the fuel, and how a feedback loop continually charges the battery to allow the process to continue, for the most part, indefinitely. You'll identify what part of the engine does exactly what role in the process, and will do so happily and with ease.

My question for you is very simple: what brain systems and functions are you calling "comp mind," and how do they work, even vaguely? How do they allow for mind? And, specifically, do parts of the brain not really involved in processing, like the blood in the veins or the cerebral spinal fluide, get called part of "mind" or not?