Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, and Metaphysics

[genkaus]

Feser didn't agree with Plato's theory, but gave it so that we could understand where Aristotle was coming from. Feser believes Aristotle's "moderate realism". His views come from Aristotle, on which Aquinas also based his theology. In what ways would this philosophy be contradictory with the Christian faith?

In Feser's words:

"while it holds that universals considered in abstraction form other features exist only in the mind, it also holds that they exist in the extra-mental things themselves (albeit always tied to other features) and that the abstracted universals existing in the intellect derive from our sense experiences of these objectively existing things, rather than being the free creations of the mind."

Its not that difficult to figure out the contradictions of his philosophical ramblings.

Consider this statement - "while it holds that universals considered in abstraction form other features exist only in the mind, it also holds that they exist in the extra-mental things themselves" - in the same statement he is arguing that those universals exist only in the mind and that they don't.

According to Aristotle's view of the forms, the universals considered in abstraction that exist in mind are the perception of the essence that exists in the extra-mental thing. While arguable, he does admit that the essence cannot be independent of the substance - that the essence is the derivative and consequence of the object. And this is where it contradicts the Christian faith where essence is given primacy over the substance.

To use an example - consider a person "John Doe". Now, according to Platonic and Christian faith, there exists another plane where John Doe actually exists - that that 'form' of John Doe encapsulates all his John Doe'ness and the John Doe we see is the material reflection of it. However, by Aristotle's view, the substance and form of John Doe here is what dictates his essence - his John Doe'ness. That essence is not independent of his substance and form and it'll perish with it. Feser (and Aquinas) both ignore this logical implication of Aristotle's philosophy.

He also gives reasons why the "immaterial nature of these things entails that the intellect which grasps them must itself be immaterial as well" (I suppose he would mean a soul here, or that rationality depends on it, as he later states, and as I mentioned in an earlier post):

Consider first that when we grasp the nature, essence, for form of a thing, it is necessarily one and the same form, nature, or essence that exists both in the thing and in the intellect. The form of triangularity that exists in our minds when we think about triangles is the same form that exists in actual triangles themselves; the form of "dogness" that exists in our minds when we think about dogs is the same form that exists in actual dogs; and so forth. If this weren't the case, then we just wouldn't really be thinking about triangles, dogs, and the like, since to think about these things requires grasping what they are, and what they are is determined by their essence or form. But now suppose that the intellect is a material thing - some part of the brain, or whatever. Then for the form to exist in the intellect is for the form to exist in a certain material thing. But for a form to exist in a material thing is just for that material thing to be the kind of thing the form is a form of; for example, for the form of "dogness" to exist in a certain parcel of matter is just for that parcel of matter to be a dog. And in that case, if your intellect was just the same thing as some part of your brain, it follows that that part of your brain would become a dog whenever you thought about dogs. "But that's absurd!" you say. Of course it is'=; that's the point. Assuming that the intellect is material leads to such absurdity; hence the intellect is not material.

Another example of mixing up Platonic and Aristotelian metaphysics. Thankfully, he made the error in the very first statement, which renders the rest of his mental convulsions pointless.

Assuming Platonic idealism, the form of an object has an independent existence - and is therefore reflected in the object and our intellect. In this case both forms can be considered one and the same.

In Aristotelian realism, the form of an object is the consequence of its substance and the form within our intellect is the reflection of that form. It is, therefore, not the same. The difference is the same as that between an object and its picture.

For example, the form of 'dogness' that exists in the dog could be very different from the form of 'dogness' that exists in our intellect - which is the result of observation of different dogs. Therefore, even if the 'dogness' of a dog is a material thing within a dog and the 'dogness' in our mind is a material thing within our mind, it still wouldn't turn that part of our mind into a dog because these are different entities to begin with.

[MindForgedManacle]

...Do you know everything Gen? :p

[genkaus]

...Do you know everything Gen? :p

Still getting there.

[Neo-Scholastic]

In Aristotelian realism, the form of an object is the consequence of its substance and the form within our intellect is the reflection of that form.

No. You're projecting your own materialism onto Aristotle. Form is not a consequence of substance. The term is hylomorphism and it refers to the concept that all real substances (which has a particular meaning) are a unity of form and matter, neither of which can exist separately but may be discerned as such by the intellect.

(Why do we always end up debating the same topic on two threads simultaneously?)

