I have a theory about how spontaneous recreation of a given individual might work in a rational sense.
Basically I emphasize the importance of the pattern/form of personality and de-emphasize the importance of unbroken continuity.
Or to put it another way it’s like you have an identical clone and I say that it is legitimately “you” and then the first you changes and then I say that clone is now more “you” than you.
Or to put it another way it’s like when you meet some who looks just like someone you know who died, only focusing on the inside (personality) rather than the outside (appearance)
Or to put it another way It’s saying having people like you in alternate universes counts as an afterlife
That is to say I think that if you die and then cease to exist and then after a period of time a person randomly comes into being who is sufficiently similar, then that person counts as “you”.
Our idea of Self is a hotly debated subject and the accepted definition is mish-mash of instinct, superstition and laziness.
The definition of Self is not like mass or Ram or oxidation. These all have simple clear definitions.
Self, however is defined by practical functions; your relationships to the world, to other people and to yourself. These are shaped by emotions and emotions are not simple or clear.
All living things are more or less you-ish. A dog, not so much. An identical twin, quite a bit.
One’s core beliefs are important. The type of hat you often wear is less important.
If you lose your job, you become less yourself (or at least like the “yourself that you were). You effect the world and people and yourself in different ways.
When one being shares your core beliefs they are more you-ish.
When one being puts on a hat like the hat you often wear, they become a tiny bit more you-ish.
There are two major concerns with this theory: continuity and complexity
Continuity
Continuity is an imaginary line that goes through your body through time and space from your conception to your death.
Many would say it the most critical aspect in defining oneself.
It is vital in holding your other bits together through time.
Aside from that however, it is ultimately just a line.
If that line could cease for a while and random chance put your other aspects back together, the broken continuity wouldn’t in itself mean anything.
Let say something incredibly unlikely (but not impossible) happened.
Let’s say right now, as you are, every atom in your body suddenly spontaneously dissipated into air killing you.
But then, another fabulously unlikely event happened and some molecules that had been not part of you suddenly jumped together in the same place forming a living human body that was an exact replica of your old body. This person would then continue living your old life.
You might insist this person was not you.
But by all practical standards it would make absolutely no difference at all.
Same memories. Same face. Same clothes. They/you might even realize something had happened.
That person would interact with the world and itself in the exact same way the first person would have.
This hold true even if there is a gap of year or millions of years rather than an instant.
(although, or course being in a different world would affect you making that person less “you”-ish
Heck, falling asleep is not unlike this. Your conscious mind ceases to be and is then remade (although from continuous memories)
In our society the body is invariably considered to equal self.
Perhaps in the future, cloning, mind back-ups, memory transplants or independently sentient digital avatars will come along to challenge that definition.
Works of fiction, chemicals and computer programs are defined by their shape (and thus how they affect the world) and not by being physically connected to their past forms.
All copies of fallout 4 are considered to be “fallout 4” even though they do not share the same continuity. If one is destroyed Fallout 4 still exists and if a randomly created game was like fallout 4 it would fall to be fallout 4 only if its code was sufficiently different.
Consider the old idea of a million monkeys working on a million typewriters producing the plays of Shakespeare. Those plays would still be the plays despite having no connection to the original writer or books.
Consider people who have married the identical twins of their dead spouses.
The things that cause us to give so much importance to continuity are superstition and instinct.
Superstition leads us to believe in the concept of soul –an object that conveniently holds our memories, personality and maintains continuity.
Instinct shaped by a billion years of evolution emphasizes the importance of the continuation of the body. We feel strongly that if this body is destroyed that this is big deal.
One might say that many people’s emotions about continuity are strong and therefore highly significant.
This means that if I remake a person who believes continuity is important I should make sure the brain includes a belief that continuity is important. It doesn’t mean I have to maintain continuity (with say a bit of brain or some atoms) for that person to be that person.
If one remakes someone who loves cake I don’t have to give them cake.
Complexity
A fair point could be made that minds are complex and even if we define a person by their pattern the chances of that particular pattern reoccurring in the lifetime of this universe could be very slim.
I honestly couldn’t say how many factors are needed to define a person.
Some people say that “all are one” that each and every person is all people.
On the other hand insisting on identical arrangement of every molecule is a viable viewpoint.
I *think* most people would be happy with a clone where the mind was 99.9% the same.
I personally favor a very simple definition of self, stripped down to one’s basic personality. With that definition you might actually have a chance of being “reborn” in a century or two.
In any case the main thing that would make a person’s rebirth possible would the existence of alternate universes.
If we have an infinite number of universes it would not matter how complex we consider a person to be they would still reoccur; infinitely even.
If we do not consider unbroken continuity as essential in defining identity then a sufficiently similar person in an alternate universe counts as a specific person as much as a similar person born in the original universe.
Many reputable people support the many worlds theory.
We have no direct proof of course and it is possible that there is only one universe.
However the existence of a single universe is actually a more complex and specific event than the existence of a multiverse and therefore by Occam's razor more probable.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multiverse....27s_razor
“consider the set of all integers. Which is simpler, the whole set or just one number? Naively, you might think that a single number is simpler, but the entire set can be generated by quite a trivial computer program, whereas a single number can be hugely long. Therefore, the whole set is actually simpler... (Similarly), the higher-level multiverses are simpler.” - Max Tegmark, "Parallel universes. Not just a staple of science fiction, other universes are a direct implication of cosmological observations". Scientific American 288 (5): 40–51. May 2003.
So an infinite number of universes (the entire set) is more likely than a finite number of universes.
