Determinism

[Caecilian]

Hmmm...

'Determinism' is simply the view that some set of phenomena is determined by some other set of phenomena.

There are actually quite a few different types of determinism. For example:

Economic determinism- The position that history determined by economic factors, as opposed to the actions of 'great men'. Marxism is a form of economic determinism.

Genetic determinism- The position that phenotypical traits are determined by a genetic program. Dawkins and Dennett are very close to being full-blown genetic determinists. Oyama and West-Eberhart are prominent opponents of the position.

Linguistic determinism- The position that our understanding of the world is fundamentally shaped by our language- its vocabulary, grammatical structure etc. The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, basically.

The general case is of course the kind of scientific determinism that the rabbit has been discussing. This is the view that everything is causally determined by something. As the rabbit notes, its a position that is radically undermined by some interpretations of QM, including the dominant (Copenhagen) interpretation. One could even conclude from this that the notion that causation is a fundamental ontological category (part of the 'furniture of the universe') is also undermined.

Theres also the determinism/ free will debate, but we already have a thread on that one in the Philosophy section.

[Purple Rabbit]

Determinism means the future is determined which means there is only one possible future - if there was more than one possible future then it isn't determined.

I'm talking about philosophical determinism not scientific determinism. As I said, indeterminacy and determinacy in science are perhaps another matter altogether.

There is no difference in the way that philosophy and science define causal determinism. If you claim that, please let me know what this difference is. In the definition that is. Also, please observe that the quote I gave was from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. It is true however that science and philosophy have another angle of approach to the problem. In trying to establish whether our reality is causally determined science and philosophy follow different paths. Philosophical arguments, like that of Dennett, try to establish from argument and experience whether determinism holds. Dennett puts on top of that the question if it in the end matters to us? Scientific arguments try to show that there is a description of nature that is fully causal, i.e. a description that fully describes all phenomena of reality if all inputs were known. Dennett's argument is of the kind that it in the end has no impact on what we perceive as human freedom whether the physics is fully causal or not. For instance he argues that randomness, if it truly exists in nature, does not amount to freedom at the level of human perception.

Determinism in science I believe refers to the predictability of the future, which has got nothing to do with philosophical determinism which just means that the future is fixed, determined, whether we can predict it at all or not. Philosophical determinism just means there is only one possible future.

As I've said, the definitions of causal determinism are the same for science and philosophy but only their methods of proof differ. Predictability often is used to describe the concept of determinism in both cases.

Wikipedia: "Determinism is the philosophical view that every event, including human cognition, behavior, decision, and action, is causally determined by the environment. It is, in essence, the view that one's life is predetermined before one is even born. Determinism proposes there is a predetermined unbroken chain of prior occurrences back to the origin of the universe."

If the future is predetermined from the start and layed out, then by definition there can't be any more than one possible future: therefore there is one possible future. Only one possible future=determinism.

The Wiki quote shows that there is no tenet about one possible future. Causal determinism (= philosophical understanding of determinism = scientific understanding of determinsim) does not necessarily mean that the future is fixed in the sense of one possible future. The catch here is in the word "necessarily". On first examination it seems that causal determination, defined as above, indeed should mean that there is only one possible future, for if every event has specific causes, how can that lead to multiple outcomes? But the point is that the term "possible future" is a rather vague one. Does it mean something like "possible for us to live in" or "possible to exist" or something else still? In the Everett Many Worlds model multiple realities co-exist with each other, yet in any particular history of events in the Everett Many Worlds model (EMW) causal determinism holds. To understand its implication it is not necessary to know anything of quantum mechanics, the theory that led to the fomulation of EMW. The important thing is that causal determinism does not necessarily mean "one possible future" in a strict sense. Please note however that I am not saying here that the EMW model is the final description of reality. The jury (as in Mother Nature) is still out on that one. But as a model it shows that determinsim does not necessarily imply "one possible future".

You can observe from this definition that it does not claim "one possible future"

It doesn't need to though does it? It just has to imply it. And it absolutely does imply it: If the future is completely predetermined and fixed, then there is only one possibility of what it will be: the way it is fixed, predetermined, to be.

This is where you should adjust your reasoning. The EVM model refutes the argument you're making.

The way I define it as meaning "only one possible future" is how Daniel Dennett defines it by the way...

Determinism, according to Dennett, is the thesis that ''there is at any instant exactly one physically possible future''

Does Dennett embark on the EVM model? I have "Freedom Evolves" with me here but can't find a single line in it on the subject . All Dennett says about quantum mechanics is that quantum indeterminacy does not yield free will. He nowhere to my knowledge embarks on the Many Worlds hypothesis. And he need not, for his argument, which I fully comply with, is that human freedom does not depend on either quantum indeterminacy or full causal determinacy.

