The Problem of Evil (XXVII)

[ApeNotKillApe]

Let me ask you, if I told you that there was a fix for the things you attribute to the problem of evil; would you do everything within your power, to save as many as you could from suffering?

God wouldn't, apparently.

[robvalue]

Yep, God being good/moral "by definition" is an equivocation fallacy, if it's intended to be anything other than circular.

I cover this at 3:35

https://youtu.be/HU7ZA-XS0Lo

[Mister Agenda]

It would be trivially easy for a theodic God to construct a world in which natural disasters didn't happen without sacrificing any benefits. We might not even know they were a possibility, but when the problem of evil came up, people could say, 'hey, it seems like all the suffering there is, is what we do to ourselves and each other'. The very notion that an omnipotent being can't construct a planet that is more hospitable or people who are more durable is laughable. To explain the problem of evil for a theodic God requires a justification for allowing pointless suffering, not quips like it's unreasonable to expect such a being to work miracles or take time out of his busy schedule to save us: miracles and time are supposed to be the hallmarks of a theodic God. You can never be too busy or too preoccupied for anything if you're omniscient and omnipotent.

Probability doesn't enter into it, the difficulty is in reconciling the existence of the God of theodicy with a universe that doesn't seem to be the kind of universe a theodic God would be expected to devise. You either have to cut a leg off the tripod of theodicy (God can be omnipotent, omniscient, or omnibenevolent; pick two), or there has to be a justification for seemingly pointless suffering that omnibenevolence requires, and omnipotence and omniscience can't get around.

You are positing a unviverse that has no ability to cause human suffering. It is not apparent that having a universe with a set of natural laws can avoid natural events that can cause suffering. Something as simple as gravity kills an awful lot of people. Wind and water kills people. Where do you draw the line between what "ought not be" and what is permissible for God to allow to happen? 

Also, there is a bluring of the line between free will and suffering at the hands of nature. People decide where to be and live, people decide how to construct homes and vehicles, and people decide what to do in every particular situation facing them. It is not like there is no safe place. There are many places on the planet that provide protection from serious natural disasters. 

I do not think that omnibenevolence requires intervention to save human life. That would put safety at the top as the greatest good. I think there are at least two things higher than that: 1) There is the greater good of free will and 2) there is the greatest good of each person's knowledge of God. It is not obvious that a universe that achieves these could also be a universe where there is no suffering from natural causes.

All of your objections assume that God had no choice but to make humans so frail that all those things pose terrible dangers to us. I guarantee there are no laws of nature that prevent a being that can do anything that is possible from making biological organisms that are hard to kill by falling or drowning.

There are safe places where people are never subject to natural disasters and never will be, but you won't name one?

The most common Christian version of free will is a joke: use your free will to be a Christian or suffer forever. And if the greatest good is knowledge of God, a being that can do anything possible ought not to have a problem with arranging things so everyone has knowledge of God.

[Mister Agenda]

So, these guys who disagree with you are what, Chad?  Not True Xtians like you?

http://www.raptureready.com/featured/funk/ooo.html

First: that site your referenced doesn't contradict anything that Chad had said.

Second: what in Chad's posts, drew you to your opening remark?   It seems that you are trying to pick a fight, and putting words in others mouths to do so.

Chad's post implied that he speaks for all Christians on their view of God's omnipotence. He certainly doesn't. As a great theologian once said: if the Bible said that Jonah swallowed the whale, he'd believe it.

[Mister Agenda]

So you've conceived of a possible situation where God would have morally sufficient reasons to permit suffering, despite his tri-Omni super powers. I'd like to hear what it is.

Only an infinite (or nearly so) mind can calculate all the outcomes of a storm or one earthquake--not just in the near term but from that point on through eternity. Just a few possible "good" outcomes from such an event:

1. Community grows stronger in time of crisis. 
2. Neighbors helping neighbors. Recipients lives are touched/changed by compassion. Those giving aid or compassion are themselves changed.
3. Outsiders helping. Some results as #2 but they go back to another place a changed person. 
4. People's lives are refocused on things that matter. More introspection. 
5. Possibly as a result of #1-4 people gain a knowledge of God.
6. People from #5 live lives, come in contact with others, have families, possibly affecting hundreds, thousands, or even millions of future lives.

I'm sure you are familiar with Chaos Theory and the butterfly effect. It cannot be fathomed what effect one little change can have on the rest of eternity.

So the justification you put in the mouth of your God is a series of 'just so' ad hoc stories?

So a rapist can take comfort in knowing that at least his crimes will eventually result in a greater good, else God wouldn't allow them?

If I knew that allowing a child to drown would result in a greater good later, would I be justified in letting that child drown?

And finally, it's hard to be impressed by a supposedly omnipotent deity that can't accomplish its ends less clumsily and painfully than this. If he were real, he's literally made a world where it's harder to believe in his existence because of the means he supposedly uses to get people to know his existence.

[Mister Agenda]

Traditionally, the excuses mostly consist of temporarily forgetting that god is supposed to be omnipotent, or that that he is supposed to be omniscient, or that he's supposed to be omnibenevolent.  I say temporarily because the people who give up god's benevolence for the sake of argument will then turn around and worship him for his goodness. 

So I like to say that the art of defending against the problem of evil consists largely of not realizing what you have given up.  To be consistent, you have to give up omnipotence, omniscience, or omnibenevolence; but, to continue worshiping a tri-omni god, you have to not realize that you gave it up.  

