I'm aware of modal axiom S5, it's the logic of possibility and necessity. Though I'll admit I'm not really familiar with this system and its axioms in regards to usage.

The main problem ontological arguments in this logical system (aside from the one I already mentioned, i.e counter modal arguments) is that they get hopelessly tied into knots by confusing epistemic possibility with metaphysical possibility, and this makes holding to this argument as not being useless indefensible. Basically, "epistemic possibility" can be boiled down to "possible as far as I know", while "metaphysical possibility" is basically "actually possible".

The problem is that Plantinga's modal ontological argument is that all we have to go on is the epistemic possibilty that God could possibly exist. For all we know, God's attributes could be incoherent, either alone or if possessed in tandem, thus voiding the argument. Now, your response might be something like "You can reject anything like that." THAT'S THE POINT. I can run just as strong a modal argument for the truth of atheism:

Modal Ontological Argument for Atheism Wrote:P1) If metaphysical naturalism is possibly true, it is true and God does not exist.

P2) Metaphysical naturalism is possibly true.

C) Therefore, metaphysical naturalism is true and God does not exist.

Have I established the metaphysical truth of metaphysical naturalism? Do you accept it?
The ONLY way to refute this argument is to appeal to an inherent contradiction in the concept of metaphysical naturalism (or deny the first premise, but it seems self-evidently true). And that's exactly what one does with Plantinga's argument. This argument makes a stalemate with Plantinga's, demonstrating that the ontological argument is entirely useless. It makes no sense at all to treat an argument style that can only end in a stalemate with it's opposition as good.

I agree with the distinction between epistemic/metaphysical possibility.

But is it true that we have no metaphysical possibility to rest on? I think your claim is "For all you know, the notion of a MGB may be incoherent."

But the opposite is also true. We can't give your claim any more weight than it's opposite. Rather I think both must be given equal weight at best, until and unless someone can show there is something incoherent about the concept of God.

What about your MOA for atheism?

I don't think we can go from P2 to C.

The reason for this is that while maximal greatness (or excellence) entails non-contingency, it must be necessary or impossible.

But the same isn't true of metaphysical naturalism. The claim "metaphysical naturalism is true" can be contingent on other truths.

So even if P2 is true, it entails the possibility that metaphysical naturalism is false, because it could be contingent.

Those are my two cents.

PS- I hate how abstract the MOA is.

I am not a huge fan of the cosmological argument-although you are absolutely right-this particular objection to it is absurd.

I walked into my kitchen the other day, and there was a freshly baked cake setting on the counter, and I asked aloud, “Who baked this cake?”
As I was asking the question I was half expecting an atheist to jump out of the closet shaking his finger, “No no no! You cannot ask that because then we would have to ask who baked the baker!” To think that some people actually think this is a legitimate objection is rather troubling.

(November 6, 2013 at 10:42 pm)Vincenzo "Vinny" G. Wrote: Okay, so there are smart atheists and there are dumb atheists.

Some dumb atheists make some piss poor arguments. Here I'll deal with one that comes up a lot.

1) "If God created everything then who created God?"

This is one facepalmtastic objection. Typically the atheist is some 12 year old who thinks he's "refuted religion". If he is, it's no use trying to reason. But if there are smart atheists, they ought to know why this is a terrible argument:

a) There are various beings that are called "God", and they all have different features. But philosophically, the most rigorous concept of God is called the "Maximally Great Being", or a being that possesses all the categories of greatness to such a degree that nothing greater can be conceived. Such a being is almost always thought to be personal rather than impersonal.

b) One of the features of this maximally great being is it's role as the "First cause" or "uncaused cause". To understand what this is, you have to look at everything in the world in terms of cause-effect relations. Everything contingent has a cause that leads backwards in a causal chain. Does the causal chain go on infinitely, or is it finite? Theists argue that the causal chain is finite, and it begins at an uncaused cause, or first cause which was not itself caused by anything. This is God.

If you disagree with this idea, you can either:
i) Challenge the claim that the causal chain is finite, arguing that it is infinite in the past.
ii) Challenge the claim that the first cause must be God.

What you cannot do is imply that God needs to be caused by something.

Special pleading.

"God created everything!"

"How do you know?"

"Nothing exists without a cause!"

"What caused God?"

"Nothing caused God!"

"So God has no cause?"

"Of course!"

"So God doesn't exist?"

"..."

Try again.

(November 20, 2013 at 8:41 pm)Vincenzo "Vinny" G. Wrote: I agree with the distinction between epistemic/metaphysical possibility.

But is it true that we have no metaphysical possibility to rest on? I think your claim is "For all you know, the notion of a MGB may be incoherent."