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@Caecilian

I'm just talking about causal determinism, nothing else. I think economic and linguistic determinism loosely borrow on that concept but are quite different from causal determinsim.

Genetic determinism I'm not quite sure of. But if you are referring to the nature vs nurture debate IMO it is a mistake to attribute genetic determinism (~nature) to Dawkins and Dennett. Both gentlemen acknowledge that the genetic makeup is not enough to explain human behaviour.

[Caecilian]

@Caecilian

I'm just talking about causal determinism, nothing else. I think economic and linguistic determinism loosely borrow on that concept but are quite different from causal determinsim.

Genetic determinism I'm not quite sure of. But if you are referring to the nature vs nurture debate IMO it is a mistake to attribute genetic determinism (~nature) to Dawkins and Dennett. Both gentlemen acknowledge that the genetic makeup is not enough to explain human behaviour.

Yeah, you make some very good points about causal determinism. You're quite right in saying that the philosophical/ scientific distinction is one of emphasis rather than substance.

I think that its worth noting that in science determinism is mainly being contrasted with indeterminacy. Whereas in philosophy, determinism is mainly being contrasted with libertarian free will. Now as far as libertarian free will goes, it doesn't matter if the underlying microphysics is deterministic or stochastic. For philosophical libertarianism to work, free will has to be somehow 'self-causing' (or perhaps not caused or determined at all).

Re. genetic determinism: I'm very well acqainted with what Dawkins and Dennett say about the matter. You're correct in saying that they don't view human behaviour as being genetically determined. However, they do come very close to viewing the physical phenotype as being genetically determined. Genotypes are seen as being programs, and the genetic program or algorithm is largely responsible for determining ontogeny. Human behaviour is co-determined by genes and memes.

[Edwardo Piet]

If the future is predetermined then it by definition can only be one way which is just another way of saying "only one possible future". If it can only possibly be one predetermined way then how could the future possibly be any other way? (if it's predetermined to be only one way!) It can't.

Yes wikipedia doesn't phrase it in the same way as Daniel Dennett does but it indeed implies it (and Dennett knows the definition of determinism!!).

This is where you should adjust your reasoning. The EVM model refutes the argument you're making.

I wasn't making an argument for determinism, I was just stating that the wikipedia definition of determinism (or any definition of determinism that defines the future as determined (therefore only being able to be one possible way!)) implies that there is "only one possible future". It means the same thing. If the future is predetermined then it can't be any other way because then it wouldn't be predetermined, it would then be indeterministic, so not full determined - it would be undetermined. And if the future can only be one way then what does that mean? That there's only one possible future.

EvF

[Purple Rabbit]

Hey, it's allright if you don't agree. But please, please, respond to the arguments if you wanna have some real exchange of thought. The EMW model shows that determinism can go together with multiple futures. I haven't invented that, Everett did.

The Wikipedia definition does not make a statement about one possible future, you read that into it because you simply assert that it is implied.

To refute that assertion it suffices to give just one counter example of a fully deterministic description of nature that has multiple futures. EMW is that example, no matter how hypothetical it may be and no matter how counterintuitive it may seem to you. If you are that evidence guy, then follow the evidence. It is right there in front of you. Maybe this will help. And I do sympathize with the emotion that it's counterintuitive, but at this level of physics, especially when quantum mechanics is involved, intuition is a bad guide.

WingedFoe seems to get it though: "Everything is determined by past events." is a far better short for causal determinism than "one posible future". The latter predicts the future from the now, the former reasons how the now was formed from the past. There is a difference, and in this case it's very relevant.

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I think that its worth noting that in science determinism is mainly being contrasted with indeterminacy. Whereas in philosophy, determinism is mainly being contrasted with libertarian free will. Now as far as libertarian free will goes, it doesn't matter if the underlying microphysics is deterministic or stochastic. For philosophical libertarianism to work, free will has to be somehow 'self-causing' (or perhaps not caused or determined at all).

True, these are issues on another level.

Re. genetic determinism: I'm very well acqainted with what Dawkins and Dennett say about the matter. You're correct in saying that they don't view human behaviour as being genetically determined. However, they do come very close to viewing the physical phenotype as being genetically determined. Genotypes are seen as being programs, and the genetic program or algorithm is largely responsible for determining ontogeny. Human behaviour is co-determined by genes and memes.

You confuse me with your use of "phenotype" because you seem to suggest that behaviour is not part of the phenotype. If that's indeed what you suggest, my wording would be "genotype".

Wikipedia: "A phenotype is any observable characteristic or trait of an organism: such as its morphology, development, biochemical or physiological properties, behavior, and products of behavior (such as a bird's nest)."

