The Moral Argument for God

[Esquilax]

I'll continue going through your lengthy response, but first I need to point out that all you've done is the same thing another poster has done: you've offered Snipty as a candidate for the office of God.

Only if your sole criteria for what constitutes a god is "makes objective moral values," in which case the argument is circular anyway. It's just "if there are objective moral values, there is the thing that makes objective moral values."

If your definition of god includes any other attributes than just "makes objective moral values," and I would suggest that most mainstream conceptions of god do, then Snipty is different from god.

None. And that only makes sense because if Snipty is the source of all OBJECTIVE (and that's the key word) moral values, then Snipty is a legitimate contender for the title.

Then the argument is useless for demonstrating the thing that it sets out to demonstrate, if an infinite series of other, patently made up beings also fulfill the criteria.

Any being that is the source of objective moral values must be a SUPREME BEING - regardless of whether it's a god or a raccoon.

Ha ha, how the hell do you intend to demonstrate that?

If there's no evidence for Snipty why did you propose him/her as a possible source for OMV's? I'm just poking the bear...the real problem with your argument follows next.

There's no evidence for god, which didn't stop you, is my point.

Arguments such as the Moral Argument ARE the evidence for god or Snipty.

Arguments are not evidence. Arguments are, you know, arguments. Good arguments reference evidence in order to support their conclusions, but the moral argument doesn't reference anything but fiat assertions at all.

If I can show that the existence of OMV's require the existence of Snipty and that OMV's do, in fact, exist, then I have proven the existence of Snipty. That goes for some of the other classic arguments, too, btw. Cosmological, Teleological, etc.

So what you're saying is that the truth of the premises of the moral argument are contingent upon you being able to show evidence that they're correct... which is both tacit admission that arguments are not evidence in isolation, and agreement that the moral argument contains no evidential justification for its premises.

... Why do you think this is a compelling argument, again?

However, YOU are hung up on your need for empirical evidence. I'm not sure what you would expect...giant letters written in the sky? Or the classic demand for the healing of an amputee complete with video tape and the sworn testimony of the entire staff of Johns Hopkins?

It seems to me that you fail to appreciate the power of philosophical arguments.

If you're going to make a claim about objective reality- which "god exists," is- then yes, I'm going to need more than a philosophical argument, because a philosophical argument that cannot demonstrate that it reflects reality is what we call, in technical terms, "making things up." You can spin as many loops of logic, spout as many premises as you desire, but if what you're saying does not align with the objective reality that it intends to make claims about, then a reasonable person will bend to the actual evidence and not the bloviating arguer committed to ignoring it.

Besides, the existence of god isn't a philosophical question. It's a claim being made about objective reality, which is exactly the sort of thing that empirical evidence is most apt to test.

This is simply more of the same, so I'll just repeat my point stated earlier: Snipty is (according to you) possibly god. Like the Flying Spaghetti Monster. Seriously, I don't really care what you call it: Yahweh, Allah, FSM, Snipty...these are just cultural designations. If a being exists which is the source and measure of all OMV's, then that being has met at least one reasonable threshold for being considered SUPREME.

Do you want a circular argument? Because defining your conclusion solely by how it fulfills the criteria of your premises is how you get a circular argument.

I'm with you so far, I think. Which is to say, I understand, but I don't think we're any closer to understanding how we establish OMV's without a fixed reference.

The point here is that OMVs are not necessary, nor are subjective morals particularly scary, or an "anything goes," scenario.

Ah, shades of Sam Harris. So, you're defining morality as that which produces a positive, pragmatic benefit for a sentient being. Is that what it means to be morally good?

If you have a moral system that doesn't concern itself with the well being of the moral actors operating within it, then you very quickly run out of moral actors, and hence, you lose your moral system. It can't be transmitted or maintained without moral actors to do so.

Besides which, are you now asserting that all the things you find to be morally bad just coincidentally align with those actions you wouldn't like perpetrated against your person? That there's some other factor, and the two things just happen to align?

Interesting. So, you acknowledge (I think) that OMV's exist, but you object to my asking for an explanation of their source?