That wasn't my claim exactly. In a vacuum, both the positive AND the negative assertion alone are only an epistemic possibility. Without a deductive argument or some means to abduce either either way, the initial premise is unacceptable. And this was Alvin Plantinga's expressed reason why the argument "doesn'tt establish it's conclusion". Plantinga thinks it does however make belief in theism rational, since if you accept the first premise, the rest follows.

However, I do have arguments and reasons why I dismiss the first premise (I think there are problems with omnipotence and omniscience), so to me at least it's a done deal.

Quote:But the opposite is also true. We can't give your claim any more weight than it's opposite. Rather I think both must be given equal weight at best, until and unless someone can show there is something incoherent about the concept of God.

I agree. I didn't make that as clear earlier as it was in my head. xD

Quote:What about your MOA for atheism?

I don't think we can go from P2 to C.

The reason for this is that while maximal greatness (or excellence) entails non-contingency, it must be necessary or impossible.

You're misunderstanding the argument I think. In modal logic, to say something is 'possibly true' means that, provided it isn'nt incoherent, is true in at least one possible world. If metaphysical naturalism is true in any possible world, God cannot exist in that possible world. If cannot cannot exist in any single possible world, then he cannot exist in any of them.

Also, if something is metaphysically true, I think that means it has to be true. For example, it would make no sense to say that mathematical Platonism is true in one possible world, but not in all others.

Quote:But the same isn't true of metaphysical naturalism. The claim "metaphysical naturalism is true" can be contingent on other truths.

So even if P2 is true, it entails the possibility that metaphysical naturalism is false, because it could be contingent.

Those are my two cents.

PS- I hate how abstract the MOA is.

"God exists in all possible worlds" rests on other truths the same way naturalism might, namely that God's nature is coherent.

Edit:

Actually, I've rethought that last bit of my post. My modal argument for atheism (that is merely meant to demonstrate why the modal ontological argument for God's existence is useless) can be reformulated as thus:

Quote:P1) If metaphysical naturalism is possibly truem then God does not exist.

P2) Metaphysical naturalism is possibly true.

C) Therefore, God does not exist.

I realized that I didn't need for naturalism to be true in the actual world for the conclusion to follow, just that metaphysical naturalism is possible. And if it is possible (i.e true in some possible world), then God - who must exist in all possible worlds if he does exist - cannot exist.

And that's why MOAs are useless.

And I don't get why Plantinga made this argument anyway. Isn't making an argument for the existence of God an evidentialist apologetic approach, which as a reformed epistemologists, Plantinga must reject a priori?

(November 21, 2013 at 3:27 pm)MindForgedManacle Wrote: And I don't get why Plantinga made this argument anyway. Isn't making an argument for the existence of God an evidentialist apologetic approach, which as a reformed epistemologists, Plantinga must reject a priori?

Plantinga is an evidentialist and not a presuppositionalist.

(November 20, 2013 at 9:35 pm)MitchBenn Wrote:

---

Special pleading.

"God created everything!"

"How do you know?"

"Nothing exists without a cause!"

"What caused God?"

"Nothing caused God!"

"So God has no cause?"

"Of course!"

"So God doesn't exist?"

"..."

Try again.

---

I am not aware of anyone who uses the premise, “nothing exists without a cause”- usually it is framed as, “everything material has a cause” or “everything that has a beginning had a cause”. Neither of which would apply to God.

(November 21, 2013 at 5:51 pm)Statler Waldorf Wrote: I am not aware of anyone who uses the premise, “nothing exists without a cause”- usually it is framed as, “everything material has a cause” or “everything that has a beginning had a cause”. Neither of which would apply to God.

Nor would they apply to the universe if that is understood as having proceeded from a form of nothingness which contained everything as one of its potential states .. which seems to be the correct description by the way.

@Stal Everything I've read keeps saying he's a reformed epistemologist and has delivered heavy critiques of the evidentialist approach.

(November 20, 2013 at 10:19 pm)MindForgedManacle Wrote:

(November 20, 2013 at 8:41 pm)Vincenzo "Vinny" G. Wrote: I agree with the distinction between epistemic/metaphysical possibility.

But is it true that we have no metaphysical possibility to rest on? I think your claim is "For all you know, the notion of a MGB may be incoherent."

That wasn't my claim exactly. In a vacuum, both the positive AND the negative assertion alone are only an epistemic possibility. Without a deductive argument or some means to abduce either either way, the initial premise is unacceptable. And this was Alvin Plantinga's expressed reason why the argument "doesn'tt establish it's conclusion". Plantinga thinks it does however make belief in theism rational, since if you accept the first premise, the rest follows.

