Free Will

[Panatheist]

But on a much more fundamental level I have no choices whatsoever.  All of my behavior is the result of forces beyond my control, the outcome of the laws of biochemistry, electricity, and physics acting on my brain and nervous system in conjunction with my environment, genes, and prior experiences.

On a fundamental level, there's no "you" anyway, to wonder if it has free will.  On a fundamental level, I'm nothing but a collection of wave functions kind of vibrating in space.  But this says really nothing about what it means to be a person and to experience life.

As soon as we start talking about conscious agency, we're talking about a very, very high order of supervenience.  The real question is whether free will can supervene on building blocks which themselves don't have the capacity for freedom.  My answer to that is-- why not?  That's what emergence IS-- the spawning at one level of organization of properties that are nowhere to be found on lower levels.

This in my opinion is a fallacy that many have committed in the argument against free will-- to paraphrase, "As below, so above."

Yes, fundamentally there is no "me," not as some agent inside here doing things.

Free will doesn't makes any sense at all except in the way I described it in my previous post as volitional behavior. Behavor doesn't occur in a vacuum. It may be caused, random, or a combination of both, but free I am sure it is not.

[Yoo]

As soon as we start talking about conscious agency, we're talking about a very, very high order of supervenience.  The real question is whether free will can supervene on building blocks which themselves don't have the capacity for freedom.  My answer to that is-- why not?  That's what emergence IS-- the spawning at one level of organization of properties that are nowhere to be found on lower levels.

This in my opinion is a fallacy that many have committed in the argument against free will-- to paraphrase, "As below, so above."

But that supervening version of free will must only be the illusion of free will. Every particle and wave in and outside your body still does whatever its cause makes it do. So you might get an illusion of free will, but by your reasoning you can't say that you actually get a version of free will which alters the chain of causation, right? Every building block follows some rules, and whatever comes from those building blocks as a byproduct can't change the nature of the building blocks. Then it wouldn't really be supervenience.

You might reason your way to get some form of consciousness, as a byproduct of the building blocks that aren't conscious themselves, because consciousness doesn't negate the nature of the building blocks.

[Panatheist]

As soon as we start talking about conscious agency, we're talking about a very, very high order of supervenience.  The real question is whether free will can supervene on building blocks which themselves don't have the capacity for freedom.  My answer to that is-- why not?  That's what emergence IS-- the spawning at one level of organization of properties that are nowhere to be found on lower levels.

This in my opinion is a fallacy that many have committed in the argument against free will-- to paraphrase, "As below, so above."

But that supervening version of free will must only be the illusion of free will. Every particle and wave in and outside your body still does whatever its cause makes it do. So you might get an illusion of free will, but by your reasoning you can't say that you actually get a version of free will which alters the chain of causation, right? Every building block follows some rules, and whatever comes from those building blocks as a byproduct can't change the nature of the building blocks. Then it wouldn't really be supervenience.

You might reason your way to get some form of consciousness, as a byproduct of the building blocks that aren't conscious themselves, because consciousness doesn't negate the nature of the building blocks.

What would it even mean for the will to be free?

[bennyboy]

As soon as we start talking about conscious agency, we're talking about a very, very high order of supervenience.  The real question is whether free will can supervene on building blocks which themselves don't have the capacity for freedom.  My answer to that is-- why not?  That's what emergence IS-- the spawning at one level of organization of properties that are nowhere to be found on lower levels.

This in my opinion is a fallacy that many have committed in the argument against free will-- to paraphrase, "As below, so above."

But that supervening version of free will must only be the illusion of free will. Every particle and wave in and outside your body still does whatever its cause makes it do.

Is the sense of self an illusion as well? You could equally argue that every particle and wave in and outside the body is not a human mind. And yet-- here I am, and the sum is greater than the parts. And that is pretty much the definition of supervenience-- that new properties arise at new levels of organization. If the ability to experience qualia can arise on the shoulders of dead matter, then why should not free will arise with it?

[bennyboy]

What would it even mean for the will to be free?

It means that the intent of a sentient agent can be manifested in the world without either compulsion or obstruction from outside the agent.

[Yoo]

But that supervening version of free will must only be the illusion of free will. Every particle and wave in and outside your body still does whatever its cause makes it do.

Is the sense of self an illusion as well?  You could equally argue that every particle and wave in and outside the body is not a human mind.  And yet-- here I am, and the sum is greater than the parts.  And that is pretty much the definition of supervenience-- that new properties arise at new levels of organization.  If the ability to experience qualia can arise on the shoulders of dead matter, then why should not free will arise with it?

Of course it depends on your definition of free will, but I already made the distinction between qualia (I used consciousness) and free will. Experiencing qualia is compatible with the nature of the particles in the sense that arising qualia don't seem to change the particles that produce them. Qualia just seem to happen, whereas the arising of free will would change the particles themselves. This is because free will arising from a configuration of particles (or something else), would change the way those particles would interact. If it didn't, and the particles just continued their predetermined chain of causing and being caused, then I wouldn't call it free will, because it was predetermined. Do you get what I'm saying? I'm having trouble explaining.