Basically I emphasize the importance of the pattern/form of personality and de-emphasize the importance of unbroken continuity.
Or to put it another way it’s like you have an identical clone and I say that it is legitimately “you” and then the first you changes and then I say that clone is now more “you” than you.
Or to put it another way it’s like when you meet some who looks just like someone you know who died, only focusing on the inside (personality) rather than the outside (appearance)
Or to put it another way It’s saying having people like you in alternate universes counts as an afterlife
That is to say I think that if you die and then cease to exist and then after a period of time a person randomly comes into being who is sufficiently similar, then that person counts as “you”.
Our idea of Self is a hotly debated subject and the accepted definition is mish-mash of instinct, superstition and laziness.
The definition of Self is not like mass or Ram or oxidation. These all have simple clear definitions.
Self, however is defined by practical functions; your relationships to the world, to other people and to yourself. These are shaped by emotions and emotions are not simple or clear.
All living things are more or less you-ish. A dog, not so much. An identical twin, quite a bit.
One’s core beliefs are important. The type of hat you often wear is less important.
If you lose your job, you become less yourself (or at least like the “yourself that you were). You effect the world and people and yourself in different ways.
When one being shares your core beliefs they are more you-ish.
When one being puts on a hat like the hat you often wear, they become a tiny bit more you-ish.
There are two major concerns with this theory: continuity and complexity
Continuity
Continuity is an imaginary line that goes through your body through time and space from your conception to your death.
Many would say it the most critical aspect in defining oneself.
It is vital in holding your other bits together through time.
Aside from that however, it is ultimately just a line.
If that line could cease for a while and random chance put your other aspects back together, the broken continuity wouldn’t in itself mean anything.
Let say something incredibly unlikely (but not impossible) happened.
Let’s say right now, as you are, every atom in your body suddenly spontaneously dissipated into air killing you.
But then, another fabulously unlikely event happened and some molecules that had been not part of you suddenly jumped together in the same place forming a living human body that was an exact replica of your old body. This person would then continue living your old life.
You might insist this person was not you.
But by all practical standards it would make absolutely no difference at all.
Same memories. Same face. Same clothes. They/you might even realize something had happened.
That person would interact with the world and itself in the exact same way the first person would have.
This hold true even if there is a gap of year or millions of years rather than an instant.
(although, or course being in a different world would affect you making that person less “you”-ish
Heck, falling asleep is not unlike this. Your conscious mind ceases to be and is then remade (although from continuous memories)
In our society the body is invariably considered to equal self.
Perhaps in the future, cloning, mind back-ups, memory transplants or independently sentient digital avatars will come along to challenge that definition.
Works of fiction, chemicals and computer programs are defined by their shape (and thus how they affect the world) and not by being physically connected to their past forms.
All copies of fallout 4 are considered to be “fallout 4” even though they do not share the same continuity. If one is destroyed Fallout 4 still exists and if a randomly created game was like fallout 4 it would fall to be fallout 4 only if its code was sufficiently different.
Consider the old idea of a million monkeys working on a million typewriters producing the plays of Shakespeare. Those plays would still be the plays despite having no connection to the original writer or books.
Consider people who have married the identical twins of their dead spouses.
The things that cause us to give so much importance to continuity are superstition and instinct.
Superstition leads us to believe in the concept of soul –an object that conveniently holds our memories, personality and maintains continuity.
Instinct shaped by a billion years of evolution emphasizes the importance of the continuation of the body. We feel strongly that if this body is destroyed that this is big deal.
One might say that many people’s emotions about continuity are strong and therefore highly significant.
This means that if I remake a person who believes continuity is important I should make sure the brain includes a belief that continuity is important. It doesn’t mean I have to maintain continuity (with say a bit of brain or some atoms) for that person to be that person.
If one remakes someone who loves cake I don’t have to give them cake.
Complexity
A fair point could be made that minds are complex and even if we define a person by their pattern the chances of that particular pattern reoccurring in the lifetime of this universe could be very slim.
I honestly couldn’t say how many factors are needed to define a person.
Some people say that “all are one” that each and every person is all people.
On the other hand insisting on identical arrangement of every molecule is a viable viewpoint.
I *think* most people would be happy with a clone where the mind was 99.9% the same.
I personally favor a very simple definition of self, stripped down to one’s basic personality. With that definition you might actually have a chance of being “reborn” in a century or two.
In any case the main thing that would make a person’s rebirth possible would the existence of alternate universes.
If we have an infinite number of universes it would not matter how complex we consider a person to be they would still reoccur; infinitely even.
If we do not consider unbroken continuity as essential in defining identity then a sufficiently similar person in an alternate universe counts as a specific person as much as a similar person born in the original universe.
Many reputable people support the many worlds theory.
We have no direct proof of course and it is possible that there is only one universe.
However the existence of a single universe is actually a more complex and specific event than the existence of a multiverse and therefore by Occam's razor more probable.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multiverse....27s_razor
“consider the set of all integers. Which is simpler, the whole set or just one number? Naively, you might think that a single number is simpler, but the entire set can be generated by quite a trivial computer program, whereas a single number can be hugely long. Therefore, the whole set is actually simpler... (Similarly), the higher-level multiverses are simpler.” - Max Tegmark, "Parallel universes. Not just a staple of science fiction, other universes are a direct implication of cosmological observations". Scientific American 288 (5): 40–51. May 2003.
So an infinite number of universes (the entire set) is more likely than a finite number of universes.
![[Image: extraordinarywoo-sig.jpg]](https://i.postimg.cc/zf86M5L7/extraordinarywoo-sig.jpg)
