Terrible Atheist Argument #1

[MindForgedManacle]

I can't speak for Plantinga's personal religious beliefs, but as far as the argument, your claim that the initial premise is unacceptable doesn't seem true.

To you it might be unacceptable (given your epistemology), but you're making a stronger claim, namely, "Nobody is justified in believing P1 is true." Can you defend such a claim successfully?

When I say that the initial premise is unacceptable, I mean it hasn't been established as being the case that it is anything more than epistemic possibility, which Plantinga himself noted at the end of his paper on this argument. That's why it doesn't establish its conclusion as true, because it's epistemically acceptable to deny the first premise, and as Plantinga says "...this is what the canny atheist will indeed do..." Acknowledging that P1 hasn't been established as a metaphysical possibility would seem justifiable, and certainly from the basis of that argument alone. And given other arguments against the coherency of God's attributes (omnipotence especially), it would seem a better inference not to accept the first premise, at least not yet.

But if you're not looking to climb this mountain, you must be willing to concede that it's possible that some people might justifiably believe (P1) is true, and to them, this argument is good.

But I don't. I don't think the attributes are coherent, which is why I reject that premise.

" In a vacuum, both the positive (Metaphysical Naturalism is coherent) AND the negative assertion (Metaphysical Naturalism is incoherent) alone are only an epistemic possibility. Without a deductive argument or some means to abduce either either way, the initial premise (A claim that metaphysical naturalism is coherent) is unacceptable."

By your own principle, you're not allowed to be a metaphysical naturalist until you can overcome your burden. Should we thus declare that metaphysical naturalism is unacceptable? Surely you think we need to be more charitable.

Until such a time as metaphysical naturalism has been shown to be incoherent (or likely to be), the proposition that it could be true is defensible. But yes, you're right. Those are ONLY epistemic possibilities. That was the whole point of the argument.

Now you say you do have problems with omnipotence and omniscience, and that's something I think is intellectually respectable as a way to denying the argument, as opposed to

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"Plantinga is an idiot."

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Kudos.

Lol.

On your MOA:

I get that possibly true means it's true in one possible world. Absolutely right. But with a MEB or a MGB, the jump can be made to all possible worlds.

Which isn't something my argument tries to do or even needs, as I'll show in a moment.

After all, if a MGB exists only in some possible worlds but not others, doesn't that make the MGB's existence contingent on something?

An MGB cannot be contingent, it would be necessary, and thus if the MGB exists in one possible world, it must in all possible worlds.

At least that's how I understand the jump. I could be wrong here.

Now one area in which I was puzzled and I had to step back and think was over the idea that metaphysical naturalism and whether it is impossible if God exists.

You are perfectly right in saying if MN is true in one possible world, it disproves God's existence. But what if there's a way out?

The MGB definition does not declare that God is natural or supernatural. If a MGB can be natural (big IF), then metaphysical naturalism can be true simultaneously with an MGB.

I think suffice to say, if MN is true in some possible world, a supernatural being is impossible, and a supernatural being exists in some possible world, then MN is impossible.

I think where this takes us is simply having to be very careful in what we presuppose, which is the antithesis of my "Philosophy by the seat of your pants" philosophy.

What about your revised MOA?

I think a theist could question P2. But if you are justified in accepting P2, then your argument is good. In the end what matters is the justification for P2.

PS- this is one of the most gratifying discussions I've had on this forum. Thanks for being one of the most interesting posters here.

I don't think it's metaphysically controversial to say that if metaphysical naturalism is true, God does not exist. It would be a very strange form of Christianity or Islam that says God is not supernatural; they often say he exists 'beyond the natural world', after all. So unless the Abrahamic in question decides to just screw with their own metaphysical views in a way I cannot really understand, they have to accept premise one.

But the fact that (until demonstrated to be incoherent or at least plausibly so) metaphysical naturalism is possible, that means there's a possible world God does not exist in. This makes it impossible for the MGB to be there, since it's more or less always tacitly assumed to be supernatural. But if there's a world in which the MGB cannot exist, by it's own definition the MGB cannot exist at all since it must exist in all of them to exist. It's not that it makes the MGB contingent per se, it's just that the MGB's own attributes entail it can only be necessarily existent if it does in fact exist.

But the problem for theists using this argument is that it stalemates the one for naturalism (among others). The only sure-fire way out is to deny this is to appeal to a hidden contradiction that they're unaware of and say the metaphysical naturalism isn't possible. But then they're doing the same as an atheist who denies the first premise of Plantinga's argument by appealing to hidden contradictions they're unaware of (although I do so for demonstrable potential contradictions).

