What would be the harm?

[bennyboy]

If we transcend them, it must be because it is in our nature to do so. A common spiritual theme is the struggle between the animal and the angel in us. But we seem to be in agreement-- with no feelings or motivations, what would cause us to eat, let alone arrive at moral positions upon which to act?

That is, pretty much, why I defined morality in that previous thread as intrinsically subjective: because those motivations are experienced as feelings-- though I should emphasize here the caveat that for that argument, it must be taken as given that a real moral agency exists, i.e. that someone HAS feelings, rather than just being them.

[The Grand Nudger]

I keep informing you that ethical objectivity seeks to remove evolutionary imperatives as justification not on the grounds that they can never be in alignment with each other, but because we understand that what is natural is not necessarily right.  So, yes, you can have such an interest or pressure that aligns with what is good, but it isn't the imperative or your interest in it that -makes- it good.


Consider these two statements.

Things which reduce our chances for survival are commonly bad. 

Things are bad because they reduce our chances for survival.

Not the same, yeah?  The later, falls to the naturalistic fallacy.  The former, well..you tell me, does it seem like an objective appraisal that's true regardless of whether someone else sees it or cares?

[Angrboda]

The length of penises can be quantified, too, that doesn't make the length of penises the objective basis for morals.

Is the length of a penis a reference to good and bad in the same way that harm obviously is so?  Poor analogy.

You said that harm is objective because it is quantifiable. The problem is not with the analogy but with your claim.

How is harm related to good or bad exactly? You've defined harm as bad. That's not a natural relationship but an arbitrary one that you've drawn, likely out of biologically rooted motivations. Failing such motives, there's nothing from my declaring that having a short penis is bad in the same arbitrary way that you are claiming harm is bad. Unless your belief that harm is bad is rooted in something objective, it's no different. The only objective property that you've linked to harm to suggest that it is bad is that it is quatifiable. As noted, I can make the same link to penis length. Analogy confirmed.

[The Grand Nudger]

Is the length of a penis a reference to good and bad in the same way that harm obviously is so?  Poor analogy.

You said that harm is objective because it is quantifiable.  The problem is not with the analogy but with your claim.

Correct, that;s what makes it objective..but not every objective thing is morally relevant.  

How is harm related to good or bad exactly?  You've defined harm as bad.

I've defined harm as morally relevant.  Personally, I accept that there at least can be such a thing as "good" harm, or, at the very least, a good reason to do harm. But, yes...harm does seem to be bound up in those things we describe as bad.

Don't you think? Sometimes the harm is real, sometimes it's imagined. Good thing there's a way to test between the two, eh?

That's not a natural relationship but an arbitrary one that you've drawn, likely out of biologically rooted motivations.  

It's not arbitrary, but its actually a good thing that it's "not natural".   If my standard were whatever was natural...well...I can only say it so many times.  Fallacy.  

Failing such motives, there's nothing from my declaring that having a short penis is bad in the same arbitrary way that you are claiming harm is bad.

Failing such motives I would lack motive, but harm would still be relevant to morality and still be quantifiable.

Unless your belief that harm is bad is rooted in something objective, it's no different.  The only objective property that you've linked to harm to suggest that it is bad is that it is quatifiable.  As noted, I can make the same link to penis length.  Analogy confirmed.

You can make it anything you like..but this will only mean that we're not talking about the same thing.  Your idea of "morality" is something about penises.  Fine.  Nothing you have to say about a dick based "morality" has anything to do with what I'm talking about.

[Angrboda]

I keep informing you that ethical objectivity seeks to remove evolutionary imperatives as justification not on the grounds that they can never be in alignment with each other, but because we understand that what is natural is not necessarily right.  So, yes, you can have such an interest or pressure that aligns with what is good, but it isn't the imperative or your interest in it that -makes- it good.


Consider these two statements.

Things which reduce our chances for survival are commonly bad. 

Things are bad because they reduce our chances for survival.

Not the same, yeah?  The later, falls to the naturalistic fallacy.  The former, well..you tell me, does it seem like an objective appraisal that's true regardless of whether someone else sees it or cares?