In The Extended Phenotype Dawkins suggested that phenotype could be extended with behaviour. But IMO he did not suggest with that, that behaviour is fully determined by genetic markup alone.

[Caecilian]

Re. genetic determinism: I'm very well acqainted with what Dawkins and Dennett say about the matter. You're correct in saying that they don't view human behaviour as being genetically determined. However, they do come very close to viewing the physical phenotype as being genetically determined. Genotypes are seen as being programs, and the genetic program or algorithm is largely responsible for determining ontogeny. Human behaviour is co-determined by genes and memes.

You confuse me with your use of "phenotype" because you seem to suggest that behaviour is not part of the phenotype. If that's indeed what you suggest, my wording would be "genotype".

Wikipedia: "A phenotype is any observable characteristic or trait of an organism: such as its morphology, development, biochemical or physiological properties, behavior, and products of behavior (such as a bird's nest)."

In The Extended Phenotype Dawkins suggested that phenotype could be extended with behaviour. But IMO he did not suggest with that, that behaviour is fully determined by genetic markup alone.

The Dennett-Dawkins position, as I understand it, makes a sharp distinction between the behaviour of humans and the behaviour of other organisms.

In the case of non-human organisms, behaviour is understood as being part of the phenotype, and as such is largely determined by the genetic program (genotype).

In the case of humans, there are some behavioural tendencies that can be attributed to the genotype. However, humans also have a cultural replication system (the memes), which to a large degree replaces and over-rides the genetic system with regard to behaviour.

Thus Dennett and Dawkins can, I think, be reasonably described as genetic determinists with respect to biology, but not to culture, and therefore not to human behaviour. They could, however be described as genetic-memetic determinists (or perhaps replicator determinists) with respect to human behaviour.

Hope this clears up any confusions.

[Edwardo Piet]

@ Purple Rabbit

As I said, I never made an argument defending determininism. I am merely saying that the defininition of determinism is "One possible future", if we're talking about an ultimately 100% laid out future that quantum mechannics can't mess with. I'm not defending determinism at all, I'm just giving the definition, and the one Dennett used in the quote above about how it means there's only one possible future.

So I have made no arguments at all, I'm just defining here, so no I never ignored any of your arguments because I never fought against them or made any of my own....

All I'm saying is that a 100% determined laid out future where the future can be one possible way and "there is only one possible future" mean the same thing. I'm not defending determinism at all. I don't need evidence for arguments I never made or attacked.

It's all very well attacking arguments I haven't made PR, but don't expect me to defend myself if I haven't (at least not intentionally) made any arguments.

EvF

[Purple Rabbit]

EvF, you don't seem to register anything I've posted here.

To be clear about where I stand:

1) I haven't stated that you defend determinism, nor am I attacking you on such a position

2) I disagree whith you that "one possible future" is necessarily implied in both the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy version and Wiki version of the definition of causal determinism.

3) You ascribe to another definition of causal determinism (that of Dennett) and use an argument from authority to argue that you have the "real" definition: "and Dennett knows the definition of determinism!!"

4) I have given you an example of a fully deterministic scenario in a strict mathematical sense that does not imply "one possible future". This shows that:

a) both mainstream science and mainstream philosophy use a more strict definition of causal determinism that nonetheless makes fewer assumptions than the one you are proposing

b) Dennett's definition fails to take into account the possibility of multiple futures in combination with fully deterministic laws of nature

5) You haven't responded even once on my EMW counter example

6) You are in denial about the fact that you are makking an argument, while you at the same time are argumenting that "one possible future" is implied in all quoted definitions we have considered here.

Please continue on this road you're taking, but whatever it is, it will not be mine.

[Caecilian]

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EvF, you don't seem to register anything I've posted here.

To be clear about where I stand:

1) I haven't stated that you defend determinism, nor am I attacking you on such a position

2) I disagree whith you that "one possible future" is necessarily implied in both the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy version and Wiki version of the definition of causal determinism.

3) You ascribe to another definition of causal determinism (that of Dennett) and use an argument from authority to argue that you have the "real" definition: "and Dennett knows the definition of determinism!!"

4) I have given you an example of a fully deterministic scenario in a strict mathematical sense that does not imply "one possible future". This shows that:

a) both mainstream science and mainstream philosophy use a more strict definition of causal determinism that nonetheless makes fewer assumptions than the one you are proposing

b) Dennett's definition fails to take into account the possibility of multiple futures in combination with fully deterministic laws of nature

5) You haven't responded even once on my EMW counter example

6) You are in denial about the fact that you are makking an argument, while you at the same time are argumenting that "one possible future" is implied in all quoted definitions we have considered here.