I suppose so (with regards to P2). The only example I can think of contrary to P2 is Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism, but I think that's been refuted (to my satisfaction anyway) by users like Genkaus and this YouTube video (which indirectly refutes it) made by the YT user 'KnownNoMore':

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"Response to OnceForgivenNowFree: Is My Brain Designed"

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No problem. Every once in a while I manage to be something like useful here.

[MindForgedManacle]

I think that guy calling Plantinga an idiot was a little unfair at points.

[Statler Waldorf]

Nor would they apply to the universe if that is understood as having proceeded from a form of nothingness which contained everything as one of its potential states .. which seems to be the correct description by the way.

Are you trying to argue that the Universe is not made of material and did not have a beginning? Are we now going back to the steady state theories of the 1920s?

@Stal Everything I've read keeps saying he's a reformed epistemologist and has delivered heavy critiques of the evidentialist approach.

That’s odd because I have seen him argue against presuppositionalism, so maybe he is just not very consistent in his position. :/

[MindForgedManacle]

I have no clue. But I don't think reformed epistemologists can be equated with presuppositionalists. Presupps. have to think they're right to begin with and will openly admit they cannot be wrong. I doubt Plantinga would go that far. William Lane Craig has (by arguing from religious experience equally automatic, indisputable proof), but I would expect Plantinga to be a cut above that.

Maybe I'm just wrong.

[Statler Waldorf]

I have no clue. But I don't think reformed epistemologists can be equated with presuppositionalists. Presupps. have to think they're right to begin with and will openly admit they cannot be wrong. I doubt Plantinga would go that far. William Lane Craig has (by arguing from religious experience equally automatic, indisputable proof), but I would expect Plantinga to be a cut above that.

Maybe I'm just wrong.

Yes, I have trouble pinning down exactly what he means by the term Reformed epistemology. At times it seems evidential in nature and other times seems presuppositional. I do know that his critique of presuppostionalism was based completely upon a mischaracterization of their position, so it appears that at times Plantinga can be a bit sloppy (note: his critique of presuppositionalism was based upon an interviewer’s question so I do not believe the mischaracterization was intentional but was rather based upon a lack of understanding).

[Vincenzo Vinny G.]

I can't speak for Plantinga's personal religious beliefs, but as far as the argument, your claim that the initial premise is unacceptable doesn't seem true.

To you it might be unacceptable (given your epistemology), but you're making a stronger claim, namely, "Nobody is justified in believing P1 is true." Can you defend such a claim successfully?

When I say that the initial premise is unacceptable, I mean it hasn't been established as being the case that it is anything more than epistemic possibility, which Plantinga himself noted at the end of his paper on this argument. That's why it doesn't establish its conclusion as true, because it's epistemically acceptable to deny the first premise, and as Plantinga says "...this is what the canny atheist will indeed do..." Acknowledging that P1 hasn't been established as a metaphysical possibility would seem justifiable, and certainly from the basis of that argument alone. And given other arguments against the coherency of God's attributes (omnipotence especially), it would seem a better inference not to accept the first premise, at least not yet.

But if you're not looking to climb this mountain, you must be willing to concede that it's possible that some people might justifiably believe (P1) is true, and to them, this argument is good.

But I don't. I don't think the attributes are coherent, which is why I reject that premise.

" In a vacuum, both the positive (Metaphysical Naturalism is coherent) AND the negative assertion (Metaphysical Naturalism is incoherent) alone are only an epistemic possibility. Without a deductive argument or some means to abduce either either way, the initial premise (A claim that metaphysical naturalism is coherent) is unacceptable."

By your own principle, you're not allowed to be a metaphysical naturalist until you can overcome your burden. Should we thus declare that metaphysical naturalism is unacceptable? Surely you think we need to be more charitable.

Until such a time as metaphysical naturalism has been shown to be incoherent (or likely to be), the proposition that it could be true is defensible. But yes, you're right. Those are ONLY epistemic possibilities. That was the whole point of the argument.

Now you say you do have problems with omnipotence and omniscience, and that's something I think is intellectually respectable as a way to denying the argument, as opposed to

---

"Plantinga is an idiot."

---

Kudos.

Lol.

On your MOA:

I get that possibly true means it's true in one possible world. Absolutely right. But with a MEB or a MGB, the jump can be made to all possible worlds.

