Omniscience, omnipresence, omnipotence... etc.

[JuliaL]

---

I have a theory about this.  I think the goofier the myth, the more easily people can stick to it.  Understanding religion requries a suspension of rational thought.  Which is easier to give up on-- something that makes 90% sense, but you're working out the details?  Or something that makes 10% sense, and you just say "fuck it"?

To me, the former would encourage rational thought, as you try to polish off a near-perfect world view.  The latter is the one that causes you to really turn off that left brain and go instead with imagination and feelings.  Therefore, it will be easier to fully commit to a complete fairy tale than to something that seems plausible.

---

David Hume:

---

Secondly. We may observe in human nature a principle which, if strictly examined, will be found to diminish extremely the assurance, which we might, from human testimony, have, in any kind of prodigy. The maxim, by which we commonly conduct ourselves in our reasonings, is, that the objects, of which we have no experience, resembles those, of which we have; that what we have found to be most usual is always most probable; and that where there is an opposition of arguments, we ought to give the preference to such as are founded on the greatest number of past observations. But though, in proceeding by this rule, we readily reject any fact which is unusual and incredible in an ordinary degree; yet in advancing farther, the mind observes not always the same rule; but when anything is affirmed utterly absurd and miraculous, it rather the more readily admits of such a fact, upon account of that very circumstance, which ought to destroy all its authority. The passion of surprise and wonder, arising from miracles, being an agreeable emotion, gives a sensible tendency towards the belief of those events, from which it is derived. And this goes so far, that even those who cannot enjoy this pleasure immediately, nor can believe those miraculous events, of which they are informed, yet love to partake of the satisfaction at second-hand or by rebound, and place a pride and delight in exciting the admiration of others.

With what greediness are the miraculous accounts of travellers received, their descriptions of sea and land monsters, their relations of wonderful adventures, strange men, and uncouth manners? But if the spirit of religion join itself to the love of wonder, there is an end of common sense; and human testimony, in these circumstances, loses all pretensions to authority. A religionist may be an enthusiast, and imagine he sees what has no reality: he may [118] know his narrative to be false, and yet persevere in it, with the best intentions in the world, for the sake of promoting so holy a cause: or even where this delusion has not place, vanity, excited by so strong a temptation, operates on him more powerfully than on the rest of mankind in any other circumstances; and self-interest with equal force. His auditors may not have, and commonly have not, sufficient judgement to canvass his evidence: what judgement they have, they renounce by principle, in these sublime and mysterious subjects: or if they were ever so willing to employ it, passion and a heated imagination disturb the regularity of its operations. Their credulity increases his impudence: and his impudence overpowers their credulity.

Eloquence, when at its highest pitch, leaves little room for reason or reflection; but addressing itself entirely to the fancy or the affections, captivates the willing hearers, and subdues their understanding. Happily, this pitch it seldom attains. But what a Tully or a Demosthenes could scarcely effect over a Roman or Athenian audience, every Capuchin, every itinerant or stationary teacher can perform over the generality of mankind, and in a higher degree, by touching such gross and vulgar passions.

The many instances of forged miracles, and prophecies, and supernatural events, which, in all ages, have either been detected by contrary evidence, or which detect themselves by their absurdity, prove sufficiently the strong propensity of mankind to the extraordinary and the marvellous, and ought reasonably to beget a suspicion against all relations of this kind. This is our natural way of thinking, even with regard to the most common and most credible events. For instance: There is no kind of report which rises so easily, and spreads so quickly, especially in country places and provincial towns, as those concerning marriages; insomuch that two young persons of equal condition never see [119] each other twice, but the whole neighbourhood immediately join them together.

---

The pleasure of telling a piece of news so interesting, of propagating it, and of being the first reporters of it, spreads the intelligence. And this is so well known, that no man of sense gives attention to these reports, till he find them confirmed by some greater evidence. Do not the same passions, and others still stronger, incline the generality of mankind to believe and report, with the greatest vehemence and assurance, all religious miracles?

http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/341#Hume_0222_239

That Hume guy again...
I have uniformly found that every inspiration or thought with merit I have had in my long life has been anticipated.
But in this case Hume is being only descriptive of the pleasures that persons take in siding with the mob.
(the usual caveats and magical incantations to let me ignore solipsism and failed induction go here)
I want a model which accurately predicts results of actions taken.
At the moment, the best I have revolves around natural (of which artificial is a subset) selection among behaviors.  It may be that this is only the hammer I have.  It makes sense to me (unless I listen to Alex K in which case I slip into causal nihilism and nothing makes sense.)  We enjoy joining the mob because our forebears enjoyed doing so and the aggregation was more effective in our persistence and replication than going solo would have been.
I have a substantial background in biological sciences so my bias could be brainwashing too.