[genkaus]

No. You're projecting your own materialism onto Aristotle. Form is not a consequence of substance. The term is hylomorphism and it refers to the concept that all real substances (which has a particular meaning) are a unity of form and matter, neither of which can exist separately but may be discerned as such by the intellect.

(Why do we always end up debating the same topic on two threads simultaneously?)

You are correct - I should have made this clarification earlier.

The sense in which Feser (and, by extension, I) used the word "form" and the one you are talking about here are two different things. Ironically, this ends up revealing how Feser commits the fallacy of equivocation.

Platonic Forms (notice the capital F - which I'd be using to indicate this meaning) refer to the ontologically separate abstract universals. According to Plato, its from this Form that concrete bodies acquire their essence. In Feser's terms, 'dogness' would refer to the Form.

Aristotle rejects the existence of Platonic Forms altogether. His view is that the essence of the object (which I and Feser incorrectly called 'form') is determined by its substance. The Platonic Forms have no place in his metaphysics. Further, as you say, Aristotle does consider substance to be the unity of form and matter - but the sense of the word 'form' here is very different from Forms. Here the 'form' means structure or shape. Ofcourse, the idea is not limited to material structure. For example, with regards to the substance of a sentence, Aritotle would consider letters to be the matter and grammer or words to be the form. Similarly with regards to a car he'd consider metal to be the matter and a running engine to be part of the form. With regards to humans, he regarded body as material and 'soul' as the form - and though he had little idea of what this soul is, he did consider it only to exist in conjunction with the body.

[CapnAwesome]

Sometimes philosophers seem to not understand that knowledge has advanced since Plato, Aristotle et al. As amazing as their contributions to so many fields have been, we know so much more now. Aristotle advocated ideas that were clearly incorrect. We've attained a tremendous amount of knowledge by refuting and challenging these ideas. That's how knowledge advances. Although I haven't read said book it seems from your synopsis like a complicated version of an argument from authority.

[InevitableCheese]

Aristotle rejects the existence of Platonic Forms altogether. His view is that the essence of the object (which I and Feser incorrectly called 'form') is determined by its substance. The Platonic Forms have no place in his metaphysics.

This is absolutely opposite of what Feser discusses. In his words on "form and matter":

The ordinary objects of our experience are irreducible composites of potentiality and actuality, of the capacity for change and something that persists through the change. In particular, they are irreducible composites of matter and form. The blue rubber ball is composed of a certain kind of matter - namely rubber - and a certain form - namely, the form of a blue, round, bouncy object. The matter by itself isn't the ball; after all, rubber could also take the form of an eraser, or a doorstop, or any number of things. The form by itself isn't the ball either; you can't bounce blueness, roundness, or even bounciness down the hallway, for they are mere abstractions. It is only the form and matter together that constitute the ball. Hence we hzve Aristotle's famous doctrine of hylomorphism...

And in the next section:

So, form and matter considered by themselves are, in general anyway, mere abstractions; they exist in the mind,, but not in reality. Still, they are different aspects of reality - in this case, of the ball. The form is not the matter and the matter is not the form. Even if, contra Plato, the form of the ball doesn't exist by itself; neither is it true to say after the fashion of materialism that the ball is "just a piece of matter." Nothing is just a piece of matter, for matter cannot exists without form, and form (being the principle that accounts for permanence) isn't material (matter being the principle that accounts for change).

---

Sometimes philosophers seem to not understand that knowledge has advanced since Plato, Aristotle et al. As amazing as their contributions to so many fields have been, we know so much more now. Aristotle advocated ideas that were clearly incorrect. We've attained a tremendous amount of knowledge by refuting and challenging these ideas. That's how knowledge advances. Although I haven't read said book it seems from your synopsis like a complicated version of an argument from authority.

Feser talks about this in the 5th chapter, "Descent of the Modernists". He pushes that our immorality is because we abandoned Aristotelian metaphysics, and the morality it implies. He also talks about how science never refuted Aristotle's metaphysics (although disproving his science, of course), and that the main reason modern philosopher's began leaving them is because "we'll end up spending more time contemplating first principles and the state of our souls and less time thinking up new gadgets." The push for science, and the desire to better this material life, spawned modernists. He also blames Martin Luther and John Calvin for pushing that wealth is good/poverty is bad, and supporting individual conscience over Aristotelian Scholasticism.