Which isn't something my argument tries to do or even needs, as I'll show in a moment.

After all, if a MGB exists only in some possible worlds but not others, doesn't that make the MGB's existence contingent on something?

An MGB cannot be contingent, it would be necessary, and thus if the MGB exists in one possible world, it must in all possible worlds.

At least that's how I understand the jump. I could be wrong here.

Now one area in which I was puzzled and I had to step back and think was over the idea that metaphysical naturalism and whether it is impossible if God exists.

You are perfectly right in saying if MN is true in one possible world, it disproves God's existence. But what if there's a way out?

The MGB definition does not declare that God is natural or supernatural. If a MGB can be natural (big IF), then metaphysical naturalism can be true simultaneously with an MGB.

I think suffice to say, if MN is true in some possible world, a supernatural being is impossible, and a supernatural being exists in some possible world, then MN is impossible.

I think where this takes us is simply having to be very careful in what we presuppose, which is the antithesis of my "Philosophy by the seat of your pants" philosophy.

What about your revised MOA?

I think a theist could question P2. But if you are justified in accepting P2, then your argument is good. In the end what matters is the justification for P2.

PS- this is one of the most gratifying discussions I've had on this forum. Thanks for being one of the most interesting posters here.

I don't think it's metaphysically controversial to say that if metaphysical naturalism is true, God does not exist. It would be a very strange form of Christianity or Islam that says God is not supernatural; they often say he exists 'beyond the natural world', after all. So unless the Abrahamic in question decides to just screw with their own metaphysical views in a way I cannot really understand, they have to accept premise one.

But the fact that (until demonstrated to be incoherent or at least plausibly so) metaphysical naturalism is possible, that means there's a possible world God does not exist in. This makes it impossible for the MGB to be there, since it's more or less always tacitly assumed to be supernatural. But if there's a world in which the MGB cannot exist, by it's own definition the MGB cannot exist at all since it must exist in all of them to exist. It's not that it makes the MGB contingent per se, it's just that the MGB's own attributes entail it can only be necessarily existent if it does in fact exist.

But the problem for theists using this argument is that it stalemates the one for naturalism (among others). The only sure-fire way out is to deny this is to appeal to a hidden contradiction that they're unaware of and say the metaphysical naturalism isn't possible. But then they're doing the same as an atheist who denies the first premise of Plantinga's argument by appealing to hidden contradictions they're unaware of (although I do so for demonstrable potential contradictions).

I suppose so (with regards to P2). The only example I can think of contrary to P2 is Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism, but I think that's been refuted (to my satisfaction anyway) by users like Genkaus and this YouTube video (which indirectly refutes it) made by the YT user 'KnownNoMore':

---

"Response to OnceForgivenNowFree: Is My Brain Designed"

---

No problem. Every once in a while I manage to be something like useful here.

I see where you're going here, and I think it's an interesting direction.

I think the way you frame it is different from how I'm used to, because you seem to place a certain burden of proof where I don't usually see it placed. It could be that you're right in doing so, I want to find out.

Now we both agree that in order for the argument to succeed, P1 must hold true. But about P1,
a) We can concede that it is epistemically possible,
b) We don't know that it is metaphysically possible.

But you also seem to be saying regarding MN (or God, in the MOA), that until MN (God) is shown to be incoherent, the proposition that it could be true (or the conception of God being coherent is true) is defensible, even though this only takes us to epistemic possibility.

So at best the MOA would say "So far as I'm aware, God exists" or the MN would say "So far as I'm aware, MN is true".

But in order to demonstrate metaphysical possibility, normally the appeal is to conceivability IIRC. I've seen some people frame the issue such that "Unless you can show some metaphysical incoherency, it is reasonable to believe it's possible."

But you seem to be saying something different. You're saying that the proponent has to bear a positive burden to show metaphysical possibility.

What exactly is the burden here? How can it be met, whether for God, or MN, or anything else?

[MindForgedManacle]

Now we both agree that in order for the argument to succeed, P1 must hold true. But about P1,
a) We can concede that it is epistemically possible,
b) We don't know that it is metaphysically possible.

Exactly.

But you also seem to be saying regarding MN (or God, in the MOA), that until MN (God) is shown to be incoherent, the proposition that it could be true (or the conception of God being coherent is true) is defensible, even though this only takes us to epistemic possibility.

So at best the MOA would say "So far as I'm aware, God exists" or the MN would say "So far as I'm aware, MN is true".