No, it does not seem like an objective appraisal because it is only bad in that we want to survive for biologically rooted reasons. If we don't care about survival, then reducing our chances of survival is no longer bad. You seem to still be under the illusion that things can be bad for reasons that aren't a result of our biological imperatives, an example of which you've yet to present.

I'm probably going to demur on this discussion because you seem to be spinning your wheels over the same bad arguments, and I have other pressing matters, not the least of which is scolding Drich for his dishonesty and such sometime later today. I will try to pick this up again after I have expedited more pressing concerns.

[The Grand Nudger]

No, it does not seem like an objective appraisal because it is only bad in that we want to survive for biologically rooted reasons.

Except that "the good" can actually involve our deaths.  Other than this direct and apparent contradiction between moral systems and survival interests...sure...you nailed it. 

If we don't care about survival, then reducing our chances of survival is no longer bad.  You seem to still be under the illusion that things can be bad for reasons that aren't a result of our biological imperatives, an example of which you've yet to present.

Starting to be a case of you asking, receiving, and asking again.  

I'm probably going to demur on this discussion because you seem to be spinning your wheels over the same bad arguments, and I have other pressing matters, not the least of which is scolding Drich for his dishonesty and such sometime later today.  I will try to pick this up again after I have expedited more pressing concerns.

No worries, you know I'm always around for these sorts of parties.

---

While you're off dealing with those things, however, consider this.  Moral ontology, the status of some moral proposition, itself..and moral compulsion, not the same thing.  

The subjectivity of my compulsions (and biological imperatives are ethically subjective), my motivations...true or false, will not have a one for one transaction with the other.  You have been commenting on moral agents, not moral systems.  Moral objectivity does not contend that we are thoroughly objective moral agents. Pretty much contends the exact opposite, and..largely, because our moral apparatus is evolved and imperfect.

That's why realism makes reference to things like super rationality - acknowledging that this ability is well beyond any human being.

So, for example, while it's certainly true that we could have evolved some other way, so that we don;t give a shit about harm...that wouldn't actually do anything to the sufficiency of harm as an objective moral metric. The one doesn't follow from the other. Those other things, evolved some other way, would simply not care. Harm would still be harm and it would still be..at least a part...what you and I are talking about (doomed penis based objections aside, lol). This, if you ask a realist, anyway, because harm is mind independent, whereas whether or not you care about harm....mind dependent. If we had evolved to be even more subjective agents than we already are, then we would be even more subjective agents than we already are.

[bennyboy]

I keep informing you that ethical objectivity seeks to remove evolutionary imperatives as justification not on the grounds that they can never be in alignment with each other, but because we understand that what is natural is not necessarily right.  So, yes, you can have such an interest or pressure that aligns with what is good, but it isn't the imperative or your interest in it that -makes- it good.


Consider these two statements.

Things which reduce our chances for survival are commonly bad. 

Things are bad because they reduce our chances for survival.

Not the same, yeah?  The later, falls to the naturalistic fallacy.  The former, well..you tell me, does it seem like an objective appraisal that's true regardless of whether someone else sees it or cares?

tbh, to me, it's all just ambiguous semantics.

You say things "are" bad or good, but I think it's more accurate to say that badness is in the eye of the beholder, if not of individual men, then of mankind.

First, I'd want to know what you mean by "bad," if it's not simply something that we have negative emotions toward.  What does the word even mean, and why do you feel justified using it in an objective sense at all?

[The Grand Nudger]

tbh, to me, it's all just ambiguous semantics.

You say things "are" bad, but I think it's more accurate to say that badness is in the eye of the beholder, if not of individual men, then of mankind.

Well, yeah..sure.  That's the intuitivist response.  Same as you or I saying that somethings "are" cats.  We definitely have disagreements, but that doesn't actually mean that there isn't one correct answer among all that competition.  

I want you to know that I agree with you here, badness -is- commonly in the eye of the beholder.  To a realist, however, this is a form of ever present moral failure and a consequence of our necessarrily subjective nature.  We fail not because there is no way to succeed...but because we are not always capable of seeing that way or..when we see it, sometimes..we just don't wanna/don't care.  

First, I'd want to know what you mean by "bad," if it's not simply something that we have negative emotions toward.  What does the word even mean, and why do you feel justified using it in an objective sense at all?

 Take it away webster!