But these people, people who actually give up omnipotence, omniscience, or omnibenevolence (as opposed to just making a feint in that direction and then reverting to their prior beliefs) don't have any reason to argue against the PoE.  They already know that a tri-omni god can't coexist with evil, which is why their gods aren't tri-omni.

While stated often, I don't think that the case has been made, where logically; to be omnibenevolent, other good attributes must be forsaken.  The argument is normally presented as a simple and naïve false dichotomy.  One where comfort and happiness are presented as supreme, and the one making the argument seems to forget about everything else. 

I agree with Steve, that it is more of an emotional problem, than a logical one. 

Let me ask you, if I told you that there was a fix for the things you attribute to the problem of evil; would you do everything within your power, to save as many as you could from suffering?

Let's say that I wouldn't lift a finger. Would you make any effort to still find a way to consider me benevolent?

[Mister Agenda]

If can be reasoned that logic is not created, it is an intrinsic property of God. It is how the mind of God is ordered. I would therefore be impossible for God to do the illogical. It is the same principle that God does not make up morality, it is part of his nature and cannot be separated (that's why the Euthyphro dilemma does not apply in the moral argument for God).

The Euthyphro dilemma absolutely still applies.  I've seen theists try this word game before.  Saying that "good" is intrinsic to the nature of God versus existing as a separate and independent property, is just a language gymnastic that in no way excuses him of the contradiction.

Attaching "good" to the definition of God's essence is convenient for the theist because it absolves him, and absolves God of the responsibility of defining what "good" actually means.  We are still left with the question of how such a moral determination of his character was reached in the first place.  How do we know that god's nature is "good"?  By what standards are we comparing god's essence in order to make such a judgement about his inherent morality?  Or, is God just circularly declaring that he is good because because he's God, and he is God because he is good?

So, as you can see, "God is inherently good" is just another vague, poorly defined, and essentially meaningless assertion in the end.  It doesn't get you out of Euthyphro's dilemma in the sense that you think; it only takes you safely away from it.  Without venturing to define what "good" actually means, you aren't even coming near the discussion.

That suffering that mortals need to go through to become good? God didn't need any of that crap, he's just good by nature. But it's really, really important that the beings he creates NOT be good by nature, because how can you really be good if you don't learn from suffering? Hmmm.

[LadyForCamus]

The Euthyphro dilemma absolutely still applies.  I've seen theists try this word game before.  Saying that "good" is intrinsic to the nature of God versus existing as a separate and independent property, is just a language gymnastic that in no way excuses him of the contradiction.

Attaching "good" to the definition of God's essence is convenient for the theist because it absolves him, and absolves God of the responsibility of defining what "good" actually means.  We are still left with the question of how such a moral determination of his character was reached in the first place.  How do we know that god's nature is "good"?  By what standards are we comparing god's essence in order to make such a judgement about his inherent morality?  Or, is God just circularly declaring that he is good because because he's God, and he is God because he is good?

So, as you can see, "God is inherently good" is just another vague, poorly defined, and essentially meaningless assertion in the end.  It doesn't get you out of Euthyphro's dilemma in the sense that you think; it only takes you safely away from it.  Without venturing to define what "good" actually means, you aren't even coming near the discussion.

That suffering that mortals need to go through to become good? God didn't need any of that crap, he's just good by nature. But it's really, really important that the beings he creates NOT be good by nature, because how can you really be good if you don't learn from suffering? Hmmm.

Yeah...I don't know about anyone else, but I don't buy into this whole, "you need suffering to appreciate happiness," crap. I live a very full life. I had a warm and rich childhood. I have a loving family, all of whom are still living and healthy. I have a lovely husband and son, a good education, comfortable living conditions, and good friends. I wholly enjoy and appreciate my life. I don't see how tragedy or irreversible loss of any kind could possibly add value to my living experience at this point. I don't need to suffer to love life.

[Neo-Scholastic]

The logical incompatibility of the claims "a tri-omni God exists" and "gratuitous suffering exist" is not terribly controversial....To salvage the doctrine of a tri-omni God, theists by and large take the skeptical position and argue that we don't know that God isn't morally justified in permitting such instances of suffering.

You can cry foul all you want. The skeptical objection still contains a positive claim that cannot be proven. That claim is this: there is a possible world without evil.

Secondly, there is no doctrine to salvage. Skeptics' definitions of "tri-omni" are not part of Christian doctrine. Skeptics strain the definition of omnipotent well beyond any reasonable bounds by saying that an all-powerful god could do the impossible. In so doing they are objecting to a god not associated with Christianity.

"...All confess that God is omnipotent; but it seems difficult to explain in what His omnipotence precisely consists: for there may be doubt as to the precise meaning of the word 'all' when we say that God can do all things. If, however, we consider the matter aright, since power is said in reference to possible things, this phrase, "God can do all things," is rightly understood to mean that God can do all things that are possible; and for this reason He is said to be omnipotent." - Thomas Aquinas, Summa, Question 5

Chad's post implied that he speaks for all Christians on their view of God's omnipotence. He certainly doesn't.

Not all. Nearly all. As you can see from the Aquinas quote, my position is eminently traditional and widely accepted.

[Divinity]

Honestly the problem of Evil isn't a good argument against the Abrahamic God. I mean the guy sounds like a total prick. He's the kind that would smite puppies because he thought it was fun. He sacrificed his son (which was also himself) by means of crucifixion. He's obviously a torture fetishist.