[bennyboy]

Is the sense of self an illusion as well?  You could equally argue that every particle and wave in and outside the body is not a human mind.  And yet-- here I am, and the sum is greater than the parts.  And that is pretty much the definition of supervenience-- that new properties arise at new levels of organization.  If the ability to experience qualia can arise on the shoulders of dead matter, then why should not free will arise with it?

Of course it depends on your definition of free will, but I already made the distinction between qualia (I used consciousness) and free will. Experiencing qualia is compatible with the nature of the particles in the sense that arising qualia don't seem to change the particles that produce them. Qualia just seem to happen, whereas the arising of free will would change the particles themselves. This is because free will arising from a configuration of particles (or something else), would change the way those particles would interact. If it didn't, and the particles just continued their predetermined chain of causing and being caused, then I wouldn't call it free will, because it was predetermined. Do you get what I'm saying? I'm having trouble explaining.

I get it.  You are talking about determinism.

What's the point of consciousness, by which I mean the ability to actually experience qualia, then?  If it's all just brain "doing stuff," then what's the point of having an agent around to serve only as a sideline observer?  Why have the illusion of free will at all? That's a pretty curious byproduct, I'd say.

But my position is a little more semantic than that. I have experiences, and I use words to describe them. I go to 7-11, I sit there for a minute deciding what I want, then I buy and consume it. That's about as free as it gets, and it doesn't really matter to me what's going on in the machinery underneath.

[The Grand Nudger]

I get it.  You are talking about determinism.

What's the point of consciousness, by which I mean the ability to actually experience qualia, then?  If it's all just brain "doing stuff," then what's the point of having an agent around to serve only as a sideline observer?  Why have the illusion of free will at all?  That's a pretty curious byproduct, I'd say.

Not really.  Hit ctrl/alt/delete.  Whats the point of that screen in front of you...it's not like it helps the system to "do stuff".  It would "do stuff" without that screen.   Utilities exist...because they have utility.

Do you actually have the "illusion" of free will...or do you just have the experience of will?  I know that in my case, it's only the latter.  I can generally identify  moments when my will is constrained...and when I can;t...I really don;t know why it is what is is.  To claim that I experience it to be free would be claiming one thing too many.   

But my position is a little more semantic than that.  I have experiences, and I use words to describe them.  I go to 7-11, I sit there for a minute deciding what I want, then I buy and consume it.  That's about as free as it gets, and it doesn't really matter to me what's going on in the machinery underneath.

See, you don't actually have an illusion of freedom either. You find utility in the term even if the terms referent is nowhere to be found in what you describe.  

[Yoo]

Of course it depends on your definition of free will, but I already made the distinction between qualia (I used consciousness) and free will. Experiencing qualia is compatible with the nature of the particles in the sense that arising qualia don't seem to change the particles that produce them. Qualia just seem to happen, whereas the arising of free will would change the particles themselves. This is because free will arising from a configuration of particles (or something else), would change the way those particles would interact. If it didn't, and the particles just continued their predetermined chain of causing and being caused, then I wouldn't call it free will, because it was predetermined. Do you get what I'm saying? I'm having trouble explaining.

I get it.  You are talking about determinism.

What's the point of consciousness, by which I mean the ability to actually experience qualia, then?  If it's all just brain "doing stuff," then what's the point of having an agent around to serve only as a sideline observer?  Why have the illusion of free will at all?  That's a pretty curious byproduct, I'd say.

But my position is a little more semantic than that.  I have experiences, and I use words to describe them.  I go to 7-11, I sit there for a minute deciding what I want, then I buy and consume it.  That's about as free as it gets, and it doesn't really matter to me what's going on in the machinery underneath.

No of course not. Whether it's an illusion or not, for me and you it's as real as it gets.  But it's still an interesting philosophical discussion, right? I too have doubts about hard determinism, because why would there then be qualia at all? I can't rap my head around them being there without a function, because they seem to be way too complex to be a random by-product of something else. But I also can't think of any possible function they might fulfil, that wouldn't be already fulfilled by the machinery in the brain that caused them. So qualia, it seems to me, can't be entirely caused by the brain. But that doesn't seem reasonable to me either, because where the hell would they then come from?

I'm thinking of starting a thread on the Hard problem of consciousness, see what others have to say about this.

[The Grand Nudger]

It would take a long time to unpack all of the tiny logical mis-steps above.  So I'll cut to the heart of it.  You can;t think of any function for qualia.  It doesn't seem..to you, like it's an advantageous thing to possess?

Look around you, a world -run- by creatures with qualia.  All we ever talk about is our qualia.  We use that qualia to make inferences about the world and use those inferences to subjugate it.....our qualia form both the context for production and appreciation of art and our human languages... but you can't imagine a -single- function......for qualia? Can you not imagine a function for a picture of an arrow, or a technical schematic for an orbital launch system? Can you not imagine the function of an interactive live map of the african savannah...including which lions are or may be hiding under which clumps of grass? Can you not imagine the function of a visceral experience of family unity and happiness? Can you not imagine the function of a compelling feeling of satisfaction with chocolate?