Seeing red

[emjay]

I understand and agree with your point, Chad; it's very easy to talk past each other in these sorts of discussions if we don't share or aren't clear on the definitions we're using, and that's made even worse by the fact that our opinions on these sorts of questions tend to be very personal and idiosyncratic, making use of a lot of 'private logic' that is not necessarily transparent to everyone else. For instance I'm pretty sure I don't know exactly what Benny means by an idea, or for that matter what I mean by one, and likewise the terms I use... like abstraction... possibly require an understanding of neural networks to be understood in the sense that I mean them.

So what should we do, each define our terms so we can see how they differ and if we can reach a consensus for each of them, so that we're assured we're all talking about the same thing? And also make sure to define any future terms that could be contentious, rather than just assuming others know - or can work out - what we're talking about?

And finally with regard to my opinion... opinion 3... and your appraisal of it:

Opinion 3 uses the terms ‘abstractions’ and ‘information’ and sees them manifested by functions and structures. What benefits does qualitative experiences add to functions and structures? It seems that by so defining mental phenomena they become either redundant or unnecessary.

Yes, that's correct. In my current world view, mental phenomena are both redundant and unnecessary... and only mirror/represent the underlying system activity but do not influence it ... so we may as well be philosophical zombies, and the puzzle is why we're not.