[Neo-Scholastic]

For Pete's sake, does Feser not distinguish between matter and substances? It doesn't sound like he is. Matter in Aristotle is Primal Matter. Substances are the composite forms. For example, wood is a substance, stone is a substance, water is a substance, even a person is a substance, but in the end they're all made of 'matter'. (plus form)

[CapnAwesome]

Sometimes philosophers seem to not understand that knowledge has advanced since Plato, Aristotle et al. As amazing as their contributions to so many fields have been, we know so much more now. Aristotle advocated ideas that were clearly incorrect. We've attained a tremendous amount of knowledge by refuting and challenging these ideas. That's how knowledge advances. Although I haven't read said book it seems from your synopsis like a complicated version of an argument from authority.

Feser talks about this in the 5th chapter, "Descent of the Modernists". He pushes that our immorality is because we abandoned Aristotelian metaphysics, and the morality it implies. He also talks about how science never refuted Aristotle's metaphysics (although disproving his science, of course), and that the main reason modern philosopher's began leaving them is because "we'll end up spending more time contemplating first principles and the state of our souls and less time thinking up new gadgets." The push for science, and the desire to better this material life, spawned modernists. He also blames Martin Luther and John Calvin for pushing that wealth is good/poverty is bad, and supporting individual conscience over Aristotelian Scholasticism.

Our immorality? Give me a break. We live in the least violent time in history. Aristotle also advocated slavery as a natural system and claimed that women were intellectually inferior. Is that the morality that he wishes we had back? Sounds again like a Theist longing for the good ole days when they were in change and we had to give a shit or be burned at the stake.

[genkaus]

This is absolutely opposite of what Feser discusses. In his words on "form and matter":

The ordinary objects of our experience are irreducible composites of potentiality and actuality, of the capacity for change and something that persists through the change. In particular, they are irreducible composites of matter and form. The blue rubber ball is composed of a certain kind of matter - namely rubber - and a certain form - namely, the form of a blue, round, bouncy object. The matter by itself isn't the ball; after all, rubber could also take the form of an eraser, or a doorstop, or any number of things. The form by itself isn't the ball either; you can't bounce blueness, roundness, or even bounciness down the hallway, for they are mere abstractions. It is only the form and matter together that constitute the ball. Hence we hzve Aristotle's famous doctrine of hylomorphism...

This section simply repeats Aristotle's theory of substance. As far as philosophy goes, this is nothing more than a copy-paste job. The only mistake here he makes is regarding objects as irreducible composites of form and matter. The phrase 'irreducible composite' is self-contradictory. If its a composite, it can be reduced to whatever it is composed of.

And in the next section:

So, form and matter considered by themselves are, in general anyway, mere abstractions; they exist in the mind,, but not in reality.[1] Still, they are different aspects of reality - in this case, of the ball. The form is not the matter and the matter is not the form. Even if, contra Plato, the form of the ball doesn't exist by itself[2]; neither is it true to say after the fashion of materialism that the ball is "just a piece of matter."[3] Nothing is just a piece of matter, for matter cannot exists without form, and form (being the principle that accounts for permanence) isn't material (matter being the principle that accounts for change)[4].

And here's where the errors and equivocations come flooding in. Going through them one by one:

[1] - This is the first indication that he confuses Aristotelian form with Platonic Forms. His statement is applicable to Aristotle's forms. However, in the previous argument, he said - "Consider first that when we grasp the nature, essence, for form of a thing, it is necessarily one and the same form, nature, or essence that exists both in the thing and in the intellect". Either the form is an aspect of reality that exists in mind (thus compatible with Aristotelian metaphysics) or it exists in reality (where it is something like Platonic Forms).

[2] - Here, even with rejection of Plato's theory, he is implicitly assuming that Plato's Forms and Aristotle's forms refer to one and the same concept.

[3] - This just indicates an abysmally poor understanding of materialism.

[4] - Did he really say that? If so, that just indicates a poor understanding of Aristotle. According to him, it is the matter which is permanent and the form which changes. The substance (house) is built out of matter (bricks) and form (laid in specific way). When the form is destroyed (layout is eradicated), the substance ceases to exist while the matter (bricks) continue to exist. The reversal here - saying that form is permanent and matter changes - is another example of equivocating with Platonic Forms which are considered unchanging and eternal.