(March 13, 2026 at 3:14 pm)Fake Messiah Wrote: It is, but why is it like that? Because people agreed to it, and people are the ones who set the rules.

When you say that X is morally permissible, then, do you just mean that people have agreed upon rules that say that X is morally permissible?

And, if so, does this mean that when people agreed upon rules that said that it was okay to own slaves, that it was then, back then, morally permissible to own slaves?

(March 13, 2026 at 2:51 pm)Disagreeable Wrote:

(March 13, 2026 at 2:44 pm)Angrboda Wrote: I never said that it did.

Then why did you say that I was equivocating? You seemed to suggest that I was equivocating if I wasn't going by common usage. If that's not what you were suggesting then I don't see why you made a point about me possibly equivocating.

I never said that your not abiding by common usage alone necessarily entailed that you are equivocating. This is a logic fail. If not abiding by common usage in combination with other things entails that you are equivocating, then not abiding by common usage not necessarily entailing the conclusion on its own does not argue that the conclusion itself is false. This is a case of ignoratio elenchi.

(March 13, 2026 at 2:51 pm)Disagreeable Wrote:

Quote:That's not what I was doing.  I was pointing out that as long as there is a category of being human, then the ethical question lies elsewhere than debating what does or doesn't make one human.

If whether a creature has or doesn't have the property of being human is what determines whether it's morally permissible or impermissible to eat such a creature then whether a creature actually is human or not *is* morally relevant.

My initial point was that you seem to be assuming that something other than the property of being human was the case regarding the moral significance. If that is the sole criterion, and assuming that being human is a legitimate category as implied by usage, then things will fall into one of two categories: things that are human and things that aren't human. If the property of being human is the criteria for determining the moral significance, then the fact that something is close to being human does not matter as there is nothing that being close grants you as far as the ethics are concerned. So you can parade an infinite class of close "human-like" beings and their deaths will not acquire moral significance from partially fulfilling the requisites for being human as being human is essentially all or nothing, as is any ethics predicated on that property alone. Liebniz's law doesn't decalare things that possess some, most, or many, but not all properties the same as being the same thing. I recognize that you seem inclined to want to argue that human-like creatures be treated the same, but in order to reach that conclusion, you have to either give up the coherence of the category human, or the supposition that being human alone is the relevant moral property. As long as the latter holds, possessing or not possessing other properties aside from being human are irrelevant. This follows from Liebniz' law and those two assumptions. If you want a different conclusion, you'll need to debate one of the two hypothesized assumptions, not make emotive arguments about how things should be treated or counted as they have no potential logical force to entail a different conclusion about eating non-human animals.

(March 13, 2026 at 2:51 pm)Disagreeable Wrote:

Quote:what you wrote doesn't even remotely follow.  If being human makes an organism's unjustified killing immoral, it is not entailed that such with something not human is also immoral.

That's' not what I said.

You seem to be repeatedly interpreting me uncharitably.

To go back to what I said verbatim:

Quote:if the property of being human is what makes it not acceptable to kill and eat a creature and the property of not being human is what makes it acceptable to kill and eat a creature then this entails that it's acceptable to kill and eat a creature very, very similar to a human that isn't technically of the same species . [Assuming, of course, that having the property of 'being human' is interchangeable with being a member of the human species].

I fail to see what difference in my paraphrase you are seeing. You wrote that if having property B-H is what makes some killing immoral, then it is entailed that killing something almost having the property is also immoral. If you think that follows, you're going to have to do more than simply asserting it.

(March 13, 2026 at 3:01 pm)Disagreeable Wrote: What's more, this exchange is rather suspect:

(March 13, 2026 at 2:28 pm)Disagreeable Wrote: Not abiding by common usage doesn't necessarily entail equivocation.

(March 13, 2026 at 2:44 pm)Angrboda Wrote: I never said that it did.

If you can't see the difference between those two, I suggest anyone and everyone ignore your incompetent ass.

(March 13, 2026 at 3:55 pm)Angrboda Wrote:

(March 13, 2026 at 3:01 pm)Disagreeable Wrote: What's more, this exchange is rather suspect:

If you can't see the difference between those two, I suggest anyone and everyone ignore your incompetent ass.

On the contrary, if you don't see your self-contradiction then you're the one with a problem.

Disagreeable Wrote:When you say that X is morally permissible, then, do you just mean that people have agreed upon rules that say that X is morally permissible?

Yes, people made rules and agreed to them. Or do you think there's another way?

Disagreeable Wrote:And, if so, does this mean that when people agreed upon rules that said that it was okay to own slaves, that it was then, back then, morally permissible to own slaves?

So, why are we moving from veganism to slavery? But ok. Yes, in the past, people saw no problem with owning slaves; they were not punished or felt guilty about it.

In some societies today, people still believe that slavery is morally acceptable or just treat people like shit. One of the problems is the tribal mentality that humans have, which frequently makes people not care for "outsiders" and thus treat them like lower beings.

(March 13, 2026 at 3:45 pm)Angrboda Wrote: I never said that your not abiding by common usage alone necessarily entailed that you are equivocating.  This is a logic fail.

Are you saying that when you said that if I am 'not abiding by common usage' then I am 'equivocating' you didn't in fact mean that my not abiding by common usage was alone enough to mean that I am necessarily equivocating?