Please continue on this road you're taking, but whatever it is, it will not be mine.

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Just to try to simplify/ clarify things a little:

Causal determinism is what it says it is. Its the doctrine that all phenomena are caused. In a Newtonian universe this would imply that the future is pre-determined (that there is only one future). However, we do not live in a Newtonian Universe.

QM has a number of possible interpretations. Two of the best known are the Copenhagen Interpretation and the Many Worlds Interpretation. If the Copenhagen Interpretation is correct, then microphysics is stochastic rather than determinant, and causal determinism is straightforwardly wrong. If the Many Worlds Interpretation is correct, then the universe is determinant, but there is more than one possible future.

In both cases, 'one possible future' is incorrect, but in the many worlds version causal determinism still holds.

[Edwardo Piet]

1) I haven't stated that you defend determinism, nor am I attacking you on such a position

Ok, understood, I thought you were implying that I was.

2) I disagree whith you that "one possible future" is necessarily implied in both the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy version and Wiki version of the definition of causal determinism.

I was only talking about the Wiki one.

In which case can you please explain how the following quote does not imply "one possible future"

Determinism is the philosophical view that every event, including human cognition, behaviour, decision, and action, is causally determined by the environment. It is, in essence, the view that one's life is predetermined before one is even born. Determinism proposes there is a predetermined unbroken chain of prior occurrences back to the origin of the universe.

Determinists believe the universe is fully governed by causal laws resulting in only one possible state at any point in time.

(my emphasis).

If it is the view that every event is a predetermined event of an unbroken chain of events then how can the future be more than one possibility if it is predetermined (since every event is) and it is part of the completely unbroken chain (of every event)?

3) You ascribe to another definition of causal determinism (that of Dennett) and use an argument from authority to argue that you have the "real" definition: "and Dennett knows the definition of determinism!!"

I'm not using the argument from authority at all. I'm just using his definition because it is through Dennett that I understand determinism. I'm not saying that his definition is the correct one because he knows what he's talking about. I'm just saying that 1. I believe he does know what he is talking about, and 2. Its his definition I'm using.

I'm not making an argument here.

b) Dennett's definition fails to take into account the possibility of multiple futures in combination with fully deterministic laws of nature

I'm not making an argument so much as saying that if a future, if any future truly is 100% predetermined then it is tautologically true that it is the future - that it is therefore what will happen (because that's what the future means, whatever happens=the future - determined or otherwise, the future is therefore inevitable whether it's determined or otherwise, etc, etc.) and that there is "only one possible future" because these are all different ways of saying the same thing.

5) You haven't responded even once on my EMW counter example

I have already responded by saying I haven't made an argument, I'm just using tautology. And so your response only applies if I used your definition of determinism. Because the way I understand it "only one possible future" and "a 100% predetermined future (meaning it has to be that future therefore it's not just a future but the future that will be" are just different ways of saying the same thing.

6) You are in denial about the fact that you are makking an argument, while you at the same time are argumenting that "one possible future" is implied in all quoted definitions we have considered here.

I'm saying that it's implied in the wikipedia one, I dunno about others. I'm saying it's implied because it's saying the same thing in different words. I don't know how you can claim I'm "in denial" without any proof. There is a difference between denial and ignorance. I could be either of the two, or you may be mistaken and all my "arguments" may have indeed not been arguments but just tautologies.

Please continue on this road you're taking, but whatever it is, it will not be mine.

Well, apologies if I misunderstood any of your arguments - and I'll continue to take my road unless I see a reason to follow a road that surprises me by being more correct and/or by just providing more clarity.

Causal determinism is what it says it is. Its the doctrine that all phenomena are caused. In a Newtonian universe this would imply that the future is pre-determined (that there is only one future).

In both cases, 'one possible future' is incorrect, [...]

(my bolding)

What is the difference between the two boldings here? Because in the above bolding it seems that you agree with me that casual determinism means/implies that there is only one possible future. Whereas with the second bolding you seem to then contradict yourself and disagree with me.

Unless, I presume you mean that determinism itself is found to be incorrect by quantum mechanics and yet the definition (and the one I also use) of "only one possible future" is still correct?

To get more pedantic, you say that determinism ="that there is only one future", well what's the difference between that and "that there is only one possible future"? If it's the only, the one, possibility then that is the future so it's the same thing right? So I presume you agree with my definition (and I've only been arguing for the definition of determinism I've never argued for the truth of it - although I'd hope you realized that ).

Just asking for some clarity here on your position over whether you believe my definition/Dennett's definition of determinism being "only one possible future" to be correct. Apologies if I've wrote this post a bit awkwardly :S

EvF