But in order to demonstrate metaphysical possibility, normally the appeal is to conceivability IIRC. I've seen some people frame the issue such that "Unless you can show some metaphysical incoherency, it is reasonable to believe it's possible."

But you seem to be saying something different. You're saying that the proponent has to bear a positive burden to show metaphysical possibility.

What exactly is the burden here? How can it be met, whether for God, or MN, or anything else?

Sorry, I've been a bit sloppy, but I think I can clear it up.

What I'm doing when I make the modal argument for atheism is showing that what theists are trying to do is fundamentally flawed. I'm not saying that they have to meet a burden of proof that metaphysical naturalists don't, I'm showing that if - like proponents of the MOA for God's existence - I treat P1) as metaphysically possibility rather than epistemic possibility (which is what both P1s only are), then the arguments stalemate.

So the point is neither side can use this kind of argument unless they've demonstrated beforehand that God's existence is metaphysically possible. But if they could or had done that, why would they need this MOA? The whole point of ontological arguments - from what I understand - is to essentially turn God's existence into an analytic judgement, i.e to make God's existence entailed by the very definition of God. If they had already coherently defined God into such, they wouldn't need the MO argument to show it because he would have to exist. I'd say Kant sort of ruined that kind of argument.

So, the main thing to get is that theists have to realize their are viable atheistic modal arguments as well that call into question this approach via stalemate (and if it doesn't, they can actually can go against religious theisms). Unfortunately, most Christian/Muslim apologists aren't usually told this by the bigger name apologists who wave around this argument as having established God's existence (William Lane Craig, as always; though he sometimes flip-flops on this). Funnily enough, there's this fairly popular YouTube theist called "InspiringPhilosophy" who claims the argument is irrefutable and that this particular objection is just philosophers "biting the epistemic bullet". What a crock.

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In other words, these arguments don't establish metaphysical possibility, they have to be supplemented with further powerful arguments. Theists in the know will sometimes supplement it with Robert Madoyle's argument about "great-making" properties. I don't think his argument works either, partly because it's entirely subjective. A being with "great-making" properties cannot have "lesser-making" properties and such. -sigh-

[MindForgedManacle]

And I think that without a successful ontological argument, religious theists loose what is in principle probably their best possible argument. I think generic theism like deism has a better shot at establishing itself. I've heard some cosmic consciousness arguments that I admit are a little bit compelling, at least in terms of persuasiveness.

[Whateverist]

Nor would they apply to the universe if that is understood as having proceeded from a form of nothingness which contained everything as one of its potential states .. which seems to be the correct description by the way.

Are you trying to argue that the Universe is not made of material and did not have a beginning? Are we now going back to the steady state theories of the 1920s?

Not at all. It just seems that empty space turns out to not be irreversibly empty. With or without the help any pre-existing being to pronounce "let there be ..", the material and immaterial seem to be interchangeable.

[repentsinners]

Okay, so there are smart atheists and there are dumb atheists.

Some dumb atheists make some piss poor arguments. Here I'll deal with one that comes up a lot.

1) "If God created everything then who created God?"

This is one facepalmtastic objection. Typically the atheist is some 12 year old who thinks he's "refuted religion". If he is, it's no use trying to reason. But if there are smart atheists, they ought to know why this is a terrible argument:

a) There are various beings that are called "God", and they all have different features. But philosophically, the most rigorous concept of God is called the "Maximally Great Being", or a being that possesses all the categories of greatness to such a degree that nothing greater can be conceived. Such a being is almost always thought to be personal rather than impersonal.

b) One of the features of this maximally great being is it's role as the "First cause" or "uncaused cause". To understand what this is, you have to look at everything in the world in terms of cause-effect relations. Everything contingent has a cause that leads backwards in a causal chain. Does the causal chain go on infinitely, or is it finite? Theists argue that the causal chain is finite, and it begins at an uncaused cause, or first cause which was not itself caused by anything. This is God.

If you disagree with this idea, you can either:
i) Challenge the claim that the causal chain is finite, arguing that it is infinite in the past.
ii) Challenge the claim that the first cause must be God.

What you cannot do is imply that God needs to be caused by something.

The original God had to have always existed, he was never born. This god has existed in all timelines since time is irrelevent that dimension. He has created many demi-gods who in turn created other gods. To the point that no intelligent being in the universe knows the original god.

Anyhow, atheists claim the the big bang was created by mother nature, a freak accident. Yet one can argue mother nature is GOD.