If so, then I don't see why you even bother pointing it out, if it's not a sufficient reason to believe I'm equivocating, why bother mentioning it but not give any further reasons that do in fact, supposedly, explain it?

Quote:  If not abiding by common usage in combination with other things entails that you are equivocating, then not abiding by common usage not necessarily entailing the conclusion on its own does not argue that the conclusion itself is false.  This is a case of ignoratio elenchi.

This is all a red herring because it doesn't apply since I didn't equivocate. To equivocate I'd have to conflate definitions, which I haven't done.

Quote:My initial point was that you seem to be assuming that something other than the property of being human was the case regarding the moral significance.

I never said anything that suggested that I was assuming that. In fact, on the contrary, as soon as you wrongly suggested that I was assuming that I immediately responded by saying that the property of being human actually could be what was morally significant.

Quote:  If that is the sole criterion, and assuming that being human is a legitimate category as implied by usage, then things will fall into one of two categories: things that are human and things that aren't human.  If the property of being human is the criteria for determining the moral significance, then the fact that something is close to being human does not matter as there is nothing that being close grants you as far as the ethics are concerned.

Yes, but the question, then, is whether or not it is actually the case that we ought to revise our standard of what is morally significant.

Obviously if having the property of being human is what's morally significant then if something doesn't have the property of being human then that is not an objection. But the point is that if we start by saying that having the property of being human is what makes it not okay to eat a creature, but then we discover that there are creatures that it's not okay to eat that don't have the property of being human, then this entails that it's not actually the case that having the property of being human is the sole criterion of what makes it not okay to eat a creature.

Quote: So you can parade an infinite class of close "human-like" beings and their deaths will not acquire moral significance from partially fulfilling the requisites for being human as being human is essentially all or nothing, as is any ethics predicated on that property alone.  Liebniz's law doesn't decalare things that possess some, most, or many, but not all properties the same as being the same thing.  I recognize that you seem inclined to want to argue that human-like creatures be treated the same, but in order to reach that conclusion, you have to either give up the coherence of the category human, or the supposition that being human alone is the relevant moral property.

Yes, that's the whole point, if there are creatures that don't have the property of being human but are morally impermissible to kill and eat then it's not the case that having the property of being human is the sole criterion determining which creatures are morally impermissible to kill and eat.

 

Quote:As long as the latter holds, possessing or not possessing other properties aside from being human are irrelevant.  This follows from Liebniz' law and those two assumptions.

Obviously if having the property of being human is what's morally significant then having the property of being human is what's morally significant. Yes, Leibniz's law always applies, obviously. The question is whether having the property of being human actually is what's morally significant or not. The problem is that if there are creatures that do not in fact have the property of being human but it's still morally impermissible to kill and eat them then, obviously, it's not in fact the case that having the property of being human is the sole criterion with regards to whether it's impermissible to kill and eat a creature or not.

 

Quote:If you want a different conclusion, you'll need to debate one of the two hypothesized assumptions,

Which is exactly what I've been trying to do but it's been completely going over your head.

Quote: not make emotive arguments about how things should be treated or counted as they have no potential logical force to entail a different conclusion about eating non-human animals.

We can have normative or 'emotive' reasons for how we define 'human'. And whether or not X is a human depends upon what the word 'human' refers to, and what the word 'human' refers to depends upon how we define the word 'human'.

Quote:You wrote that if having property B-H is what makes some killing immoral, then it is entailed that killing something almost having the property is also immoral.

What I'm saying is that if having the property of B-H is the sole reason for what makes killing a creature that has the property B-H immoral, then it can't be the case that it's immoral to kill something without the property B-H.

This obviously follows.

If X is the sole reason for Y then not-X can't be a reason for Y. This is very basic logic. If the entirety of something explains something, then something that is not that thing that entirely explains it cannot explain it.

Quote:If you think that follows, you're going to have to do more than simply asserting it.

What follows is that if X is the sole reason for Y then something else other than X cannot be a reason for Y. Do you know what 'sole reason' means?

(March 13, 2026 at 4:04 pm)Fake Messiah Wrote: Yes, people made rules and agreed to them. Or do you think there's another way?

It depends upon whether moral realism is true or not. If moral realism is true then it might be objectively impermissible to do certain things even if everybody in practice permits those things.

Quote:So, why are we moving from veganism to slavery?

It was just an analogy.

Quote: But ok. Yes, in the past, people saw no problem with owning slaves; they were not punished or felt guilty about it.

And so all you mean by it being morally permissible in the past is the fact that people permitted it in the past? So you see 'permissible' and 'permitted' as interchangeable?

Quote:In some societies today, people still believe that slavery is morally acceptable or just treat people like shit.

In which case, is what they do permissible or impermissible?

I’m not convinced that whether or not to eat other people is necessarily a moral question at all.

Boru

(March 13, 2026 at 5:02 pm)BrianSoddingBoru4 Wrote: I’m not convinced that whether or not to eat other people is necessarily a moral question at all.

Boru

But I take it that you think that killing and eating them is a moral question. Right?

@Disagreeable

Quote:In which case, is what they do permissible or impermissible?

Permissibility is a legal issue, not a moral one.

Boru