: failing to reach an acceptable standard : a bad repair job
b: make a bad impression
c: not fresh : bad fish
d: not sound : the house was in bad condition

2a: morally objectionable : bad men
b: MISCHIEVOUS, a bad dog

3: inadequate or unsuited to a purposea bad planbad lighting

4: DISAGREEABLE, bad news

5a: INJURIOUS, a bad influence
b: SERIOUS, in bad troublea bad cough

6: INCORRECT, bad grammar

7a: suffering pain or distressfelt generally bad
b: UNHEALTHY, bad teeth

8: SORROWFUL, feels bad about forgetting to call

9a: INVALID, a bad check
b: not able to be collecteda bad debt

10badder; baddest slang
a: GOOD, one of the baddest songwriters to be found anywhere— Black Collegian
b: TOUGH, the baddest guy on the block

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/bad

So, what do you think.  Are any of the uses on that list something that might describe a meaningful objectivity?

[bennyboy]

I have to say that the Merriam Webster dictionary seems to have little interest in the finer points of moral ontology.

"Fail" implies a goal. But if one has no particular destination, how can one be said to "fail" to arrive there at all? Can it be that I'm walking my dog, and something in the Universe pops ups and says, "Fuck you. You didn't arrive at Disneyland. You've failed!" Has a homosexual person "failed" to be straight, if he doesn't see being gay as a failure? Has a chronic masturbator "failed" to keep it in his pants, if he enjoys what he does? Has a fat person "failed" to stay thin, even though he loves food and thinks he looks like a badass sumo-wrestling mofo?

To say that the goals are objective is to say that something in the Universe is intrinsically goal-oriented. But how would material interactions be said to be right or wrong in any regard? What would such a Universal goal even look like?

I'm not sure that I'd even say that evolution itself is goal-oriented. I'd say that all goals as we see them are reverse-engineered: I get a terrible feeling when I see a child harmed, and know that most people also do, and so I infer that our evolutionary history has arrived at a "goal" of preventing harm to children.

I then take an additional step: having inferred a virtual goal, I will start planning the process of conformity my nature, with the understanding that this is likely to reduce stress or induce happiness.

Is there any of this that you are online with?

[The Grand Nudger]

I have to say that the Merriam Webster dictionary seems to have little interest in the finer points of moral ontology.

"Fail" implies a goal.  But if one has no particular destination, how can one be said to "fail" to arrive there at all?  Can it be that I'm walking my dog, and something in the Universe pops ups and says, "Fuck you.  You didn't arrive at Disneyland.  You've failed!"  Has a homosexual person "failed" to be straight, if he doesn't see being gay as a failure?  Has a chronic masturbator "failed" to keep it in his pants, if he enjoys what he does?  Has a fat person "failed" to stay thin, even though he loves food and thinks he looks like a badass sumo-wrestling mofo?

Sure, fail implies a goal.  Both consequentialist and deontological ethics propose explicit and implicit goals.  

To say that the goals are objective is to say that something in the Universe is intrinsically goal-oriented.  But how would material interactions be said to be right or wrong in any regard?  What would such a Universal goal even look like?

A goal doesn't need to be universal for there to be goals in the universe, or for those goals to be objective, or for a failure to reach those goals to be objectively assessed.  

I'm not sure that I'd even say that evolution itself is goal-oriented.  I'd say that all goals as we see them are reverse-engineered: I get a terrible feeling when I see a child harmed, and know that most people also do, and so I infer that our evolutionary history has arrived at a "goal" of preventing harm to children.

An intuitionist would tell you that this is your ability to make moral observations.  You see the bad, and it wrenches your guts.  You asked me what bad was, in this leadup, but if I could point at some kid getting stomped by a group of adults it very much seems like you would say "ah, yeah, okay, i see it."  So.....?  

I then take an additional step: having inferred a virtual goal, I will start planning the process of conformity my nature, with the understanding that this is likely to reduce stress or induce happiness.

Sure, you'd want to reduce your discomfort. Sometimes, anyway.

Is there any of this that you are online with?

You sort of blew it on a couple points, but in the main, yeah..sure.  Is failure the only sense you saw that referred to a meaningful objectivity? How about inadequate, injurious, invalid, and incorrect?