I object to the idea that rejecting the existence of OMV's, or even just not having a source in mind for them, is some grand challenge with chilling consequences, or that one must have an objective moral source or else just be down to "everything goes."

And are you honestly going to argue that if one group of people in one corner of the planet decide that X is acceptable, then it is FOR THEM but not FOR YOU simply because you grew up in a a different country???

No, because I don't accept the false dichotomy of "objective/anything goes." You can have a subjectively derived system that is superior to other subjectively derived, or even objectively derived, systems, for example. I don't accept that "subjectively acceptable," necessarily leads to an inability to argue against other subjectively derived systems, nor have I seen you do anything other than assume that false dichotomy in your argumentation.

Are you going to tell people from that corner who migrate to your country, "Whoops, sorry...that may have been perfectly acceptable where you came from, but now you're bound by my (technically, our) sense of morality since you crossed a line on a map"?

Subjective is not the same as arbitrary. Please stow the lazy strawmen elsewhere, if you please.

Hmmm...sounds like you actually advocate subjective morality.

No, what I'm saying is that the things you're pointing to in justification of objective morality do not imply objective morality. I am entertaining an idea, without accepting that idea as true.

I think the theist response would be that OMV's exist not because of God's opinions but because of his nature. What is called "good" not because he declares it to be so but because he is so.

But is it good because god declared his nature to be good, or because his nature reflects some external standard of goodness? If it's the former it's subjective, if it's the latter than god is irrelevant to objective moral standards, merely a mouthpiece of them, and the moral argument fails because the moral values god espouses exist independently from him. Euthyphro's Dilemma scales back infinitely.

Let me try an analogy. Suppose we envision an earthly ruler who has absolute authority over the land and people he governs. Are his opinions about what should and should not be permissable in his country considered "good" merely because he issues orders regarding various behaviors? Hardly. History is littered with the damage caused by evil tyrants. What they decreed was not good because they were not good; they were evil.

But you'd be totally okay if the tyrant said that his commands were good because they were a part of his nature, yes?

But if a god exists, then that god must a good god and not an evil god.

Again, how did you determine that? So far you've just asserted it.

And what he commands must be good because he himself is good and not evil.

How did you determine that god's nature is good and not evil, without making the circular argument of referring back to god's nature?

An evil god could not or would not create a universe like ours because the goodness we see and experience would go against his very nature. A supreme being cannot contradict himself.

And yet a good god can create a world full of evil without contradicting his nature. How completely arbitrary and self serving of you.

Now, I could be wrong cause this isn't my thing, but although the definition of "subjective" refers to personal feelings, tastes and opinions, god as theists envision him has none of these. So, he can't be subjective.

So when the bible is all like "god hates divorce," that's not god having a personal feeling regarding divorce?

As I pointed out above, this is a demand for empirical evidence. The Moral Argument is a philosophical argument, and I find it unconvincing.

A philosophical argument that makes claims about objective reality opens itself up to being tested via empirical means. It's not my problem that when your philosophical argument is tested against the real world, it fails. I'm not obligated to provide a handicap to your argument just because you'd really like it if it were valid.

And for that matter, if you want to exempt your argument from being proved wrong by empirical evidence, then you must also exempt the conclusions from being applied to the real world, since it clearly will not support them. So fine: the moral argument is totally valid... in some pretend philosophical world. But not the real one we inhabit.

I'm going to go out on a limb and say that on this point you are in error.

If P then Q is logically equivalent to If not Q, then not P.

Sure, but the problem is that, presented in full, I've established that the moral argument's "If P," provides an equal possibility of "then Q," and "then Not Q." The premise literally provides two mutually exclusive answers. That's the problem.

So, the Moral Argument is that the existence of objective moral values requires the existence of source (called "God"), and since our own experience tells us that OMV's are real, their source must be real, too.

The moral argument does little other than assert that baselessly, unfortunately.

Skeptics offer little in the way of a compelling alternative to that source being a supreme being.

Oh well, you know: that which can be asserted without evidence can be dismissed without evidence....