However, I do have arguments and reasons why I dismiss the first premise (I think there are problems with omnipotence and omniscience), so to me at least it's a done deal.

Quote:But the opposite is also true. We can't give your claim any more weight than it's opposite. Rather I think both must be given equal weight at best, until and unless someone can show there is something incoherent about the concept of God.

I agree. I didn't make that as clear earlier as it was in my head. xD

Quote:What about your MOA for atheism?

I don't think we can go from P2 to C.

The reason for this is that while maximal greatness (or excellence) entails non-contingency, it must be necessary or impossible.

You're misunderstanding the argument I think. In modal logic, to say something is 'possibly true' means that, provided it isn'nt incoherent, is true in at least one possible world. If metaphysical naturalism is true in any possible world, God cannot exist in that possible world. If cannot cannot exist in any single possible world, then he cannot exist in any of them.

Also, if something is metaphysically true, I think that means it has to be true. For example, it would make no sense to say that mathematical Platonism is true in one possible world, but not in all others.

Quote:But the same isn't true of metaphysical naturalism. The claim "metaphysical naturalism is true" can be contingent on other truths.

So even if P2 is true, it entails the possibility that metaphysical naturalism is false, because it could be contingent.

Those are my two cents.

PS- I hate how abstract the MOA is.

"God exists in all possible worlds" rests on other truths the same way naturalism might, namely that God's nature is coherent.

Edit:

Actually, I've rethought that last bit of my post. My modal argument for atheism (that is merely meant to demonstrate why the modal ontological argument for God's existence is useless) can be reformulated as thus:

Quote:P1) If metaphysical naturalism is possibly truem then God does not exist.

P2) Metaphysical naturalism is possibly true.

C) Therefore, God does not exist.

I realized that I didn't need for naturalism to be true in the actual world for the conclusion to follow, just that metaphysical naturalism is possible. And if it is possible (i.e true in some possible world), then God - who must exist in all possible worlds if he does exist - cannot exist.

And that's why MOAs are useless.

I can't speak for Plantinga's personal religious beliefs, but as far as the argument, your claim that the initial premise is unacceptable doesn't seem true.

To you it might be unacceptable (given your epistemology), but you're making a stronger claim, namely, "Nobody is justified in believing P1 is true." Can you defend such a claim successfully?

I humbly suggest it's too high a mountain to climb (and I remembered after the fact that Plantinga is an avid mountain-climber!).

But if you're not looking to climb this mountain, you must be willing to concede that it's possible that some people might justifiably believe (P1) is true, and to them, this argument is good.

In case all this seems oddly unfair, let's use metaphysical naturalism as an example:

" In a vacuum, both the positive (Metaphysical Naturalism is coherent) AND the negative assertion (Metaphysical Naturalism is incoherent) alone are only an epistemic possibility. Without a deductive argument or some means to abduce either either way, the initial premise (A claim that metaphysical naturalism is coherent) is unacceptable."

By your own principle, you're not allowed to be a metaphysical naturalist until you can overcome your burden. Should we thus declare that metaphysical naturalism is unacceptable? Surely you think we need to be more charitable.

Now you say you do have problems with omnipotence and omniscience, and that's something I think is intellectually respectable as a way to denying the argument, as opposed to "Plantinga is an idiot."

Kudos.

On your MOA:

I get that possibly true means it's true in one possible world. Absolutely right. But with a MEB or a MGB, the jump can be made to all possible worlds.

After all, if a MGB exists only in some possible worlds but not others, doesn't that make the MGB's existence contingent on something?

An MGB cannot be contingent, it would be necessary, and thus if the MGB exists in one possible world, it must in all possible worlds.

At least that's how I understand the jump. I could be wrong here.

Now one area in which I was puzzled and I had to step back and think was over the idea that metaphysical naturalism and whether it is impossible if God exists.

You are perfectly right in saying if MN is true in one possible world, it disproves God's existence. But what if there's a way out?

The MGB definition does not declare that God is natural or supernatural. If a MGB can be natural (big IF), then metaphysical naturalism can be true simultaneously with an MGB.

I think suffice to say, if MN is true in some possible world, a supernatural being is impossible, and a supernatural being exists in some possible world, then MN is impossible.

I think where this takes us is simply having to be very careful in what we presuppose, which is the antithesis of my "Philosophy by the seat of your pants" philosophy.

What about your revised MOA?

I think a theist could question P2. But if you are justified in accepting P2, then your argument is good. In the end what matters is the justification for P2.

PS- this is one of the most gratifying discussions I've had on this forum. Thanks for being one of the most interesting posters here.